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Abstract
In this thesis, I investigate spatial aspects of education and family economics. In the first
chapter, I explore the effect of voucher school competition on pupil achievement in Chile.
Specifically, I create spatial indices to measure spatially determined competition: a choice
index which counts the number of schools that are accessible from a given municipality; and
a competition index which summarizes the choice index for a given community of students.
The chapter tests the hypothesis that schools which spatially compete more are also more
efficient. The results show no effect of spatially determined competition on value added.
I discuss how the absence or slow response of parents to “poorly performing” schools and
a “too low” voucher can be proposed as two of the causes of the poor functioning of the
voucher system. In the second chapter, I exploit a police report on occupied schools in the so-
called Chilean Winter—a huge social outburst of pupil protests, walk-outs, riots and school
occupations, which started in early June of 2011—and test the hypothesis that a decrease
in attendance has a causal effect on reducing students’ performance in standardized tests.
My evidence indicates that the performance of pupils affected by missed days from school
dropped to nearly 0.18σ, which is sizeable in terms of human capital accumulation. In the
last chapter, I produce the first quantitative evaluation of maternal surrogacy. I exploit
variation in surrogacy legislation in every US state over time and study surrogacy’s causal
effect on vital statistics such as marriage, divorce, births and out-of-wedlock births. Using
arguably exogenous changes in legislation to identify the causal impact of surrogacy, I show
that one additional standard deviation in the surrogacy rate causes an increase of 0.05σ in
the number of marriages and of 0.04σ in the number of divorces. It also causes a decrease of
-0.02σ in births and of -0.03σ in out-of-wedlock births. The three chapters introduce novel
results that advance current knowledge and should be carefully considered by policy makers
in these areas.
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Introduction and Critical
Discussion
In this thesis, I investigate spatial aspects of education and family economics.
Firstly, I study the performance of the Chilean school voucher system from a spa-
tial perspective. This is of key public policy interest because the voucher scheme
is believed to outperform more centrally planned interventions. The relevant liter-
ature is full of Chilean voucher scheme assessments, but until my study there has
not been a spatial evaluation of voucher performance. Elucidating whether spatial
incentives, i.e. spatial economic stimuli, can increase school value-added is of central
importance in the theory of education economics. Assessing whether schools that
serve a wider—more distant—audience of students are also the ones adding more
value to them, can permit us to address the question of whether spatially determined
competition plays a role in Chilean education. Secondly, I am also measuring the
decrement in human capital accumulation caused by lost school days in the context
of student riots. Since the so-called “Penguin Revolution”, an increasingly strained
atmosphere between students and the government has resulted in long and ongoing
student walk-outs and riots. This thesis tries to measure exactly how much school
absence reduces performance among students using the exogenous variation embed-
ded in the student riots. In the Chilean debate, this pure assessment is not part of
the discussion. Both students and policy makers will gain from knowing exactly the
amount of diminished education caused by missed school days. Finally, I study a
novel area of economic assessment: surrogacy and surrogacy legislation in the US.
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From a policy perspective, this is the first applied approach with a new dataset
on surrogacies in each US state. Surrogacy is a new practice, broadly debated but
poorly understood. I use this unique dataset to answer questions regarding whether
the marriages, divorces and out-of-wedlock births are affected by the practice of
surrogacy. Surrogacy is still an open debate and policy makers will certainly benefit
from the outcomes of my study.
More precisely, I explore the spatial relationships between schools and school
performance through school choice and competition in the long-standing voucher
educational system in Chile. I also study the spatial liaison between student per-
formance on standardized tests and missed school days in the context of student
protesting, during the Chilean Winter, against what they perceive to be an unfair
educational system. Finally, I investigate the spatial characteristics of the relation-
ship between surrogacy in the various US states and its effects on vital statistics
such as those related to marriage, divorce and births. The chapters attempt to
answer the following questions: “Is spatially determined competition increasing the
productivity of schools in the Chilean voucher system?”; “Are the missing school
days due to the student riots in the Chilean Winter decreasing the performance of
those students measured as the standardized SIMCE test?”; and “Is the increase
in surrogacy in the US causing more marriages, more divorces and fewer births?”.
Causal empirical work is needed to attempt to answer these questions. I next intro-
duce the frameworks I will use in my thesis.
A causal dissection of the three chapters
Each of the problems I investigate is subject to endogeneity concerns, in that my
causal variable/treatment is partly affected by factors, some unobserved, that also
affect the outcome variable. For example, when studying school competition, ability
is in the error term and is correlated with the causal variable/treatment, i.e. school
17
competition is endogenous. Therefore, a central focus of the thesis is on providing
estimates of the effects of the causal variable/treatment on the outcome that can
be interpreted as causal. By causal, I mean a connection between the causal vari-
able/treatment and the outcome as a functional relationship that describes what a
given outcome would be if the causal variable/treatment took a certain value, i.e. if
I could change the causal variable/treatment in a perfectly controlled environment,
or change the causal variable/treatment randomly so that those with different levels
of causal variable/treatment would be otherwise comparable. The framework I am
using to discuss causality here follows that of Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Mor-
gan and Winship (2010). As a matter of fact, each of my essays has an explained
outcome, a causal variable/treatment, an instrument and specific confounders (or
variables that fog the causal link):
chapter explained outcome causal variable instrument confounders
(treatment)
spatially ability
Chilean voucher SIMCE test scores determined competition slope/ruggedness residential location
travel time
ability
Chilean Winter SIMCE test scores missed school days school occupation “compensatory”
study
Surrogacy vital statistics surrogacy rate surrogacy legislation moral attitudes
in the US (marriage, divorce, births) (“cons/libs”)
In the Chilean voucher chapter (Chapter 1), I assess the effect of spatially deter-
mined competition—the causal variable which is measured by choice and competi-
tion indices—on standardized test scores—the explained outcome—for the city of
Santiago. The main confounder is ability. “High-ability” students score higher test
scores. At the same time, a pupil with more ability or better family background
might travel a longer distance to school. Therefore, more spatially determined com-
petitive schools will have better students on average, causing a positive bias on my
coefficients. Class size is another confounder, because more popular schools where
students travel longer distances will be crowded and so will have larger class sizes.
18
The effect of class size is deeply controversial but the estimates may be biased as a
result. Residential location is yet another confounder, richer families choosing more
competitive schools will most probably also choose closer residential location. So
there might be a negative bias of school competition if students living close to the
very productive schools lowering its competition indices. Finally, travel time is a
related confounder with analogous interpretation and bias with richer pupils with
more educated families travelling shorter distances with little travel time. To by-
pass these threatens to identification, I use slope and ruggedness as instruments to
address the endogeneity issue introduced by the indices. Slope and ruggedness pick
up building and travel costs, which translate into fewer schools for voucher schools
but into school agglomeration for private schools because of competing reputation
of being “on the top of the hill”. Therefore, using this defensible external variation
in the causal variable permits disclosure of the exact impact of spatially determined
competition on test scores. Note that in my regressions I control for elevation and
distance to border of the city of Santiago so that any link between these variables,
family income and school reputation is controlled for. A balancing test shows that
the instruments are conditionally uncorrelated to the unobservable. After addressing
the endogeneity issues, I measure the causal effect of spatially determined compe-
tition on productivity and value added on pupil education. The chapter tests the
hypothesis that schools which tend to spatially compete tend to provide more value
added, or whether school performance is responsive to market forces.
In the Chilean Winter chapter (Chapter 2), I assess the effect of missed school
days—i.e. the causal variable—on standardized test scores—i.e. the explained out-
come. The confounder is again ability, which could create selection bias if more/less
able pupils attend school regularly/miss more school days. In addition, “compen-
satory” student activities can emerge as confounders if, during school absences,
students or students’ parents offset school deprivation with out-of-school counter-
balancing activities (e.g. extra reading or math exercises). A police report lists the
schools which were occupied, providing an external source of variation in decreased
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attendance so that I can test if missing school days decreases student performance
as measured by the SIMCE, the Chilean standardized test. In short, this chapter
aims to measure the causal effect of decreased attendance on test score performance,
exploiting the arguably exogenous variation of riots in causing missed school days.
The evidence shows that the performance of pupils affected by missed days from
school due to the riots dropped by nearly 5%—0.18σ, which is a large number in
terms of its cost in human capital. At the centre of the chapter, then, is the effect
of diminishing school input on pupil achievement.
Finally, in the surrogacy chapter (Chapter 3) I assess the effect of increased
surrogacy in a US state—the causal variable—on vital statistics such as marriage,
divorce and births—i.e., the explained outcome. The confounders here are moral
attitudes. “Liberal” states, besides having a higher number of surrogacies, also
have lower marriage rates—and this situation generates selection bias. Variation in
surrogacy legislation (the instrument) is the source of external variation that I use
to isolate the causal effect of the surrogacy rate on vital statistics. States which
pass more favourable legislation typically show more surrogacies than states where,
for instance, surrogacies are criminalized. A balancing test shows that variation
in legislation within states over time is arguably random after controlling for key
covariates and year and state fixed effects. Exploiting this variation, I found that
more surrogacy implies higher marriage rates, higher divorce levels and fewer births.
Final remarks
In summary, I attempt to consolidate a distinct contribution to education and
family economics from an economic geography perspective. This thesis seeks to
uncover new facts and relationships amongst school vouchers, student riots—as an
instrument for missed school days—and maternal surrogacy, through the exercise
of solid causal analysis. In each chapter, I present a critical assessment of the
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relevant literature, the methodology of the research, the findings and a discussion
with the main results and their implications, including external and internal validity
and extensive robustness checks. As a conclusion, these essays are applied causal
contributions as they answer specific “what-if” questions, and their judgement must
be based on the creativity and relevance of the questions and the rigour and accuracy
of the answers. It is now the time to prove their value in the community of social
scientists and beyond.
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Chapter 1
School Competition and Pupil
Attainment in the Chilean
Voucher System
1.1 Introduction
The market for Chilean education has been widely explored mainly because it
is the oldest and most radical voucher system in the world. As schools are paid a
subsidy for each pupil that enrols, the schools compete to attract and serve pupils.
The voucher system thereby should promote competition among fiscally subsidized
schools, with most of the competition exerted through the spatial engagement of
pupils and families getting around and choosing schools: pupils and parents vote
with their feet. This model predicts that schools that compete in a spatial manner
to serve pupils will be more efficient as measured by standardized test results. A key
characteristic of the system is its spatial nature and the main scope of this chapter
is to systematically address that “spatiality”. Previous well-known studies of the
Chilean voucher system such as Mizala and Romaguera (2000), Hsieh and Urquiola
(2002), Gallego (2006) and Chumacero et al. (2011) have not elucidated this aspect
of the market. In fact, they have not used space in defining how competition should
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be measured. They have, therefore, missed out on one of the key elements of the
Chilean voucher system. If you want to understand whether a school is competitive
or not, you must understand how geographically far its market stretches.
This paper, for the first time, uses space to infer competition from choice. My
focus is on the Santiago municipalities. Pupils are not constrained to choose a
school in the same municipality in which they are living; on the contrary, they can
choose a school anywhere. The only major constraint is the potential travel time.
Space thereby plays a central role in pupils’ choice and school competition. I first
infer from geographical patterns how pupils from a given municipality choose their
schools. This inference constitutes my measure of how far they are willing to choose
to travel. The measure of competition is based on these pupils’ revealed preferences
averaged across each school. A school will be more competitive if the pupils that are
attending the school had more choices. By these means, schools competing harder
for pupils in a spatial setting are also the schools that perform better on standard-
ized tests. It is therefore necessary to test how space affects the productivity of the
model if the central incentives of the pupils are spatial in nature.
By using choice and competition measures I am also introducing endogeneity to
the model. For example, pupils with a better family background will travel from fur-
ther away, which means that the school that they attend can have a biased measure
of competition and a biased effect on test scores making it problematic to uncover
the real causal effect. I have two solutions for this endogeneity problem. The first
and foremost is an instrumental variable strategy. My instruments are slope and
ruggedness, how fast the altitude is increasing and the terrain undulation, both of
which are unlikely to be correlated with the unobservables and individual charac-
teristics. These instruments are good predictors of competition because they are
negatively correlated with voucher competition: the extra building cost is inter-
nalized in the market as fewer built schools, which drives down the indices. After
controlling for distance to Santiago’s urban footprint and elevation, which are both
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proxies for “high class” (families with higher income live in elevated areas and close
to the urban border), a balancing test shows the conditional orthogonality of my
instruments to the unobservables, thus making the case for a smooth identification
strategy. The second strategy comes from the fact that I observe pupils at two
stages: in primary school and then again in secondary school. These two stages of
observations allow me to use a value-added model to partial out individual fixed
characteristics of individuals that affect at the same time the school choice and the
educational attainment.
Discussion of the effects of school competition on school performance should en-
visage an input oriented approach to production of education. First, teacher quality
as a confounder will upwardly bias test score outcomes because more competition
will also signify more teacher quality and finally better test score outcomes. Schools
that spatially compete to a greater extent attract better teachers, and the literature
shows that school teacher quality systematically increases education outcomes, e.g.
Hanushek (2003) finds a 0.11σ increase. At the same time, schools that spatially
compete to a greater extent should attract more students, which will probably im-
ply larger classes, which the literature has shown has disputable effects on student
performance. Recall for example, the famous debate between Alan Krueger (2002)
and Eric Hanushek (2002) in Mishel and Rothstein (Eds., 2002). In some of the
recent literature this issue has been settled by researchers, such as Bingley, Jensen
and Walker (2007) who state that reducing class size during compulsory schooling
by 5% would increase mean length of education by about 8 days, which translates
to approximately a 0.2% increase in lifetime earnings. Another input is accessibil-
ity/transport travel time which is also related to schools’ spatial determined compe-
tition. Asahi (2014) finds that schools that have a large decrease of more than 4.7
km of distance to the nearest subway station—ending at walking distance from the
subway network—have test scores 0.15σ lower.
Overall, my OLS results are positive but likely to be biased and my IV results
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are marginally negative or insignificant when I measure the effect of voucher compe-
tition on voucher pupil test results. I analyse the heterogeneity of my main model
and, in Appendix A, I present a model on changes. In Appendix B, I also “disaggre-
gate” competition and pupils, with interesting additional results. In sum, although
competition may still work for some specific schools or in some specific sectors, my
results show that competition works poorly in general. In short, competition is not
a tide that lifts all boats.
Within the Chilean literature, this chapter continues the spatial analysis started
by Chumacero et al. (2011) who find that students are willing to “walk” 0.2σ of
distance—a quarter of a km—to avoid paying one standard deviation more of the
price of the nearest school—50 dollars. Furthermore, parents are willing to pay 1.5σ
of the price—75 dollars—more to attend the nearest school if it improved its test in
one standard deviation —30 points in SIMCE. Chumacero et al. (2011) acknowledge
that they do not measure any causal link between spatially determined competition
and test scores, proving that my research is the first to do so. Improving upon this
study, my paper aims to measure the relevance of distance from the municipality of
residence to school as a predictor of school choice. It also adds a new measurement
of voucher efficiency to the well-known studies of Mizala and Romaguera (2000),
Hsieh and Urquiola (2002) and Gallego (2006). My results compare best to those
of Hsieh and Urquiola (2002). Using panel data for about 150 municipalities, the
researchers found no evidence that choice improved average educational outcomes
as measured by test scores, repetition rates, and years of schooling. As I said before,
what distinguishes my data and results from these previous studies is their spatial
nature. Only Chumacero et al. (2011) is spatial in nature, but they do not measure
the effect of spatial choice on test scores, which is exactly what I assess in this chap-
ter.
At the same time, this chapter contributes to the broad debate on school com-
petition, e.g., to the work of Gibbons et al. (2006) and Gibbons and Silva (2008),
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and aims to advance the extensive literature in the US on spatially determined
choice and competition, such as the work of Hoxby (2002) and Cullen et al. (2000).
While Hoxby (2002) based her analysis in a Tiebout world where competition comes
from mobility, Gibbons et al. (2006) and Cullen et al. (2000) measured choice and
competition conditional on where the agent is. Hoxby (2002) finds positive effects of
competition, but some critical comments on this paper were subsequently published:
Ladd (2003) indicated that she is deeply skeptical about the benefits of an educa-
tional market—primary and secondary education are compulsory, parental choices
of school are heavily influenced by the composition of students, and absence of pric-
ing mechanism, evidence on “cream-skimming” and impact of choice on students’
achievement in choice of school; and Rothstein (2007) said Hoxby’s key results do
not seem robust to small, reasonable alterations to the sample or to the instrumen-
tal variable used. Most importantly, Gibbons et al. (2006) and Cullen et al. (2000)
find no general effect of competition, only some effect on heterogeneous and selected
groups. My methods, and therefore my results, are more similar to those of the
latter papers. In fact, I find a non-negative correlation in primary and secondary
schools between voucher competition and voucher test results in an OLS setting,
and I find no significant or marginally significant results, in the IV setting which
compares closely to Gibbons et al. (2006) results for London.
Lastly it is necessary to include an explanation of why this research paper ques-
tion centres only on the educational outcomes—test scores—dismissing the costs.
This is easily explicated by the fact that for Chile and the period of study no full
data for productivity is available. For public voucher schools, the voucher amount
is readily available but the often soft municipality budget is not. While for private
voucher schools, the voucher is also available, but co-payment and profit are not.
Voucher value for the period was around £40 per month for primary schools and
£50 per month for secondary schools.1 Co-payment for a later period, i.e. 2013, was
1A complete explanation of how voucher values are calculated can be obtained from the Chilean
Ministry of Education Vouchers (2010) “Vouchers”.
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on average £17 for half of the private voucher schools that charge co-payment—for
the other half it is just £0. Profit data are also not available, for a previous period
and for US Hanushek (1994) reported profits on average equal to 60% of costs for
all private schools.2
1.2 The school system
In the Chilean voucher system, there are no districts. As a result, every pupil is
free to choose any school in any place he/she prefers. There are three main types of
schools: public voucher schools, private voucher schools and private schools. Both
types of voucher schools are fiscally subsided. Private schools receive funds directly
from parents. Some voucher schools also receive a co-payment from the parents. In
terms of the curriculum taught in Chile, the “what” to study is centrally defined
but the “how” is flexible and decentralized. The quality of teachers and even their
average age are different. Better teachers, for example, are in private schools and
older teachers are in public voucher schools. The length of a school day is regulated
for voucher schools by the full school day reform passed in 1997. As a result of
this legislation, the time spent at school has increased by 30%—115% of the OECD
average—since the onset of the reform. Length of school day is not regulated in pri-
vate schools. Managerial practices vary from municipality administration for public
voucher schools, where the mayor is the legal representative, to private administra-
tion for private voucher and private schools. Additionally, public voucher schools
receive poorer and harder-to-teach students. All of these factors generate a great
heterogeneity in the system with a continuum of quality/performance in which pri-
vate schools are the top performers, followed by private voucher schools, and finally
public voucher schools. Primary school starts at 6 years old and finishes eight years
later at 14 years old. Then secondary school lasts four years until pupils are 18
years old. Some schools are mixed, enrolling primary and secondary pupils, but
2Again the on-going educational reform includes non-profit, non co-payment and non selection
and full public accountability of state resources in the system, so full productivity measurement
will be readily available.
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most of the time (nearly 85%) each pupil chooses a different school for secondary
school after primary school. Often, the decision to change schools happens before
the complete cycle of primary schools ends; for instance, the so-called emblematic
lyce´es (a group of well-performing public secondary schools) start in 7th grade, a
full two years before primary school ends. In reality, there is no rule for the transfer
from primary school/education to secondary school/education. At the time of the
sample (2002/2008), compulsory education was primary and secondary education;
preschool education became compulsory only in 2013. Finally, it is important to
note that the standardized tests (SIMCE) are compulsory: all pupils from every
school must take them on any of the test dates.
The Chilean education system, as indicated, permits families to freely choose
schools that are either near or far away, as selection is rarely linked to proximity of
households and schools, so the whole notion of a catchment area is highly implausi-
ble in the actual system.3 Notwithstanding this, residential location may still be a
confounder, because families sort in space, i.e. a more educated family will choose
a residential location closer to better and/or more competitive and efficient schools,
not to belong to a particular catchment area but because travel cost are reduced.
This would represent a downward bias of the estimates, in other words, the effect
of spatially determined competition would be understated by OLS. At the same
time, house prices will be higher in the proximity of more efficient/more competi-
tive schools for the same reason, namely that better educated families will choose
residential locations with better schools. Moreover, different concepts of distance to
school that are picked up by municipality FE, the control distance to GEO border
and travel time distance (public and private transport travel times), all contribute
to endogeneity.
I focus on Santiago, the capital of Chile. Less than 7% of pupils travel in or out
of Santiago, suggesting that I can assume that its market is an independent one,
3But this is going to change with the on-going reform.
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and therefore I can try to measure the spatial nature of this educational market and
exploit choice and competition indices. After picking one of the 2-period data with
a time gap of six years in the SIMCE data (explained below), my sample contains
79,463 pupils in primary school in 2002 and 52,164 pupils in secondary school in
2008. The large attrition of the sample is due mainly to course repetition; for in-
stance, in 2002, 8.6% of overall pupils repeated the year. If I presume the same rate
for each of the six following years, a simple calculation explains the attrition almost
in full. As Table 1.1 shows, the sample contains 1,762 primary schools (644 public
voucher, 793 private voucher and 325 private) and 839 secondary schools (139 public
voucher, 484 private voucher and 216 private). This can also be seen spatially in
Figure 1.1, which shows graphically that private voucher schools are more numer-
ous and that private schools are located in the so-called “High Neighbourhood”, a
popular designation for an elevated and extensive north-eastern residential area in
Santiago.4 Table 1.2, which shows the number of pupils per school, confirms that
mixed schools (both primary and secondary schools) and public voucher schools are
the biggest. While Table 1.1 shows the number of schools, Table 1.2 shows their
size. Multiplying both numbers at the beginning and at the end of the sample re-
veals that during this period there were more students in private voucher schools
than in public voucher schools. Although in 2002, public voucher schools enrolled
54% of pupils while private voucher enrolled just 38%, in 2008 this was reversed,
and private schools enrolled 49% while public schools only 44%. Private schools
maintained a steady 7%. Additionally, though it is not shown in a table, 15.92% of
pupils stay in the same school for primary and secondary education. As Table 1.3
indicates, transferring from a primary public voucher school to a secondary private
voucher school and vice versa is quite common, with 17.5% and 10.7%, respectively.
Staying in public voucher schools for primary and secondary education accounts for
14.4% of pupils. But the most popular choice (39.7%) is to stay in private voucher
schools for primary and secondary education. At the same time, private schools are
4In recent years there has been an increase in the development of new subcentres outside the
“High Neighbourhood” where more aﬄuent people live, but at the time of the sample, rich people
“strictly” lived in the area .
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an independent but tiny market.
The standardized and centrally and externally marked test, called the SIMCE,
was first administered in 1991, testing the last grade of primary school. Since then,
the SIMCE schedule has undergone many changes: from one SIMCE per year in
the beginning, it has become an intense set of tests spanning five examinations
in different cohorts every year. The Chilean Ministry of Education’s Agency for
Quality in Education (AQE, 1999-2013), has released data for every SIMCE test
since 1999. The data is only made available after a careful analysis of a written
research proposal sponsored by a tertiary academic institution, and the use of the
data is held under a very strict confidentiality agreement. Single schools or pupils
cannot be, for any reason, identified. In principle, pupils are trackable along time.
The complete dataset contains fifteen 1-period cross-section data, ten 2-period panel
data (with a time gap of two, four, and six years) and one 3-period panel data. As I
have indicated, I use one 2-period data with a time gap of six years from 4th grade
in primary school in 2002 to 10thgrade in secondary school in 2008 for any particular
reason.
1.3 Methods
In my main equation I explain the outcome, the SIMCE test (a proxy for the
productivity of each school), by a spatially determined measure of competition;
individual and school characteristics; individual, school type, level of education and
municipality fixed effects. The following is the equation I aim to estimate:
Yismt = αi + β1compst + X
′
itΛ + Z
′
stΘ + σp + ϕt + δm + εismt (1.3.1)
Where the subscript i stands for individual; s for school; m for municipality; and
30
t for level of education (primary or secondary). Yismt represents the standardized
test score of pupil i going to school s in municipality m at level of education t.
compst is competition experienced by school s at level of education t. Xit are indi-
vidual characteristics, which are possibly time varying. These include prior achieve-
ments (SIMCE or grades), school choice, age, gender, family background, books at
home, and disadvantaged groups (family receiving subsidy, Chile Solidario, vulner-
ability index, integrated, etc.). Zst are school characteristics, including class size.
This category also includes the geographic concentration indices, the competition
indices and observable teacher evaluations. αi is an individual fixed effect which
causes problems, being potentially correlated with the error term;5 σp are school
types: public voucher, private voucher and private; ϕt are primary or secondary
dummies; and δm are municipality dummies. These control for choice because data
is not available at postcode level and some municipalities may have more choice as
revealed by the preferences of the pupils. In some specifications, I use choice indices
instead of the municipality dummies. Finally, εismt is an error term picking up pos-
sible serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, and unobserved characteristics (other
teachers’ quality besides observable teachers’ evaluation, motivation of neighbours,
other local or spatially close neighbouring resources that improve the educational
outcome of the pupils).6 A data generating process with pupils sampled from many
schools is likely to be correlated; therefore, it should be clustered at the school level.
In spatial analysis, the researcher can create spatial weights and define spatial
lags at the center of spatial analysis. Therefore, inspired by similar indices defined by
Gibbons et al. (2006), I define a choice index and a competition index as follows:
choice indexm =
M∑
m=1
schoolsm (1.3.2)
5A correlation between the regressors and the individual fixed effect, unobserved effect or unob-
served heterogeneity αi requires controlling for the fixed effect.
6The correlation between the regressors and the idiosyncratic error: εismt requires instrumental
variables.
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competition indexs =
1
Is
Is∑
i=1
choicei (1.3.3)
The choice index for a given municipality m is defined as how many schools you
can get to from that municipality, i.e. the number of schools which pupils in the given
municipality can choose from—in a revealed preference manner—regarding where
the schools are located (M is equal to the schools inside the given municipality m,
plus the schools outside the given municipality that the pupils living in that munic-
ipality actually choose).7 Similarly, the competition index for a given school s is
defined as how many alternative choices the students attending that school actually
have, i.e. the weighted average of the number of schools each pupil from the given
school s chooses, i.e. an average of the choice indices of each pupil’s municipality for
the given school s (i.e. for each pupil in a municipality his/her choice index is the
same choice index of the municipality), where i is the choice index for pupil i , Is
is the number of students in school s and the sum is over students within schools.8
For both indices, I use all pupils of each school, not just the ones that sat for the
SIMCE in a particular year. This seems reasonable as distortions could arise doing
the contrary because pupils sitting for the SIMCE may not form a representative
sample of the pupils of each school. Moreover, schools compete to attract pupils
from all grades, not just those tested by the SIMCE, as these grades change yearly.
Figure 1.2 shows the overall competition index for primary and secondary schools.
It can be seen that municipalities such as Puente Alto (south-east), La Florida
(south-east) and Maipu´ (south-west) have the schools with the highest competition
indices. Gibbons et al. (2006) counted the number of schools that pupils can choose
from within the 75th percentile of the home-to-school travel distance, which limited
the number of “feasible” schools (i.e. those that can be attended) which in their
7For instance, pupils from a given municipality attend 15 schools only situated in the same
municipality, so the choice index is 15. Or perhaps students from a given municipality attend a total
of 40 schools in six municipalities eventually which may or may not include the given municipality;
then the choice index is 40.
8For instance, suppose there are three students from the municipality with choice index 40 and
two from the municipality of choice index 15. Then the competition index is 30.
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case is based, as said, on common travel patterns. In a sense, schools that are very
far and attended by few pupils are dropped from the “choice set” (and therefore
from the competition index), avoiding very “artificial” large numbers. Since I work
at the municipality level, it does not make much sense to use home-to-school dis-
tance; instead I use “frequency”. For example, for each municipality, the schools
are in the “choice set” if at least 5% of the pupils from that municipality chose to
attend them. If a school is chosen by only one pupil out of 100 (1%), then I call
this an outlier and drop it from the “choice set”. Taking this into account, I exper-
imented with different tail dropping techniques, sequentially discarding the lowest
5%, 10%, 20%, 25%, 30% or the lowest 5th, 10th, 20th, 25th and 30th percentiles
of the schools according to the revealed preference of the pupils’ school choices for
each given municipality. Ultimately, I preferred the 25th (lowest) percentile because
the “choice set” represents a spatially robust market showing the main and stable
schools available in each municipality in repetitive samples. I picked the 25th lowest
percentile over the percentage because it gives more flexibility to the distribution
by freeing it from being a fixed quantity regardless of the number of chosen schools.
Notice that the least chosen schools are systematically located in places of extremely
difficult access or are part of hospitals (to benefit children with chronic illnesses who
must remain hospitalized) so it seems correct to exclude those schools. There is also
a high correlation between the untrimmed and the trimmed version of the ranks.
Testing the null hypothesis that both the untrimmed and trimmed version of the
ranks are independent, I obtain a rejection of the null meaning that both ranks are
closely rank correlated. For example, comparing overall secondary competition with
the full sample and the 25th trimming I calculate a Spearman’s rho of 0.9230 and a
p-value of virtually zero.
As a clarifying example, in a district-shaped educational market, the pupils
come only from the same municipality, and accordingly the choice index counts
only schools inside that educational district. In fact, it is equal to the total number
of schools in the municipality. That, of course, is not the case for the Chilean free-to-
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choose market, so both indices are meaningful. At the same time, Figure 1.3 shows
that schools have a distribution of competition indices upwardly skewed. Addition-
ally, Figure 1.4 compares the public voucher and private voucher school competition
indices for overall schools in 2002 and 2008, showing they are remarkably stable,
while private school competition indices are stable with a slight downward trend in
the middle of the distribution.
Unfortunately, with the inclusion of competition measures I am also introducing
endogeneity to the model. But as I have already said, I have two potent strategies
for this endogeneity issue. Firstly, I adopt an instrumental variable strategy; slope
(how fast the altitude is increasing) and ruggedness (the terrain undulation) are my
instruments, both unlikely to be correlated with the unobservables and individual
characteristics. To set the instrumental variable model, I also control by distance
to the urban footprint (which I call the GEO border) and elevation. Both controls
are proxies for “high class” families (i.e. families with higher income living in ele-
vated areas and close to the GEO border). Secondly, because I observe pupils at
two stages, in primary and then again in secondary school, I can implement a value-
added model to partial out fixed characteristics of individuals that at the same time
affect the school choice and the educational attainment.
1.4 Main results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1.4 provides a statistical summary of the competition indices and test
scores. The competition indices remain stable across primary and secondary schools.
Specifically, the primary mean for the overall competition index and for the public
voucher competition index is the same as the secondary mean at 64 and 16 re-
spectively. The primary and secondary means for the private voucher competition
index vary slightly, at 31 and 35 schools respectively. The private competition in-
34
dex has a slightly higher mean in primary, with 17 versus 12 schools. These results
are similar to the results that Figure 1.4 displays graphically. Test scores have a
normal distribution around the 50th percentile as expected for a standardized test.
Table 1.5 presents the correlation among the competition indices of primary and
secondary schools. From this table, it follows that there is a fairly strong correlation
in competition between both types of voucher schools and a somewhat weaker neg-
ative correlation in competition between the voucher schools and the private schools.
On the other hand, Table 1.6 shows the list of exogenous covariates. These in-
clude parents’ education, books at home, ethnic background, disabled pupils, sex
and age. Parents’ education is 11 years in primary and 12 years in secondary; books
are 54 units in primary and 62 units in secondary; the male-to-female sex ratio is
approximately 1:1; 0.2% of disabled pupils in primary and secondary -when they
are called integrated -; and pupils are 9.5 years old in primary and 16 years old in
secondary.
OLS regressions are contaminated by endogeneity bias because of the standard
argument that there is no reasonable proxy for ability, which implies that ability
remains in the error term, causing correlation from the competition indices and the
error term. For this reason the key identification issue in this paper is to find an
appropriate instrument, i.e. one highly correlated with the competition indices and
uncorrelated with the error term. After careful theoretical and empirical considera-
tions, I propose the following candidates as instruments:
1. slope is the slope of the area centred around each school in Greater Santiago
according to the processing by the Slope tool of ArcMap of a DEM provided
by the SRTM 90m Digital Elevation Database of the CGIAR Consortium for
Spatial Information. Slope is the first derivative of elevation, and a sensible
calibration is the use of a Z factor of 0.00002619 according to the data in
meters and the Latitude close to 70 as suggested by this ESRI blog (ESRI,
2014), (Figure 1.5b).
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2. ruggedness is the ruggedness of the terrain calculated as the second derivative
of the elevation using the just described DEM, (Figure 1.5c).
In the spirit of Pearl (2009) and Morgan and Winship (2010), the theoretical ar-
guments for selecting slope and ruggedness as valid instruments are explained as
follows: slope and ruggedness are negatively correlated with the voucher competi-
tion, because the extra cost of building is internalized in the market as fewer schools
are built, which drives down the indices. A different outcome is found for private
competition, where building a school in an inaccessible place gives the school a rep-
utation linked to the survival of the best fit. Also notice that slope and ruggedness
are not necessarily correlated; neither are they correlated with elevation. This is im-
portant because I need to use slope or ruggedness as instruments while conditioning
on elevation to block other sources of endogeneity. In fact, as shown below, there is
some correlation between slope and ruggedness which makes both potentially good
instruments, but less between elevation and slope, and very little between elevation
and ruggedness to serve as a good conditioning strategy.
Furthermore, these arguments predict something which my empirical findings
confirm: the first-stage correlation between the instruments and competition in-
dices, with slope and ruggedness being negatively correlated with overall, public
and private voucher competition indices, while being positively correlated with the
private competition index. Notice that this correlation not only has the right sign,
but is also sufficiently strong, as the first stage F tests show in all the IV tables below.
It could be argued that the instruments are also correlated with the error term
(and by this mean correlated with the outcome). A thorough study of the causality
model suggests a straightforward way of blocking the other sources of endogeneity by
conditioning on dwellers’ income, elevation or distance to GEO border to estimate
the causal effect of competition on test scores using slope and ruggedness as valid
instruments. This is a typical reverse causality relation. Instead of the market
structure causing the academic outcome, it is the academic outcome causing the
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market structure. In other words, instead of more competition causing more efficient
schools, more efficient schools causes a monopolistic structure. Pupils just choose
this school, then the competition index is at the minimum. This is the endogeneity
of the school market. The key controls needed to identify the causal effect of the
competition indices on test scores are as follows:
1. distance to GEO border is the distance from each school to the GEO border
or border of the urban footprint of Greater Santiago.
2. elevation is the elevation of each school in the Greater Santiago area according
to a DEM provided by the SRTM 90m Digital Elevation Database of the
CGIAR Consortium for Spatial Information, (Figure 1.5a).
These controls are good controls because they are proxies of “high class” and fami-
lies with higher income live in elevated areas and close to the GEO border.
Figure 1.5 shows the orographic details of slope, ruggedness and elevation. Ele-
vation (Figure 1.5a) is defined by waves of east-west platforms in successively lower
altitudes; slope (Figure 1.5b) is marked by higher activity east of the city and by a
lower, but still intense, activity in the west; and ruggedness (Figure 1.5c) is charac-
terized by intense activity all over the surface of Greater Santiago, with high activity
not just in the east of the city but also in the west. Table 1.7 shows the summary
statistics for controls and instruments. The table provides evidence that the mean
distance to the GEO border increases from 3.1 km in primary to 3.9 km in sec-
ondary school, while the elevation of the school only increases from 577 m to 582 m.
Considering the instruments, the mean slope is 2 degrees but with a minimum just
over 0 degrees and a maximum of 19-35 degrees; finally, ruggedness is close in mean
to 0.5 degrees with a range between almost 0 to 15-12 degrees. Table 1.8 presents
the correlation between controls and instruments. Broadly speaking, the correla-
tions are modest; it is reassuring that information is not being lost in the process.
Specifically, the correlation within controls is just over 0, within instruments 0.6-0.4
and between controls and instruments -0.1 (distance to GEO border) and 0.2-0.5
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(elevation).
Finally, while the causation of slope and ruggedness (i.e. the instruments) to
the competition indices is mediated by the building costs as explained above, the
causation of elevation and distance to the GEO border (i.e. the control variables) to
the test scores is mediated not by construction costs but mainly by environmental
amenities (e.g. property rights over clean air and a pollution-free environment) which
cause high dwellers’ income and more educated family background to be localized
in the high areas of the city and/or in the shortest distances to the GEO border.
The fact that instruments and controls have different underlying processes is the
theoretical explanation of why they are weakly correlated and why the conditioned
instruments are excluded and do not cause the test scores other than via competition.
Balancing tests
I have already shown the power of slope and ruggedness by demonstrating their
correlation with the competition index. It is now time to defend exogeneity, i.e. to
show that these instruments are not correlated with the unobservables. To do so I
perform balancing tests using related variables not included in my controls, aiming
to test the exogeneity of the instruments. From the surveys conducted of the pupils’
cohort I take several related variables aggregated at the school-level that presum-
ably are part of the unobservables which are not outcomes and are pre-determined.
I regress them on slope and on ruggedness with controls clustered at the school level.
The list of tested variables starts with the average and the standard deviation of
the SIMCE for the exact previous cohort, reasons for choosing the school (close-
ness, good teachers, low cost), whether the household has a personal computer and
internet, the total income of the household, the co-payment to the school, other
school-related expenses and preschool background. Each tested variable is aggre-
gated at the school-level. These balancing tests permit me to provide a plausible
check that the instruments are exogenous with respect to the similar and correlated
variables which are subsumed in the error term. These tested variables remain in
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the background and are a credible sample of what constitutes the unobservables, to
which the instruments are shown to be strictly orthogonal. The results are presented
in Table 1.9 and neatly support the claim of exogeneity. None of the independent
19 regressions shows a significant coefficient for the respective instrument. In other
words, the correlation between the instruments and the unobservable is likely to be
non-existent or weak at most.
Results
The first and foremost result is that the coefficient for “aggregated” school com-
petition (i.e. overall competition index) is non-negative in Table 1.10 (0.060 without
controls and 0.053 with controls in primary and 0.100 without controls and 0.108
with controls in secondary) but negative in Table 1.11 (-0.223 without controls and
-0.231 with controls in primary and -2.168 without controls and -2.390 with con-
trols in secondary) using slope as the preferred instrument. The reversion of the
coefficient indicates that there was a positive selection bias, i.e. pupils from more
competitive schools also have more ability and for this reason perform better in test
scores. This is a plausible story, because pupils naturally gifted for study look for
more competitive schools. But they are not better off: they perform better only
because of this extra ability, not by any value-added from the school. This effect
is very interesting because it is spatially similar to the literature finding that con-
trolling by peer effects, socio-economic background and non spatial selection bias
either dissolves the difference between private voucher and public voucher schools
entirely or reduces it to existing only for selected groups. See, for instance, Hoxby
(2002), Howell et al. (2001). As presented in Table 1.3 the voucher, i.e. public and
private voucher schools, and the private are two separate markets. My results in
Table 1.10 confirm this fact, showing different coefficients for both type of schools
(for instance, 0.065 v/s 1.281** in secondary schools with controls). As my main
interest is to scrutinize the causal effect of spatially determined competition in the
voucher system, the results I present subsequently are for voucher schools. In short,
I am testing the voucher system. Table 1.10 shows that voucher competition also
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causes non-negative reactions in voucher schools in primary schools and in voucher
schools in secondary schools. But this is fully permeated by endogeneity. Tables
1.12 and 1.13, for example, show different findings. These two tables display the
results of the corrected instrumental variable model, the former table with a choice
index to measure and control for choice variation and the latter with a municipality
fixed effect to achieve the same. The real effect is mainly marginally significant for
primary and for secondary voucher pupils when using the choice index and slope as
instrument and not significant in all other specifications. The instrumental variable
approach proves all its effectiveness and discloses the underlying causal effect.
1.5 Heterogeneity
In an effort to identify the groups that are in a better position based on the
spatially determined competition, I repeat the main regression equation: voucher
schools with OLS and IV, by family background and school characteristics. From
Table 1.14 it seems that pupils with families having more income, parents with more
years spent in school, a personal computer and internet access at home are better
off, i.e. the spatially determined competition in the voucher system increases their
performance and school achievements. Books at home seems not to factor into the
results. From Table 1.15, it seems also that smaller schools and schools with higher
achievements in standardized tests and with a median dispersion that is not too
heterogeneous or homogeneous in pupil performance9 are more incentive-driven.
There are two sources of heterogeneity: Competition heterogeneity, or so-called
“cause” heterogeneity or test results/pupils heterogeneity, and “reaction” hetero-
geneity. In reaction heterogeneity, for example, while private schools better serve
pupils with an average primary SIMCE percentile of 75th in the 4th grade, private
9This result could be of policy interest because a system that increases or reduces the dispersion
in the composition of schools could imply large improvements or detriments in school educational
productivity. According to study results, it is best to have an inclusive system (to assure equality)
but allowing for some schools to select heavily to create centers of excellence, i.e. emblematic lyce´es
should be allowed to fully select their students.
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voucher schools serve pupils with an average SIMCE percentile of 50th and public
voucher schools serve pupils with an average SIMCE percentile of only 40th. These
scores indicate that teaching a pupil in an average public voucher school is more
demanding than teaching a pupil in an average private school. The model accounts
for these differential costs in teaching by including choice index, municipality and
school type fixed effects.
1.6 Discussion
Table 1.10 shows an OLS regression in which more competition implies non-
negative test scores for both primary and secondary schools. In Table 1.12, after
using IV regressions, the non-negative test score effects reverse into negative.10 For
secondary pupils, the effect is equal to 0 in all the specifications, which are negative
but not significant. These are the main results of the paper. How do these results
compare with the effect of other determinants of school productivity? One addi-
tional standard deviation in teacher quality causally implies an increase of 11% of
a standard deviation in pupil performance as many independent assessments have
determined; see, for example, Hanushek (2003). So in the worst case, when I use
only slope as an instrument, an increase in one standard deviation in teacher quality
cancels out with approximately one extra standard deviation in spatially determined
competition as it has been understood and implemented in the Chilean educational
voucher system in the last few decades for primary school. Again, in every other
specification for primary and in all specifications for secondary pupils, the causal ef-
fect of spatially determined competition is close to 0, so an increase in teacher quality
is not exhausted by an increase or by a decrease in spatially determined competition.
At the same time, the space aggregation process implied by the choice and the
10Using slope as instrument suggests a relatively small congestion effect at least for primary school
competition. A one standard deviation (21 schools) of the voucher competition index represents a
decrease of -4.24 (=-0.202X21) percentiles in test scores, which corresponds to a decrease in -15%
(=-4.24/27.83) of a standard deviation (27.83 percentiles) of voucher test results/pupils in primary
school for 2002 SIMCE with controls.
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competition indices mainly reflects, as has been argued up till now, spatially deter-
mined competition. But one could counter that other concepts could also be picked
up by this grouping method. For example, it is not easy to rule out the idea that peer
effects also drive the indices in the study. So why is spatial competition behind my
aggregators? Only the fact that I am aggregating at the school-level, i.e. I use the
municipality of the spatial residence of the school, drives the spatial competition in-
terpretation. Aggregation at the student-level, i.e. using the municipality of spatial
residence of the student, would tip the scales in favour of a peer effect interpretation.
One way to overcome this issue is to stress the significance of controlling for pupil
characteristics. In fact, I control for all main student-level variables which are not
outcomes in order to avoid bad controls. This approach strengthens the likelihood
of my indices picking up spatially determined competition rather than peer effects.
Recently, it has been argued by government officials in Chile that admission se-
lection should disappear completely. This chapter may indeed evaluate this public
policy using the evidence gathered and suggest some ideal policy on student mix
ratio. First, suppose that there are two types of students: G and B (good and bad).
Then also suppose that a G and G interaction increases each test score performance
and a B and B interaction decreases each test score performance. Let me finally sup-
pose than a G and B interaction could have either a positive or negative value. Then
a certain admission selection policy should be enforced if C-(A-B) is maximized for
some mix ratio (if C-(A-B)<0, then take -[C-(A-B)]). In other words you calculate
C-(A-B) for all mix ratios and take the maximum. Then the argmax is the mix
ratio that you should use. Corner solutions are likely not to be desirable solutions.
So this chapter suggests that the actual proposed admission selection policy of null
percentage for schools in Chile is highly inappropriate.
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1.7 Conclusion
This analysis has been one of the first of hopefully many more thorough spatial
analyses on the Chilean voucher system. The main spatial variables were the com-
petition indices as determined by the weighted average of schools a typical pupil
can choose from based on his or her preferences; the indices were built using a re-
vealed preference strategy. These indices were used in OLS, IV and Changes (see
Appendix A) regressions. The spatial analysis gives evidence that helps to answer
the fundamental questions on the functioning of the Santiago voucher system. As
the data show, for more than a decade a spatial process has been repeating itself over
and over: first, a school performs badly; their pupils get a poor quality education;
this education translates into poor standardized test results; families that are aware
of these results reduce their choice of this school; attendance decreases; the school
receives fewer vouchers; the school has fewer resources; the quality of the school’s
education further declines; finally, the school closes causing a void of space and less
competition amongst the surrounding schools. The turnover can be dramatic in size
and place. As just described, the voucher system has worked in Chile, producing big
changes in the market structure of schools. But as the results here make apparent,
these deep structural changes in the market have not brought performance gains in
education.
These results suggest that the voucher system is not working because more spa-
tially determined competition does not imply more value-added to the education
production functions of the different school types. Only the schools clustered in
high-high regions, such as private schools, are more productive; their pupils perform
better, and the change in value-added performance is higher, but such schools seem
to be in a separate market, with no interaction with the voucher schools, and after
controlling for pupils’ heterogeneity, not even a particularly successful one. In short,
the voucher system needs to be amended. The advanced econometric techniques em-
ployed in this chapter have yielded evidence of no spatial effects, which means that
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increased competition among schools does not increase the value-added.
But is it that the voucher system is not working? The fact that schools at the
bottom consistently close should be good overall. But the private voucher systems
are not getting better. As Schumpeter (1934) posited, there is competition for (mar-
ket share) and in the market (efficiency/productivity). In Chile, the competition for
the market works due to the voucher system. It is the competition in the market
which is failing. Why? Perhaps the standards for new schools are low and represent
not a better influx of production is replacing the lowest value-added schools. Or
think of a model where parents take time to learn whether the school is “poorly
performing”. In this case bad schools could survive before being expelled from the
system. Also, consider another model in which there is no link between the for and
in aspects of competition, in which the production function of the worst performing
schools is not linked with the overall system performance. This seems odd, but
could still be explained in the case of Chile by the big segmentation of the market;
bad schools are squeezed out of the market but their students move to other similar
bad schools and never climb the market to well-performing private schools. In other
words, poor students are captive in a vicious cycle. Often, for this group of students,
the schools that remain are not better than the schools that have exited the market.
One key mechanism that could be causing the poor functioning of the voucher
system is the voucher’s value of £40 per month for primary schools and £50 per
month for secondary schools. The costs of an excellent education are believed to be
three times these numbers.11 The fact that the economic incentive, i.e. spatially
determined competition, is not aligned with the economic outcomes, i.e. test scores,
does not preclude the voucher system from working consistently if higher demand
side vouchers were guaranteed. It is well documented in the health sector that if
providers can vary price and quality, they try to increase their market shares by
11From a personal conversation with a renowned education expert at PUC during my time as a
postgraduate pupil in Economics there.
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lowering the price, not by improving the quality of the service; this trend has been
evidenced in the literature on the NHS internal market reforms of the 1980s and
1990s. See, for example, Propper et al. (2008). Conversely, when the price is fixed,
as is the case with the state schools in England, the NHS Payment by Results and
Medicare in the US, competition is believed to translate into quality improvements;
see Gaynor (2004) for an insightful theoretical explanation. However, in the Chilean
educational system, the voucher is extremely low. Some improvements have come
from the so-called SEP reform, a law passed to increase the number of the vouchers
given to prioritized (very poor and/or disabled) pupils. In fact, for the year 2005—in
the middle of my sample—the amount of annual expenditure per student was $1,930,
while in the UK it was three times more $6,888 (USD PPP, OECD (2008)).12 Then,
raising the voucher could be one possible way of solving the paradox of more com-
petition not leading to better results because, at least theoretically, such a voucher
system seems a reasonable policy.
As mentioned previously, this analysis is one of the first spatial studies of this
long-term object of interest. The hypotheses tested are of key importance for policy
makers. New authorities in Chile are pushing toward largely uncertain changes in
voucher systems. These findings (in particular the negative effect of competition
when taking into account the endogeneity problem) can offer guidance as to which
changes are most appropriate.
12New reforms will increase voucher in 20% in 1st-6th and 9th-12th grades and 80% in 7th-8th
grades.
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Table 1.1: Number of schools by school
type
primary secondary
public voucher 644 139
private voucher 793 484
private 325 216
Total 1,762 839
Table 1.2: Mean number of pupils by school type
primary secondary primary & secondary
public voucher 428 626 932
private voucher 362 367 819
private 101 246 592
Table 1.3: Switching from primary to secondary school by school type, (percentage)
from\to pub vou pri vou pri
pub vou 14.4 17.5 0.1
pri vou 10.7 39.7 0.8
pri 0.8 3.3 12.2
51
Table 1.4: Summary statistics of competition indices and test scores
variable mean std. dev. min. max. n
competition indices
primary
overall competition index 64.832 21.654 9 103 79,463
public voucher competition index 16.32 5.954 2.988 28.201 79,463
private voucher competition index 31.342 16.603 0.968 67 79,463
private competition index 17.17 10.062 2 46.526 79,463
secondary
overall competition index 64.033 21.35 10 104 52,164
public voucher competition index 16.517 6.157 3.11 30 52,164
private voucher competition index 35.002 18.935 4 76 52,164
private competition index 12.514 9.239 2 43.363 52,164
test scores
SIMCE primary test scores 50.118 28.831 1 100 79,463
SIMCE secondary test scores 50.214 28.895 1 100 52,164
52
Table 1.5: Cross-correlation of school competition indices
variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
primary
overall competition index (1) 1.000
public voucher competition index (2) 0.648 1.000
private voucher competition index (3) 0.891 0.658 1.000
private competition index (4) 0.295 -0.283 -0.122 1.000
secondary
overall competition index (1) 1.000
public voucher competition index (2) 0.649 1.000
private voucher competition index (3) 0.922 0.641 1.000
private competition index (4) -0.012 -0.481 -0.345 1.000
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Table 1.6: Summary statistics of the full set of exogenous covariates
variable mean std. dev. min. max. n
primary
father’s education 11.73 3.938 0 28 79,463
mother’s education 11.461 3.828 0 28 79,463
books 54.125 67.505 0 250 79,463
> 100 books 0.162 0.368 0 1 79,463
disabled 0.002 0.04 0 1 79,463
male 0.499 0.5 0 1 79,463
age in years 9.517 0.522 6.045 14.773 79,463
secondary
father’s education 12.515 3.708 1 23 52,164
mother’s education 12.28 3.555 1 23 52,164
books 62.815 62.389 0 180 52,164
> 100 books 0.198 0.399 0 1 52,164
Indigenous father 0.047 0.212 0 1 52,164
Indigenous mother 0.028 0.165 0 1 52,164
integrated 0.002 0.042 0 1 52,164
male 0.48 0.5 0 1 52,164
age in years 16.041 0.403 10.303 20.167 52,164
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Table 1.7: Summary statistics of controls and instruments
variable mean std. dev. min. max. n
primary
distance to GEO border 3,177.77 2,252.561 9.746 9,493.505 79,463
elevation 577.659 85.132 376 952 79,463
slope 2.256 2.453 0.18 35.315 79,463
ruggedness 0.474 1.159 0.004 15.526 79,463
secondary
distance to GEO border 3,934.351 2,527.029 20.744 9,404.745 52,164
elevation 582.093 81.988 375 942 52,164
slope 2.367 2.073 0.127 19.473 52,164
ruggedness 0.493 1.093 0.005 12.848 52,164
1 Distance to GEO border in meters, elevation in meters above sea level, slope and ruggedness
in arc degrees of inclination to the horizontal over meters (o/m) and sq meters (o/m2).
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Table 1.8: Cross-correlation of primary school controls and
instruments
variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
primary
dist to GEO border (1) 1.000
elevation (2) 0.057 1.000
slope (3) -0.157 0.49 1.000
ruggedness (4) -0.151 0.229 0.652 1.000
secondary
dist to GEO border (1) 1.000
elevation (2) -0.094 1.000
slope (3) -0.143 0.542 1.000
ruggedness (4) -0.124 0.248 0.491 1.000
Table 1.9: Balancing test
primary secondary
Selected test variables slope ruggedness slope ruggedness
at a school-level with controls with controls with controls with controls
SIMCE average, -0.004 -0.004 0.005 -0.000
(previous cohort) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
[0.409] [0.206] [0.221] [0.952]
SIMCE std. dev., 0.026 0.004 -0.009 -0.008
(previous cohort) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010)
[0.175] [0.746] [0.550] [-0.76]
choice, 0.566 0.299 0.394 -0.005
closeness (0.396) (0.212) (0.308) (0.237)
[0.153] [0.160] [0.202] [0.983]
choice, -0.350 -0.136 -0.109 -0.033
good teachers (0.350) (0.209) (0.231) (0.140)
[0.318] [0.517] [0.638] [0.813]
choice, 0.181 0.084 -0.244 -0.335
low cost (0.229) (0.145) (0.350) (0.217)
[0.430] [0.561] [0.487] [0.124]
pc at home -0.353 -0.226 -0.023 -0.226
(0.299) (0.173) (0.345) (0.203)
[0.237] [0.191] [0.946] [0.265]
internet at home -0.416 -0.276 0.220 -0.089
(0.414) (0.213) (0.264) (0.186)
[0.316] [0.194] [0.404] [0.630]
total income -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
of households (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[0.262] [0.361] [0.320] [0.678]
co-payment -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002)
[0.169] [0.253]
other school -0.007 -0.002
related expenditures (0.008) (0.005)
[0.421] [0.682]
preschool -0.004 -0.017
(0.342) (0.202)
[0.991] [0.931]
This table shows the balancing test between the instruments for the competition measure—slope and rugged-
ness—and selected test variables thought to belong to the unobservable for primary and secondary schools and
which are not used as controls in any preferred specification: previous cohorts’ SIMCE (level and std dev), main
reason for school choice (closeness, good teachers and low cost), IT at home, total income of HHs, co-payment,
other school related expenditures and preschool. The tests make several separate regressions of each selected
variable averaged at the school level on each instruments and controls (distance, elevation and municipality
fixed effect), clustered at the school level. Not all variables are available for secondary schools. * p<0.1 Std
errs in round parenthesis, p-values in square brackets.
Table 1.10: Effect of competition on test results
with/out controls. OLS
primary secondary
overall pupil test results
overall competition index 0.060 0.053 0.100 0.108
(0.070) (0.063) (0.111) (0.099)
voucher and private pupil test results
voucher competition index 0.070 0.051 0.058 0.065
(0.101) (0.092) (0.132) (0.117)
private competition index 0.278 0.305 1.435** 1.281**
(0.306) (0.286) (0.621) (0.543)
voucher pupil test results
voucher competition index 0.073 0.054 0.014 0.006
(0.101) (0.092) (0.130) (0.115)
controls
distance to GEO border Yes Yes Yes Yes
elevation Yes Yes Yes Yes
list of covariates No Yes No Yes
municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Author’s calculation from research data provided by the Chilean Ministry
of Education’s Agency for Quality in Education. This table shows the effect of “ag-
gregated” overall competition on “aggregated” educational test scores for pupils
who sat for the SIMCE Language and Math Tests (unified in one ranking) in the
4th grade of primary school in 2002 and for the SIMCE Language and Math Tests
(unified in one ranking) six years later in the 10th grade of secondary school in
2008 for all schools located in Greater Santiago. It also shows the effect of “dis-
aggregated” in voucher and private competition to voucher and private pupil test
results. Finally, it shows the effect of voucher competition on voucher pupil test
results. The table shows the OLS regressions in levels for 2002 and 2008 regard-
ing the effect of “aggregated” overall competition indices (overall is unified public
voucher, private voucher and private, not disaggregated), “disaggregated” voucher
and private competition and voucher competition on overall, voucher and private
pupil test scores without and with controls. Controls include municipality fixed
effect, distance to GEO border, elevation and the full set of exogenous covariates
described in Table 1.6. Overall, voucher and private competition indices are the
number of schools an average pupil from a given overall, voucher and private school
can choose. They are a by-municipality weighted average of the choice indices that
measures the revealed preference number of each of the three school types that
pupils from a given municipality are effectively choosing. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01
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Table 1.11: Effect of “aggregated” competition on “aggregated” test results
with/out controls. Instrumental variables
primary secondary
instrument: overall pupil test results
slope
overall competition index -0.223 -0.231 -2.168 -2.390
tests
First stage coeff. -0.379*** -0.366*** -0.397*** -0.388***
First stage F t.(F-s r.) 16.29 15.03 13.64 12.26
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM s.(Ui) 22.96 20.95 16.66 15.60
controls
distance to GEO border Yes Yes Yes Yes
elevation Yes Yes Yes Yes
list of covariates No Yes No Yes
municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
1 Source: Author’s calculation from research data provided by the Chilean Ministry of Educa-
tion’s Agency for Quality in Education. The data is available only to researchers after submitting
a written proposal.
2 Instrument slope. First stage with F test. Choice index measuring choice variation.
3 s.=statistics, t.=test, F-s r.=First-stage relevance, Ui=Under identification test.
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Table 1.14: Heterogeneity (family background)
variable primary secondary
OLS IV OLS IV
Baseline 0.054 -0.183 0.006 -1.541
income pcm
Above 95% (≈ £2,000-£5,000) 0.203 0.138 0.058* -0.321
Above median (≈ £200- £350) 0.089 -0.132 0.039** -0.98
Below median 0.001 -0.179* 0.023 -1.05
Below 5% (≈ £50- £65) -0.025 -0.184* 0.001 -1.45**
average years of school
Above 95% (17 years) 0.110 -0.140 0.03* -0.856
Above median (12-12.5 years) 0.069 -0.201 0.027 -0.844
Below median 0.023 -0.230 0.018 -1.09
Below 5% (6-7.5 years) -0.064 -0.349** -0.019 -1.038*
books at home
Above 95% (180-250) 0.194 -0.464 0.022 -0.71
Above median (35-40) 0.099 -0.506 0.018 -0.893
Below median 0.041 -0.749 0.015 -1.41
Below 5% (2-3) -0.161 -0.825 -0.007 -1.91
pc at home
Yes 0.049 -0.121 0.007 -0.919
No 0.015 -0.219 0.01 -1.1
internet at home
Yes 0.092 -0.155 0.036 -0.84
No 0.051 -0.193 0.021 -1.139
1 Effect of competition on test scores by family background: Income,
average years of school, books at home, pc at home, internet at home.
Baseline has OLS and IV (with slope and ruggedness as instruments)
results for voucher school test scores on voucher school competition.
62
Table 1.15: Heterogeneity (school characteristics)
variable primary secondary
OLS IV OLS IV
Baseline 0.054 -0.183 0.006 -1.541
mean number of pupils
Above 95% (2,172-3,037) -3.869*** -1.93 0.013 -2.336
Above median (829-1,085) -0.087 -0.389*** 0.032* -1.868
Below median 0.132 -0.137 0.051* -0.163
Below 5% (248-389) -0.170 -1.97*** 0.081** -0.215
SIMCE average
Above 95% (80.84-85.04) 0.207*** 0.139*** 0.060*** 0.998***
Above median (48.95-47.25) 0.032 -0.045 0.041*** -0.071
Below median -0.011 -0.06 0.03** -0.047
Below 5% (24.33-19.59) -0.198*** -0.087 0.006 -0.075
SIMCE standard deviation
Above 95% (27.83-28.3) -0.671* -0.29 0.094 -1.262
Above median (23.5-20.52) -0.02 -0.224 0.014 -0.153
Below median -0.02 -0.248 0.054*** -2.3
Below 5% (15.77-12.23) 0.358 -0.074 -0.136 -9.679
1 Effect of competition on test scores by school characteristics: Size of school (number of pupils),
average SIMCE, standard deviation of SIMCE. Baseline has OLS and IV (with slope and
ruggedness as instruments) results for voucher school test scores on voucher school competition.
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Appendix
A. Changes model: A robustness check
Note that regression in changes is also a suitable model for dealing with endoge-
nous regressors. I construct the competition indices in changes as the difference of
each secondary competition index and the respective primary competition index; see
Table A.1. Notice that while the private competition index has decreased by five
percentiles, the private voucher index has risen by four percentile points and the
public voucher competition has not presented any major variation. Notice that the
distance to the GEO border, elevation, the school type FE, and the municipality
FE drop in the ‘in changes’ model. The list of covariates for the model in changes is
given in Table A.2. Households on average have more parental education,13 books
and more than a hundred books, personal computers and internet access. At the
same time, schools are bigger.
Table A.3 shows the results from a model in changes that has the same negative
but not significant effect on the value-added to all and to voucher schools. Note the
similarities with the previous IV results. Table A.4 shows the heterogeneity regres-
sion where the voucher system is more incentive-driven for more aﬄuent families,
those with higher parent average years at school, personal computers and internet
access at home, smaller schools, schools with a higher SIMCE average and near
median dispersion in SIMCE test scores.
13Of course, the years of each parent education can not defer by more than positive six years so
the min and max are inaccuracies in giving the information. Anyway they are by far the exceptions
in the whole dataset.
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Table A.1 Summary statistics of competition indices in changes
Variables in changes Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
overall competition index -0.719 5.32 -32.738 38.59
voucher competition index 4.288 4.241 -23.237 42.928
public voucher competition index 0.298 1.761 -7.348 11.842
private voucher competition index 3.991 3.888 -20.04 37.114
private competition index -5.008 3.493 -16.916 2.148
Table A.2 Summary statistics list of covariates in changes
Variables in changes Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
pupils per school 236.612 1000.27 -6140 5187
father education 0.159 2.926 -18 21
mother education 0.195 2.824 -16 18
books at home 0.393 69.164 -250 178
households with > 100 books -0.056 0.484 -1 1
households with pc 0.318 0.547 -1 1
households with internet 0.264 0.533 -1 1
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Table A.3 Overall and voucher in changes
Secondary-Primary
SIMCE in changes
all pupils
overall competition index in changes -0.123 -0.147
(.088) (.091)
SIMCE in changes
voucher pupils
voucher competition index in changes -0.067 -0.072
(.056) (.065)
1 Source: Author’s calculation from research data provided by the Chilean
Ministry of Education’s Agency for Quality in Education. The data is available
only to researchers after submitting a written proposal.
2 The table shows the effect of changes in competition between primary, in 2002,
and secondary school, in 2008, on value-added in educational test scores without
and with covariates for pupils who sat for the SIMCE Language and Math Tests
(unified in one ranking) in the 4th grade of primary school in 2002 and (but not
or) for the SIMCE Language and Math Tests (unified in one ranking) six years
later in the 10th grade of secondary school in 2008 for all and voucher schools
located in Greater Santiago.
3 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.4 Heterogeneity in
changes
variable changes
Baseline -0.072
family background
income pcm
Above 95% (≈ £2,000) 2.822
Above median (≈ £200) 0.113
Below median -0.05
Below 5% (≈ £50) -0.09
average years of school
Above 95% (17 years) 0.955**
Above median (12 years) 0.132
Below median -0.017
Below 5% (6 years) -0.125
books at home
Above 95% (180) 0.687**
Above median (35) -0.025
Below median 0.08
Below 5% (2) -0.143
pc at home
Yes 0.122
No -0.339
internet at home
Yes 0.222
No -0.318
school characteristics
mean number of pupils
Above 95% (2,172) -0.248
Above median (829) -0.052
Below median 0.061
Below 5% (248) 0.173
SIMCE average
Above 95% (80.84) 0.238
Above median (48.955) 0.177
Below median -0.048
Below 5% (24.33) -0.274**
SIMCE standard deviation
Above 95% (27.83) 0.629
Above median (23.5) 0.192
Below median -0.42
Below 5% (15.77) 0.145
1 Effect of competition on test scores by fam-
ily background and school characteristics in
changes with controls. Baseline is regression
in changes for voucher school test scores on
voucher school competition.
2 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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B. Disaggregating
Tables B.1 and B.2 show the “disaggregated” twice competition, firstly in voucher
and private competition and secondly in public and private vouchers. Doing so per-
mits the different causes of a better performance to be disentangled to identify, for
example, whether the competition among voucher or private schools or, perhaps,
public voucher or private voucher schools leads to better or worse performance in
overall pupils. Table B.1 shows similar results for primary and secondary school with
voucher school competition—after including controls and municipality FE—does not
have any effect on overall pupil test results while private competition has a strong
positive effect on them. In the other form of splitting overall competition, i.e. split-
ting voucher competition into public voucher and private voucher leaving private
competition outside the model, the main findings are that public voucher competi-
tion causes pupils to perform worse while private voucher competition causes overall
pupils to perform better overall. Therefore, in summary, vouchers and public voucher
competition cause a negative effect (i.e. lead to a decreased performance) in pupils
overall, while private vouchers and private competition have a positive effect (i.e.
lead to an increased performance). But all these is permeated with bias so it is
needed to use an IV procedure. Table B.2 indeed shows that in contrast there are
no positive effect on either of the four types of competition on overall pupil tests,
which confirm the main paper results.
Tables B.3 and B.4 show both the cause and effect “disaggregated”, so it is possi-
ble to ask whether public voucher competition affects private voucher pupils, or any
of the overall 48 possibilities (in primary/secondary, voucher-private/public-private
voucher) possibilities. As shown, the outcome is that voucher competition exerts a
negative effect on public voucher pupils, a positive effect on private voucher pupils
and a significant negative effect on private school pupils in primary school. More-
over, public voucher competition provokes a clear negative effect in private school
pupils while a mixed effect on public voucher and private voucher school pupils.
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Private voucher competition causes a mainly positive effect on the three types of
test results and pupils. The most remarkable results are the positive effect of private
competition on public voucher, private voucher and the same private test scores and
the mixed effects of voucher competition on the “disaggregated” test results and
pupils. It is also noticeable that public and private voucher competitions have a
rather neutral effect on all types, but a negative effect on private voucher schools.
This result may be attributed to the private schools’ location, namely the “High
Neighbourhood”.
Table B.3 shows that voucher competition causes a negative effect on private
pupils on primary school and a positive effect on voucher pupils and a negative
effect on private school pupils on secondary. While private competition creates pri-
marily a positive effect on the three types of pupils at both level of school education.
At the same time, public voucher competition causes various negative effects on the
“disaggregated” pupils in both levels, while private voucher competition exerts a
positive effect on voucher school pupils and private school pupils mainly in sec-
ondary school. This is for endogenously biased estimates, so there is need to at
least check the regularity of these results with the instrumental variable regressions.
Table B.4 shows that for primary schools, there is a relative confirmation of the
OLS findings with some exceptions: There is a full positive effect on the “disaggre-
gated” test results and pupils. At the same time, public voucher competition exerts
positive effects on the “disaggregated” test results and pupils, while private voucher
competition causes negative effects on almost every type of pupil. Conversely, it is
in secondary school were the IV results show more novelties: Voucher competition
provokes primarily negative effects, being positive only on private voucher school
pupils, while private competition loses almost all its strength but for the effect on
public voucher school pupils. Public voucher competition exerts positive effects but
on its own public voucher school pupils, while private vouchers positively affect pub-
lic voucher school pupils, negatively affect private school pupils and provides mixed
effects to its own private voucher school pupils.
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Chapter 2
Effect of diminishing School
Attendance on Test Scores:
Evidence from the Chilean
School Occupations
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is the result of my attempt to measure the effect of a dramatic de-
crease in school attendance related to the so-called “Chilean Winter”, a huge social
outburst that shook the country with an explosion of pupil protests which started
in early June of 2011 and continued with sequential but diminishing bursts until the
end of 2012—and even had smaller replicas until fairly recently. The question to be
answered relates to whether or not there is a causal relationship between lost school
days in the context of protests and school occupations and a decrease in the stan-
dardized test performance for those pupils whose schools were occupied. I do not
want to deter anybody from participating in politics. Indeed, this paper says noth-
ing about the righteousness or evil of school occupation. This paper is about school
attendance and school occupation is used only as an external exogenous variation
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to disentangle the effect of a worsening in school attendance on pupil achievement.
I just want to put forwards some facts and causal effects of school closure due to
school occupation in terms of test score achievements and human capital accumula-
tion.
It is difficult to imagine a timeless production function for education. New tech-
nology has changed the paradigm, but traditional face-to-face teacher/pupil interac-
tion is still considered essential to learning. A recent report by the UK Department
of Education, Improving Attendance at School, illustrates the fact that despite a
diminishing trend in cancelled school days in England, there were still 57 million
days of school missed in 2009/2010. Second, there is a clear link—but not neces-
sarily causal—between poor attendance at school and lower academic achievement.
Third, of pupils who miss more than 50 per cent of school, only three per cent man-
age to achieve five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C, including mathematics and
English. In contrast, 73 per cent of pupils who have over 95 per cent attendance
achieve five or more GCSEs at grades A* to C. Fourth, when considering attendance,
it is worth noting what a one percentage point improvement means in terms of days
missed. An average-sized secondary school that manages to improve its attendance
by one percentage point represents an additional 1,300 pupil-days spent in school in
a year. That is a significant amount of education.
Some of this evidence can be directly extrapolated to the case in Chile. School
absence is detrimental to pupil performance. Children who are persistently absent
perform worse at school and have worse job prospects, which has the potential to
increase poverty and crime rates. However, this study does not focus on chronic
absence, but is concerned with the hypothesis that poor test scores can be directly
linked to an acute—but not necessarily short—episode of days missed, namely the
episode suffered within the 205 occupied schools during the so-called Chilean Win-
ter. Estimates indicate that during this sole episode, almost 8 million pupil-days
were missed from these 205 occupied schools. To put this into perspective, while in
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England there are 8.2 million pupils attending 24,372 schools, Chile has roughly half
of both, with 3.6 million pupils attending 12,063 schools. As noted above, in Eng-
land there were a total of 57 million pupil-days of school missed in 2009/2010. To
restate, in Chile 205 out of 12,063 schools represented almost 8 million riot-related
pupil-days missed. It is therefore a very plausible hypothesis that this period of
absence could have directly and negatively impacted the process of education in
Chile. Therefore, this study seeks to establish a causal relationship between lost
school days and standardized test results.
Thanks to the national register of attendance, the number of cancelled days ex-
perienced by the identified schools can be measured. At a school-level, cancelled
days refer specifically to days missed because the school was occupied. It does not
include pupil sick days or absences for any other cause. On the other hand, when
examining the data at pupil-level, it is easy to detect different types of cancelled
days. For instance, school occupation cancelled days manifest themselves as the
sharp end of variation in individual attendance and create a distinct difference be-
tween individual and average attendance for each occupied school. In Chile, there
is not a fixed number of school days, but there is a regulatory framework issued for
each administrative division which outlines general rules. Schools are then free to
choose a calendar under these general rules. The regulatory framework fixes two
weeks of winter holidays, the starting and ending days of classes, and some national
holidays to be followed. In other words, there is no absolute baseline for attended
school days to make comparisons, and this study must rely on a relative method
to identify cancelled days. Unfortunately, this method fails to tell if some controls
should better be included as additional occupied schools. For this reason my esti-
mates may underestimate the real figures. Cancelled days can be identified in the
national register because schools report few open or school working days during
occupations. Therefore, cancelled days are calculated directly as the difference in
open or working days in the national registry of attendance between occupied and
non-occupied schools. The study then holds the following unifying definition. Pupil-
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missed school days, pupil forced-to-cancel school days, and pupil-lost days, have the
same meaning in this study. At the same time, “missed”/“cancelled”/“lost” school
days are used interchangeably, meaning non-attended school days because of school
occupations.
It is well known in the literature that there is a positive correlation between
school attendance and school performance, i.e. pupils who attend more classes
are better off: Goodman—using Massachusetts data for American students and an
instrumental variable exploiting the fact that moderate snowfall induces student ab-
sences while extreme snowfall causes school closures—shows that exogenous snow
days’ disruption and the absence provoked by bad weather reduces math achieve-
ment by 0.05σ, Goodman (2014). At the same time, longer school days and school
years are also associated with better pupil achievement: Hincapie´ shows for Colom-
bia—where municipalities were given more flexibility to choose the length of the
school day for their schools following the rescindment in 1994 of the full school day
reform; some schools offer a full school day (7 hours), meanwhile others have half
school days (or two separate 4 or 5 hour shifts)—that the cohorts exposed to full
school days have test scores that are about 0.1σ higher than cohorts that attended
half school days, Hincapie´ (2016). While Pischke uses variation introduced by two
short school years in Germany—shorter by a third—finding more repetition and less
continuing education, but not finding any adverse effect on long-term outcomes, e.g.
earning or employment, Pischke (2007). How does this compare with my results?
After using different econometric techniques I have very robust estimates which for
“hardliner”—students who on average occupied their school for 48.08 days: more
than 2 months and a week—imply a decrease in 0.18σ on the standardized test
scores. So my estimates are somehow higher most probably because the treatment
is more intense and perdurable .
In this chapter, using a unique list of occupied schools filtered by the Chilean
police, I implement a Difference-in-Difference (DiD), a Difference-in-Difference-in-
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Difference (DiDiD) and synthetic control estimates to assess the following research
question: how did lost school days in the context of protests and school occupations
affect overall pupil performance on standardized tests during the Chilean Winter
(June 2011-November 2012)? I classify schools as occupied and non-occupied ac-
cording to a leaked police report. I further distinguish between occupied-S (occu-
pied schools that gave up the occupation and sat for the first standardized test, the
SIMCE, after the onset of the revolts; because they allowed the standardized test
to take place I also called them moderates) and occupied-NS (occupied schools that
did not give in so they did not take the first standardized test, the SIMCE, after the
onset of the revolts; because they did not surrender, I call them hard-liners). The
evidence provided by the DiD indicates that the average test results of the hard-liner
occupied group who suffered an average of 48.08 days of school cancellations due
to the riots, i.e. 2 calendar months and 1 week of missed days, decreased by 5.4
percentile; this result is strongly statistically significant at the 5% level and sizeable
in magnitude. The performance of these pupils dropped, as commented on before,
almost 0.18 standard deviation, which is large in terms of its cost in human capital.
This means that there is also sufficient evidence not to reject the hypothesis that
protests caused a decrease in the performance of the pupils in occupied schools. The
DiDiD estimates also give similar results. For example, for the occupied-NS 10th-
4th the DiDiD estimate shows a decrease of 5.78 percentile or 0.19 of a standard
deviation. Additionally, the synthetic control method gives a reduction of 4.6 points
in the standardized tests which is a reduction of 0.1 standard deviation in test results.
Throughout this paper, I use the definition of causality presented in Lewis (1973),
Pearl (2009) and Woodward (2003). For the Difference-in-Difference estimate, I
closely follow the work of Angrist and Pischke (2009), Card (1990) and Card and
Krueger (1994). For the synthetic control estimate, I employ the work of Abadie et
al. (2011), Diamond et al. (2010) and Abadie et al. (2003). Furthermore, there is also
companion literature on the effects of compulsory attendance in a quasi-experimental
setting, for example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Card and Lemieux (2001).
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2.1.1 Background and theory
During the Chilean Winter and within a matter of days riots reached the na-
tional level with hundreds of thousands of pupils occupying schools, marching on the
streets and demanding better education. The protests lasted for different periods of
time in different schools, but as a general rule most schools were no longer occupied
by the end of 2012 (see Appendix IV).
The SIMCE, the outcome this chapter examines, is the Chilean standardized
test which takes place regularly each year but for different cohorts. Chilean primary
education is divided into eight grades, identified as 1st-2nd-3rd-4th-5th-6th-7th-8th.
Secondary schools have four grades which will be identified here as 9th-10th-11th-
12th. This amounts to twelve years of education. The SIMCE test sometimes covers
languages, math and science, as in 4th and 8th grades, and sometimes covers just
languages and math, as in 10th grade; these are the three grades analysed.
Pupils want better education, and in the event just described they fought for
public education and against for-profit schools. I will not assert if they are right
or wrong. But their voice stands from the fact that the students have been the
protagonists of the disputed Chilean voucher experiment. Academia, including my
personal work on chapter 1 of this thesis, has found that the voucher system does
not seem to respond to spatial incentives and educational outcomes are unimpres-
sive. In other words, while competition among schools, matching families to schools,
the closing of bad schools, mainly public schools, and the entrance to the market of
new but seemingly not more productive schools, have all occurred, they have been
unsuccessful in improving the performance of the whole educational system. In fact,
the vast majority of poor pupils have received an extremely bad education which has
condemned them to further poverty. What pupils want is an opportunity society.
They want to boost their talents. They are asking only for a chance at a better life
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through education. But some of them are doing so by hampering their own personal
education with a dramatic excision of their own number of school days: a break on
their academic life through a radical blow to their school attendance.
I also acknowledge the existence of “compensatory” activities by students (or
students’ parents) offsetting a reduced investment in human capital with greater
out-of-school educational effort. In other words, parents or the students themselves,
may be able to exploit the school absence to reduce the lack of investment due to
lost school days with special educational aids and commitments. In fact, better
educated parents are expected to compensate more than less educated ones. This
activity will bias downwardly the estimates, causing the effect of school absence to
be less steep than it really is.
There may be two different channels to link the lost days due to school occupa-
tion with the diminishing scores of the outcome exam. The main and straightforward
channel is through pupils’ school absence. The longer the absence, the greater the
impairment in human capital accumulation. This can be tested by the dose effect
model discussed below. There is also a type of school deferral, which implies that
the activities in which the pupils are involved are completely different from the ac-
tivities, for instance, during a holiday recess. One way is to add depth at the recess
in academic activities when a school occupation is in place: one week of school oc-
cupation, or just the threat of occupation, could influence more than the customary
absences from school. This effect can be captured just by the treated dummy vari-
able of belonging or not to the police report list of occupied schools, irrespective of
the days of school missing.
This model could not exhaust itself on the demonstration of protests and school
occupation as instruments on missed school days to explain bad performance. In
fact, the direct relation of absenteeism caused by school occupation is also likely to
take place. Absenteeism due to school occupation can explain the variation in pupil
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achievement. I argue that the character of the absenteeism is not different from other
instigators. In a typical holiday period, the composition of the spare time could not
be radically different from the composition of spare time during a school occupation
absence. A school occupation is a radical step, potentially altering many strata of
life, such as sociability, friends and classmates, significant others and parents. All
these relations could become tense to the maximum if the school has been occupied.
But the core common causal effect is the same: lost school days or reduced school
attendance.
In Section 2, the model is outlined and in Section 3 the treatment and the out-
come are defined. Section 4 offers pupil-level data; an analyses for school-level data;
a robustness check; an evaluation of the identifying assumptions; and an evaluation
of missed days as an extension of causality. Finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion.
Five appendices include the complete police report list of 205 occupied schools in the
central region of Santiago (I), the synthetic control R code (II), a robustness check
for the synthetic control employed here (III), an outburst review of the Chilean Win-
ter in the media at a national level (IV) and the geography of the occupied schools
(V).
2.2 Empirical methods
2.2.1 The model
All my regressions are restrictions of the following general model.
Yist = αi + βmissedist + X
′
itΛ + Z
′
stΘ + ϕs + δt + εist (2.2.1)
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The indices are as follows: i is individual; s is school; t is level of educa-
tion/cohort, primary or secondary. The dependent variable is Yist, a standardized
test score of pupil i going to school s at level of education t. The main independent
variable is a continuous variable missedist which represents missed school days or
the causal variable of interest (which will be proxied by a dummy if referring to an
occupied school during the Chilean Winter, occupyst). The control variables are
Xit, individual characteristics, and Zst, school characteristics. Individual charac-
teristics include prior achievements (SIMCE or grades), school choice, age, gender,
family background, books at home, or disadvantaged group member (family receiv-
ing subsidy, Chile Solidario, vulnerability index, integrated, etc.). School character-
istics include same-grade average standardized test score, size and school type dum-
mies PubV, PriV and Pri (the three sectors of Chilean educational system: public
voucher, private voucher and private. See Section 1.2. The school system for further
details). Fixed effects include αi (an individual fixed effect which causes problems
when correlated with the error term),1 ϕs (a school fixed effect), and δt (a level of
education/cohort fixed effect). Finally, the error term εist represents possible serial
correlation, heteroskedasticity, or unobserved characteristics (other teacher qualities
outside of observable teacher evaluations, motivation of neighbours, or other local
resources that improve pupil educational outcomes).2 A data generating process
with pupils sampled from many schools is likely to be correlated. Therefore, stan-
dard errors should be clustered at the school level.
This study also considers the following relationship, which demonstrates the
identification strategy for uncovering the causal relation of interest.
Yist = αi + βoccupyst + X
′
itΛ + Z
′
stΘ + ϕs + δt + εist (2.2.2)
1The correlation between the regressors and the individual fixed effect, unobserved effect or
unobserved heterogeneity (αi = α+γAi) requires controlling for the fixed effect, DiD and synthetic
control method.
2As an assumption, there is no correlation between the causal regressor and the idiosyncratic
error εist. Therefore, I can proceed with DiD and synthetic control analysis.
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The reduced form equation shows how school occupation in the Chilean Winter
can be a an instrument for missed school days (see discussion of a fully IV model
at the end of the chapter as an extension). The equation is used to disentangle the
model’s unobservables.
Finally, in order to clarify the main DiD model is as follows:3
Yist = γs + λt + δoccupyst + εist (2.2.3)
where i is a student, s denotes school and t level of education/cohort and E(εist|s, t) =
0. γs is a occupied/non-occupied time-invariant school group effect and λt a
level of education/cohort that is common across schools. occupyst is a dummy
for occupied schools and level of education/cohort and δ is a constant equal to
E[Y1ist −Y0ist|s, t]. The additive structure permits for each non-occupied school:
E[Yist|s = non occupied schools, t = 10th]−
E[Yist|s = non occupied schools, t = 4th] = λ10th − λ4th
(2.2.4)
and for each occupied school:
E[Yist|s = occupied schools, t = 10th]−
E[Yist|s = occupied schools, t = 4th] = λ10th − λ4th + δ
(2.2.5)
3-1 refers to previous cohort or level of education
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Then the population DiD is the causal effect δ of occupyst:
{E[Yist|s = occupied schools, t = 10th]−
E[Yist|s = occupied schools, t = 4th]}−
{E[Yist|s = non occupied schools, t = 10th]−
E[Yist|s = non occupied schools, t = 4th]}
= δ
(2.2.6)
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Treatment: Occupied schools
This study strictly follows the filtered Carabineros/LA TERCERA list of occu-
pied schools in Santiago (see Appendix I). The first standardized test -called the
SIMCE- was scheduled on October 19th 2011, four months after the onset of the
protests. In relation to this test, the list can be further divided into 108 occupied
schools that gave up occupation and held the test on that day, which this study calls
Occupied-S/moderate schools (Occupied-S meaning occupied according to the po-
lice report + SIMCE). There are 97 Occupied-NS/hard-liner schools (Occupied-NS
meaning occupied according to the police report + No SIMCE). The control group
and all three treatment groups (O, Occupied-S and Occupied-NS) have no mechan-
ically similar observable characteristics. Nevertheless, a comparison of the control
Occupied-S and Occupied-NS groups in Table 2.1 indicates that the groups are in-
deed comparable. Only slight differences exist between the control group and both
occupied groups in the percentage of school type, but not between the groups them-
selves. There are some specific differences in treatment (post-treatment SIMCE).
There is also a particularly higher income in the occupied-NS group which shows
that families with above average income have their children in the hard-liner schools
(which in Chile is called an aspirational family), but this unevenness can be eas-
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ily overcome using methods and assumptions such as DiD, matching and synthetic
control. Occupations continued after this first SIMCE test and into 2012, the next
year. However, on the next test date of November 6thth, 2012, almost all of the 205
schools sat for the test. Figure 2.1 shows a map with the treated groups: Occupied-S
and Occupied-NS.
Note that while the decision to enter into the treated group was sometimes made
through a democratic process and sometimes through the decision of a few, as soon
as the school was occupied, no more academic work could be performed there. Lec-
tures and classes all stopped immediately and could not resume until the occupation
had surrendered. School days were in fact cancelled for every pupil in the occupied
school. This signifies that, at least for those forced to comply with the school oc-
cupation, the treatment can be viewed as if randomly assigned in the sense that, in
principle, missed days from school are assumed to be uncorrelated with the other
determinants of standardized test performance changes over this period. Being able
to identify this margin could be a significant extension of this paper.
2.3.2 The SIMCE
As mentioned above, the SIMCE is this chapter’s outcome. The SIMCE is the
Chilean standardized test, which takes place regularly each year for different cohorts.
Figure 2.2 shows the relevant SIMCE exams. It includes two pupil-level cohorts in
the periods of 2006-2012 and 2007-2011. Occupied-S schools sat for both SIMCEs
(October 19th, 2011 and November 6thth, 2012). Occupied-NS schools did not sit for
the October SIMCE test, because they did not surrender their school occupation.
Figure 2.2 shows nine 2-period cohorts and one 3-period cohort.
Pupil-level cohorts have two or three observations during the cohort time lapse.
One of the two cohorts were for 4th-year students in 2007, 8th-year students in 2011
and 10th-year students in 2013. The other cohorts included pupils that were in 4th
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level in 2006 and in level 10th in 2012. Both cohorts can be tracked at a pupil level
through both the SIMCE results and several pupil, parent and teacher question-
naires. Pupil-level cohorts provide an insight into the micro-economic foundations
of the data which model the individual decision of the agents for the na¨ıve esti-
mator, DiD, matching, and regression with pupil-level controls and dose-response
analysis. The other margin at which the data can be handled is on the school level.
This approach allows the creation of new cohorts along the diagonal, or following a
given school at different years across pupil-level cohorts. This is more suitable for
synthetic control, na¨ıve estimator, DiD, matching and regressions with school-level
controls and dose-response analysis.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Pupil-level analysis
Difference-in-Difference
This section presents the results of the DiD estimates. Table 2.2 shows the
DiD estimate of the average test results per school before and after occupation for
Occupied-S schools on October 19th, 2011, where just Occupied-S schools sat for
the test. The results (for the first row) show that the pre-treatment test results
(the 2007 SIMCE for 4th grade of primary school in languages, math, and science)
were lower, higher and higher respectively in the 108 Occupied-S schools than the
results in the control group (CG). The difference is strongly significant at the 5%
level. Later, during the protests and school occupations that started in early June
of 2011 and lasted until the date of the tests (October 19th 2011), an average of at
least 11.58 days (or 2 calendar weeks) of normal school activities were lost in the
schools that appeared on the police report list of occupied schools. These losses
took place at the end of June, the climax of the occupations, and the occupations
were suspended in order to sit for the post-treatment 2011 languages, math and
science SIMCE tests. The post-treatment test results for Occupied-S schools are
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significantly lower than those of the control group. The third row shows that the
difference in test results from pre- to post-treatment years is negative, showing a
decrease in outcome for the treated units. That is, for Occupied-S, the three test
results decrease with a strongly significant drop in scores. Under the parallel trend
assumption, this means that there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis
that lost school days during school occupations do not affect pupil performance on
standardized tests during the Chilean Winter. In particular, the average of 11.58
days of school occupation leads to a decrease in 1.56, 2.23 and 2.62 percentile points
in the test result outcomes for the 108 Occupied-S schools.
Table 2.3 shows the same 108 Occupied-S schools after 9.56 lost school days. This
is less time lost than in the previous sub-period, because the Occupied-S schools im-
plemented extra time activities to catch up with the control group. Again, the
first-row results show that the pre-treatment test results for the 2006 SIMCE are
lower and lower in the 108 Occupied-S schools than those of the control group (CG).
These results represent the 2006 SIMCE for 4th grade of primary school, which took
place six (not four) years before the post-treatment test in languages and math (sci-
ence was excluded from the 10th SIMCE test). For the second row, post-treatment
test results for Occupied-S schools are respectively lower than the control group. The
third row shows that the difference in test results from pre- to post-treatment years
is slightly positive in the control group as well. For Occupied-S schools, the two test
results drop by 1.45 (language) and 1.10 (math) relative to the control group and
before and after the treatment. Under the parallel trend assumption, this means
that there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that lost school days
during the school occupations did not affect pupil performance on standardized tests
during the Chilean Winter. As a matter of fact, lost school days during the school
occupations decreased pupil performance for Occupied-S schools during the period
from June 2011 to November 6th, 2012.
Finally, Table 2.4 overviews the 97 Occupied-NS schools that did not take the
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2011 SIMCE but did take the November 6th, 2012 SIMCE. The results (for the first
row) show that the pre-treatment test results (the 2006 SIMCE for 4th grade of
primary school in languages and math) are lower and higher in the 97 Occupied-NS
schools than those results in the control group (CG). The difference is strongly sig-
nificant at the 5% level. During the period from June 2011 to the date of the second
test after the onset of the revolts on November 6th, 2012, at least an average of 48.08
days (or 2 calendar months) of normal school activities were lost in the schools that
appeared on the police report list of occupied schools at the end of June, the climax
of the occupations. These absences took place in schools that did not take the 2011
SIMCE. For the second row, the post-treatment test results for Occupied-NS schools
remain strongly, significantly lower than those of the control group. The third row
shows that the difference in test results from post- to pre-treatment years is nega-
tive, indicating that treated units decrease in outcome. That is, for Occupied-NS
schools, the two test results plunge with a strongly significant drop in scores by 2.14
(languages) and 5.40 (math) percentile points. Under the parallel trend assump-
tion, this means that there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that
lost school days during the school occupations did not affect the pupil performance
on standardized tests. As a result, this study’s main results hold for both school
types. There is strong evidence that school occupations during the Chilean Winter
significantly decreased the performance of the pupils of these two types of treated
schools on their standardized tests. As a comparison, Hanushek (2003) suggests
that a standard deviation increase of 1 in overall teacher quality is associated with a
0.11 standard deviation increase in student performance. This compares to an 0.18
decrease in standard deviation to which the 5.40 lower percentile points are equal.
Therefore, an increase in 1.5 standard deviations in teacher quality is cancelled out
by being on the occupied school list. Therefore, the effect outlined in this chapter
is a particularly strong one.
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Na¨ıve estimators
The na¨ıve estimators are a by-product of the DiD, or the mean of the treated
minus the mean of the untreated after the treatment. Thus, it is expressed by the
second row of each DiD estimator. Table 2.5 summarizes the results.
Regression with controls
To replicate all of these test results, the alternative regression approach can
be considered, or a regression of the difference in the school occupation dummy.
The results are exactly the same as those received using the DiD estimator. The
advantage of this specification is that controls can be added to the model. Table
2.5 shows the results of adding nine controls, which are books, HH income, being
indigenous, mother and father’s education, pc at home, internet at home, preschool
and repeating a year.
DiDiD
As seen above, there are losses in value-added for the cohorts immediately after
the treatment, or “during” cohorts. If the pre- and post-cohort DiD estimates are
added to these estimates, it can be seen that there are no gains or losses in value-
added for pre-treatment cohorts for Occupied-S 8th 2009-4th 2005 and Occupied-
S and Occupied-NS 10th 2008-4th 2002. The novelty is that these losses persist
for the cohorts two years later, Occupied-S 8th 2013-4th 2009 and Occupied-S and
Occupied-NS 10th 2013-4th 2007. This indicates that the effect of school occupation
is persistent, as seen in Table 2.6. These are post cohorts because there is thought
to be sufficient time for the effect to fade away. This study seeks to answer the
question of precisely whether there is a long term effect. In Figure 2.2, Occupied-S
and Occupied-NS are in orange (6-year gap with tenth to fourth 2-period cohorts)
and Occupied-S are in yellow (4-year gap with eighth to fourth 2-period cohorts)
with the last group sharing the green three-stage cohort. It is important to notice
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that it is possible for only pupils to be followed from primary to secondary school,
not schools. Applying a DiDiD approach, which subtracts the during-DiD estimate
from the pre-DiD estimate, the data can be controlled for unobserved divergent or
convergent trends in the series (data that do not have parallel trends). The following
is the DiDiD procedure:
DiDiD = DiDduring −DiDpre (2.4.1)
The DiDiD strategy can also be used to analyse the only three-wave cohort which
is precisely amid the onset of more active protests, 4th07-8th11-10th13, see Figure
2.7. Unfortunately, this cohort contains no Occupied-NS schools which did not sit
for the October 2011 test. They continue to display a strong decay in performance
as a result of the protests after controlling for unobserved divergent or convergent
trends in the data series.
2.4.2 School-level analysis, i.e. same-grade-level analysis
Difference-in-Difference
This section presents the results of the DiD estimates for school-level analysis.
These are not value-added components. Instead, they represent simple comparisons
between one-year performance figures for a grade in a definite school and another
cohort performance for the same grade and school in another year. These are not any
value-added estimates because different cohorts are examined, and pupil averages
or schools are analysed, not pupils themselves. Table 2.8 shows the DiD estimate of
average test results per school before and after school occupations for Occupied-S
schools on October 19th, 2011, where just Occupied-S schools sat for the test. The
shortest diagonal cohort of the same grade is used, 8th in 2011.
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The results (for the first row) show that the pre-treatment test results (the 2009
SIMCE for 8th-year primary school in languages, math, and science) are, signifi-
cantly, 5% lower in the 108 Occupied-S schools than in the control group (CG).
Afterwards and during the protests and school occupations, which started in early
June of 2011 and lasted until the date of the tests (October 19th, 2011), at least
an average of 11.58 days (2 calendar weeks) of normal school activities were lost
in the schools that appeared on the police report list of occupied schools at the
end of June, the climax of the occupations. The occupations of these schools were
ended in order to allow students to sit for the post-treatment 2011 languages, math
and science SIMCE tests. In the second row, the post-treatment test results for
Occupied-S schools are significantly lower than those of the control group, and with
similar magnitudes to those above. The third row shows that the difference in test
results from pre- to post-treatment years is not significant at a 5% level. Under
the parallel trend assumption, this means that there is not sufficient evidence to
reject the null hypothesis that lost school days during the school occupations do
not affect pupil performance on standardized tests—at least for these schools and
time periods. In particular, the average of 11.58 days of school occupation leads to
an insignificant decrease of 1.31, an increase of 0.67, and again a decrease of 1.78 in
percentile points in the test result outcomes for the 108 Occupied-S schools.
Table 2.9 shows the same 108 Occupied-S schools, but now after 9.56 lost school
days (approximately 2 calendar weeks). That is less time lost than before, because
the schools implemented extra time activities to catch up with the control group for
the shortest diagonal cohort, 10th grade, which is 2010.
Again, the results for the first row show that the pre-treatment test results
(the 2010 SIMCE for 10th grade of secondary school) were lower in the 108 schools
(Occupied-S) than those of the control group (CG). However, this time the results
come from the period two years before the post-treatment test in languages and
math (science was excluded from the 10th SIMCE test). The difference is strongly
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significant, at a 5% level. During the period from June 2011 to the date of the second
test after the onset of the revolts on November 6th, 2012, at least an average of 9.56
days (approximately 2 calendar weeks) of normal school activities were lost in the
schools that appeared on the police report list of occupied schools at the end of June,
the climax of the occupations. These schools also sat the previous year’s SIMCE
test. For the second row, post-treatment test results for the Occupied-S schools are
significantly lower than the control group with similar magnitudes as those above.
The third row shows that the difference in test results from pre- to post-treatment
years was not significant at a 5% level. Under the parallel trend assumption, this
means that there is not sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that lost
school days during the school occupations do not affect pupil performance on stan-
dardized tests—at least for these schools and this time period. In particular, the
average of 9.56 days of school occupation led to a insignificant increase of 1.75 and
0.53 in percentile points in the test result outcomes for the 108 Occupied-S schools.
Finally, Table 2.10 overviews the 97 Occupied-NS schools that did not take the
2011 SIMCE but did take the November 6th, 2012 SIMCE for the shortest diagonal
cohort of 10th grade, which is 2010. The DiD estimate shows that before and after,
the average test results of the Occupied-NS schools are 3.24 and 4.89 percentile lower
relative to the control group, indicating a peak in decrement .
The results for the first row show that the pre-treatment test results (the 2010
SIMCE for grade 10th of secondary school, but two years before the post-treatment
test in languages and math) are lower in the 97 Occupied-NS schools. The difference
is strongly significant at the 5% level. During the period from June 2011 to the date
of the second test after the onset of the revolts on November 6th, 2012, at least an
average of 48.08 days (or over 2 calendar months) of normal school activities were
lost in the schools that appeared on the police report list of occupied schools. Again,
this loss took place at the end of June at the climax of the occupations, and these
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schools did not take the 2011 SIMCE. For the second row, the post-treatment test
results for the Occupied-NS schools are more significantly lower than those of the
control group. The third row shows that the difference in test results from pre- to
post-treatment years is slightly positive in the control group. For the Occupied-NS,
the two test results plunge with a strongly significant drop in scores. Under the
parallel trend assumption, this means that there is sufficient evidence to reject the
null hypothesis that lost school days during the school occupations do not affect
pupil performance on standardized tests. As a result, this study’s main result holds,
at least for the Occupied-NS school type. There is strong evidence that school oc-
cupations significantly decrease the performance of these schools’ pupils on their
standardized tests using a school level grade cohort approach. This effect is both
significant and sizeable, representing an almost 0.05 decrease in standardized test
scores. This result is very close to the pupil-level approach and a particularly strong
one.
Na¨ıve estimators
For these school-level estimates, the na¨ıve estimator is the second row of each
DiD estimator. Table 2.11 summarizes the results.
It is important to note that different cohorts bear different biases. In this case,
they are mainly upward-biased and move in a direction opposite to that of the
pupil-level averages, which are mainly downward-biased. This is because pupil-level
cohorts do not have a one-to-one correspondence to school-level cohorts because the
latter is the average of the former. For instance, suppose there are just two schools,
one with only one pupil in a percentile of 40th and the other, a larger school, with
nineteen pupils all in the same lower percentile of 20th. The school-level average
is a percentile of 30th while the pupil-level average has a percentage of only 21th.
This variation happens because bias exists in different directions with the same DiD
estimates.
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Regression with controls
This section describes alternative approaches using reduced form models sim-
ilar to what was employed in the pupil-level approach. This section focuses on
Occupied-NS schools and math tests, which had the greatest DiD estimates of -4.89.
The first alternative approach is shown in Table 2.11, a regression of the difference
in the math test percentile before and after the treatment (2010 and 2012 SIMCEs)
and the binary variable for occupied-NS schools. This strategy yields an estimate
very close to the DiD estimates after applying 10 controls. The controls include
the previous 2006 exam, books, HH income, being indigenous, mother and father’s
education, pc at home, internet at home, preschool and repeating a year.
2.4.3 Robustness check
Parallel trends
To implement DiD estimates, it is first necessary to give credibility to the paral-
lel trends assumption. This assumption is untestable. Moreover, the pupil cohorts
are observed just once before the treatment. Thus, indirect testing is not possible.
Nevertheless, a similar test can be implemented for school cohorts by simply com-
paring the trends for different school-level cohorts who sat for the SIMCE in 10th
and 8th grades.
A full sample for 10th grade pupils shows that the truth of the parallel trends
assumption is highly probable, see Figure 2.3. From 2001 to 2010, five points with
their line segments between them follow a strict parallel trends pattern. Then there
is a divergence in 2011, but again the trend returns. As mentioned above, I am
not proving parallel trends, because this assumption is untestable. Parallel trends
represent a “what if” question and will remain unanswered as a consequence of the
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fundamental problem of causal inference. In summary, from 2001 to 2013, there is
an absolute parallelism which is broken only in the treated units just before and
after the treatment period. These findings reaffirm that—at least for 10th grade
pupils—DiD is the most effective option.
A full sample of 8th grade pupils shows that the parallel trends assumption is
somehow less likely in this case, see Figure 2.4. From 2000 to 2013, there is merely
an approximate parallelism in the different cohorts who sat for the 8th grade test.
These findings suggest that for 8th grade pupils, the DiD results should be treated
with caution. At least one robust non-compliance method should be attempted with
the parallel trends assumption, such as matching or the synthetic control method.
Although parallel trend is an untestable assumption, credibility is added to its
validity in this study by performing a falsification exercise. This exercise first re-
peats the DiD estimates. However, they are repeated for the SIMCE tests held in a
full previous pupil cohort, which are SIMCEs from the 4th grade level in 2002 and
10th grade in 2008. In short, the third line of the DiD tables is reported in Table
2.12. The results are self-affirming, because the DiD estimates are strictly insignifi-
cant with an almost negligible absolute value. This cannot prove the parallel trend
assumption. However, it both justifies confidence in such a trend and provides a
benchmark against which the principal results can be tested.
Synthetic control
For 8th grade pupils, the fact that the parallel trends assumption is broken sug-
gests that another method, such as synthetic control, should be enforced. The syn-
thetic control method was introduced by Diamond et al. (2010) and implemented by
Abadie et al. (2011). It is of special interest Abadie et al. (2003)’s R implementation
paper on the Basque economy under terrorism. This method could be implemented,
closely following that example after some R coding (see Appendix II for full code) and
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using twenty-one predictors. The twenty-one predictors include SIMCE 10th, repeat,
study time, income, time to home, indigent, poor, unemployment, indigenous, pc,
internet, President scholarship, indigenous scholarship,4 tuition scholarship, other
scholarship, public insurance a, public insurance b, public insurance c, public in-
surance d,5 income with subsidies, and percentage public schools. The summary
statistics of the final variables are in Table 2.13.
The simple average of the SIMCE math and language results are used as the
variable to be predicted with the synthetic model. Also, the method is slightly mod-
ified through building a panel of 7 years (2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013)
and 52 municipalities plus the hypothetical territory of occupied schools. A control
is then synthesized from the 52 municipalities.
The result shows a strict matching of occupied schools and controls before the
treatment year, a sharper decrease in 2011, and a return to the first trend after
the treatment year. The estimated treatment effect (or the difference between the
occupied schools and the synthetic control in the treatment year) is -4.6. This treat-
ment effect is significant at any significance level and implies a 0.1 reduction in the
standard deviation in the test results, being approximately two thirds of the DiD es-
timates for 8th grade (0.18 v/s 0.1 reduction on a standard deviation in test results).
All of this implies that missed school days have a cost, and that the estimation of
this cost is consistent between the several methods presented here.
4The President scholarship is a scholarship given to high performance poor students and the
indigenous scholarship is a scholarship given to indigenous people.
5The Chilean public health insurance which includes 90% of the population is divided into 4
categories: a, b, c and d according to income. a are homeless people while d working people with
high earnings. There are also many private insurances that cover the other 10% of the population.
Mostly aﬄuent workers.
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Matching: Midway between na¨ıve and DiD estimators
From Table 2.11, it can be seen that the na¨ıve or 2012 same-year estimate of
the effect of the treatment for Occupied-NS schools is -20.07 percentile points on
the 10th grade 2012 SIMCE. This is due to lower ability in Occupied-NS pupils,
which is eliminated in the DiD estimates. To improve upon the na¨ıve or same year
2012 estimate, it is necessary to control for covariates in the same spirit that was
used for the reduced form models. An estimate including previous test scores, in
particular 4th grade SIMCE in 2006 for the same cohort, plus gender and income
of the HHs, gives -6.65 percentile points on the 10th grade 2012 SIMCE. Improving
upon these results requires matching. Using the Matching R package,6 the sample
is first balanced and then the matching treated group coefficient is estimated at
-5.75 percentile points on the 10th grade 2012 SIMCE. The values for the treated
group coefficient for Occupied-NS schools are summarized in Table 2.14. It can be
seen that the coefficient converges from below from the raw na¨ıve (or same-year
comparison of means between the same year SIMCE and the Occupied-NS treated
group) of -20.07, to the DiD estimate of -4.89. The coefficient uses the regression
with covariates with special interest on the previous year’s SIMCE scores and the
matching models. It is important to stress the key effect of the previous year scores
on the estimates. In fact, the DiD estimate is mainly this effect in its own right.
Finally, Table 2.15 shows the identification strategy of each method used above.
Na¨ıve estimation requires independence between the treatment and any function of
the potential outcomes, or random experimentation. In these settings, this is dif-
ficult to satisfy. The next method is adjusted regression, which implies selection
on observables, unconfoundedness or conditional independence. Conditional inde-
pendence is independence between the treatment and any function of the potential
outcome, conditional on some selected covariates. Matching implies the same, but
it is done in a local neighbourhood of matched pairs using the propensity score to
6Jasjeet S. Sekhon. 2011. “Multivariate and Propensity Score Matching Software with Automated
Balance Optimization: The Matching Package for R.” Journal of Statistical Software, 42(7): 1-52.
97
reduce the search to a single variable or the Mahalanobis distance. Lastly, the DiD
method implies selection on unobservables: γs and λt are wiped out by the double
difference remaining the causal effect δ of occupyist (see the previous subsection The
model for details).
Apart from the selection on observables assumption, the matching estimators
need another assumption, namely the common support Pr(D=1|X)<1. This is il-
lustrated in Figure 2.6 for the propensity score approach.
2.4.4 Evaluating the identifying assumptions
Can the treatment effect be estimated for this study’s sample? It is generally
accepted that internal validity fails when there are differences between the treated
components and controls (other than the treatment itself). These differences affect
the outcome, and this cannot be controlled for. This is tested in general with a
favourable result, as seen in Table 2.1. But any unbalance remaining can be dealt
with by the identification strategy. In particualr, difference-in-differences has two
additional threats to validity. The first threat is credibility of parallel trends, which
has been discussed above. The second threat is compositional difference, which is
briefly discussed in this subsection. Repeated cross-sections are only valid when the
composition of the target population does not change between the two periods. This
condition is tested in this study by looking at the distribution of the control and
treated groups, which suggests that their distributions are the same before the treat-
ment. Table 2.16 (an elaboration of Table 2.1) shows the compositional difference of
the control and occupied groups for control variables. Control and occupied groups
are homogeneous with each other before and after the treatment. The comparison
between each type before and after evidences the natural growth of the growing
variables such as income, pc and internet. Overall, the compositional difference is
satisfied.
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The SUTVA assumption is crucial. The treatment mechanism of assignment can
be individual, executed by third parties inside the model or by a researcher. In
this case, there is a mixture of self-decision (a majority vote school decision) and
third-party decision (a radical minority decision). The reduction in standardized
tests in school A is unaltered regardless of whether school B is occupied. This could
be challenged if there is friendship or partnership. If a boy’s school and girl’s school
in proximity to each other are both occupied, it is possible that couples decide, for
instance, to go to the beach. If just one school is occupied, students from the partner
school may decide to study alone. The reduction in standardized tests for any school
may or may not be the same whether it is occupied after a majority vote decision
or under a third-party decision.
At the same time, external validity should be contrasted. In other words, can
this study’s estimates be extrapolated to other populations? This is possible, missed
school days is quite a common event in schools all over the world, and this study un-
covers its causal effect on test scores. Comparable time deprivations in the context
of school occupations, snow storms, natural disasters, most probably have a com-
mon path to diminishing test scores. A more general claim to include disruptions in
other working environments, in the context of strikes, that involve a country health
system and how does this affect the productivity in hospitals or perhaps pilots and
airplanes’ security needs further studies.
2.4.5 Extension: Missed school days
Figure 2.7 graphically illustrates the lost school days for the pre-treatment when
there were no missed school days and during the Chilean Winter. The number of
missed school days can be identified until the October 19th, 2011 SIMCE and until
November 6th 2012. The graph also shows the intensity of the treatment, which I
call the dose of the treatment.
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Table 2.17 summarizes the key information on the amount of time attended by
the control group and lost by the relevant 3 treated groups. From June 2011 to the
8th grade SIMCE Exam on October 19th, 2011, 11.58 days were lost in Occupied-S
(occupied schools that sat the 8th grade 2011 October SIMCE test). This represents
over two calendar weeks of lost school days. In addition, 40.58 days were lost in
Occupied-NS (occupied schools that did not sit the 8th grade 2011 October SIMCE
test), or approximately two calendar months of lost school days. From June 2011
to the 10th grade SIMCE exam on November 6th, 2012, the former treatment plus
the cancelled days from October 19th, 2011 to November 6th, 2012, 9.56 (the previ-
ous 11.58 days minus 2.02 “catch-up” days) days were lost in Occupied-S (occupied
schools that sat for the 8th grade 2011 October SIMCE test). This amounts to ap-
proximately two weeks of lost school days. During this period, Occupied-S schools
actually attended more time relative to the control group. This is probably an at-
tempt to catch up with missing class material. Even so, the overall attendance rate
was negative. Finally, 48.08 (the previous 40.58 days plus an additional 7.50 lost
days) days were lost in Occupied-NS (occupied schools that did not sit for the 8th
grade 2011 October SIMCE test). This was approximately two calendar months and
one calendar week of lost school days.
Pupil-level reduced form models
In this section, I describe alternative approaches using reduced form models.
This study focuses on Occupied-NS schools and math tests, which have the greatest
DiD estimates of -5.40. The first alternative approach is reg diff ns, i.e., a regression
of the difference (diff) in the math test percentile before and after the treatment
(the 2006 and 2012 SIMCEs) and the binary variable (ns) for Occupied-NS schools.
The results are statistically significant and similar to the stand-alone model.
The second alternative approach used is a dose-response treatment. This study
uses an IV approach. First, a number of missed days variable is built by setting the
100
attendance at the 90th percentile and taking the difference between this number,
278, and the real attended days of each school.
days missed = (attend90
thpctile − attends) (2.4.2)
Table 2.18 shows the percentiles of attended and missed school days respectively.
The instrument is the occupied school dummy. The sign of the coefficients is the
appropriate: more missed days implies fewer test results. In fact, one standard
deviation in missed days 14.59 multiplied by -0.711, the coefficient with controls
and municipal fixed effect, results in a decrease of -10.37 which is 0.36 of a standard
deviation of the test results (10.37/28.86). These calculated effects are similar to
the calculated estimate using the DiD estimate (-5.40). Table 2.19 summarizes the
above results. And the following is the IV model constructed in this study:
Reduced Form
SIMCE = δ occupied + controls (2.4.3)
First Stage
days missed = γ occupied + controls (2.4.4)
Second Stage
SIMCE = β ̂days missed + controls (2.4.5)
School-level reduced form models
One standard deviation in missed days 14.59 multiplied by -0.826 (the coefficients
with controls and the municipal fixed effect) results in a decrease of -12.05 which
is 0.42 of a standard deviation of the test results (12.05/28.86). These calculated
effects are similar to the estimate calculated using the DiD estimate (-5.40). Table
2.20 summarizes the above results.
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Exclusion restriction
When using IV, Z (the instrument or occupied schools) must only affect D (the
treatment or missed days) and not Y (the outcome or the SIMCE). There are two
caveats. One caveat is that the treated and control groups are not equilibrated,
meaning that there is an effect of Z on the known covariates. For instance, income
is not equilibrated, meaning the occupied dummy causes variation in income, which
on its own causes variation in the SIMCE. This is solved by conditioning on in-
come. The second caveat is the undetermined effect, which means that the occupied
dummy has an effect on the SIMCE through other covariates not included in the
model. Such a covariate, for example, could be an ideological channel.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter has addressed the cost of lost school days using an external varia-
tion engaging in social disruptive activities. The average effect is a decrease of 5.40
percentile points in standardized tests, a 0.18σ in performance.
As stated above, compared with other effects such as the increase in value-
added by better teacher quality Hanushek (2003)—0.11σ—and comparable litera-
ture values on snow days disruption Goodman (2014)—0.05σ, length of school day
in Colombia Hincapie´ (2016)—0.1σ—and length of school year in Germany Pischke
(2007)—more repetitions and less continuing education but the same earnings and
employment, the decision to miss (and force others to miss) academic work and
go on strike is similarly deleterious to losing one and half standard deviations in
teacher quality during the same period. To put it in an explicit way, if the Insti-
tuto Nacional—whose pupils were leading the protests and walkouts—was suddenly
completely deprived of its top teachers, education would suffer from a similar drop
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in value added as it did in the years 2011 and 2012 when it was on strike with its
students involved in walk-outs and protests. Therefore, the production function of
education in Chile was seriously impeded due to school occupation.
This research is part of the causality literature implementing various techniques
to attempt to establish a causal relationship among the relevant variables in use.
Comparing the different methods included in this research, the pupil-level Occupied-
NS largest DiD estimate drop in 5.40 percentiles points can be compared to the
school-level estimate of 4.89. At the same time, the DiDiD estimates also show a
relevant decrease in school performance for pupils participating in these protests
from Occupied-NS 10th-4th grades, at 5.78 percentile points or 0.19 standard points.
The synthetic control method shows a decrease in 4.6 percentile points (or 0.1 of
a standard deviation) in the results of the occupied schools. All DiD, DiDiD and
synthetic control estimates are significantly similar to each other, which confirms the
robustness of the estimators. Moreover, they are all strongly statistically significant.
Additionally, this study verified the robustness of these estimates and discussed the
validity of the parallel trend assumption and the DiD and DiDiD estimates.
In summary, this research focused on, and hopefully identified, the cost of missing
school days in the context of students immersed in the 2011/2012 Chilean student
riots called the Chilean Winter. Missed school days can be tracked as causal effects
which decrease student standardized test performance. This study does not claim
that student protest is a negative activity or that students should not involve them-
selves in these activities, but merely seeks to disclose the relevant average cost of
lost school days. This research could assist both interested scholars and students in
recognizing and balancing the real costs of lost school days due to specific protest
and riot activities.
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Figure 2.3: Parallel Trends: 10th grade
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24
0
24
5
25
0
25
5
26
0
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
non_occupied occupied
106
Figure 2.5: Synthetic control: 8th grade
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Figure 2.6: Common support
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Table 2.1: Comparison statistics control group, occupied-S and occupied-NS
Variable Control Group Occupied-S Occupied-NS
books 42.85 49.94 64.79
income 500.15 566.81 837.93
mother indigenous 0.08 0.07 0.08
father education 12.07 12.34 12.77
mother education 11.78 12.11 12.35
pc 0.73 0.77 0.79
internet 0.57 0.62 0.67
years of preschool 1.30 1.28 1.26
repeat year 0.48 0.45 0.44
percentage public voucher schools 25.88 44.97 61.58
percentage private voucher schools 67.41 53.91 38.42
percentage private schools 6.71 1.12 0
SIMCE perc. pre-treatment Lang. 4th 50.51 48.41 49.08
SIMCE perc. pre-treatment Math 4th 50.43 49.01 50.99
SIMCE perc. Language 10th 50.67 47.05 47.09
SIMCE perc. Math 10th 50.74 47.97 45.90
SIMCE perc. difference 10th-4th Lang. 0.15 -1.36 -1.99
SIMCE perc. difference 10th-4th Math 0.31 -1.04 -5.09
1 Author’s calculation from research data provided by the Chilean Ministry of Education’s Agency for
Quality in Education. The data is available only to researchers after submitting a written proposal.
2 The table shows the summary statistics of the control group, occupied-S and occupied-NS. It lists the
type of school, pre- and post-SIMCE, difference in percentiles and control variables.
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Table 2.7: DiDiD in the three wave co-
hort
Occupied-S 8th-4th
language math
8th11-4th07 -1.56*** -2.23***
10th13-8th11 -0.35 -0.08
DiDiD -1.21*** -2.15***
1 The table shows the Difference-in-Difference-in-
Difference (DiDiD) for value-added results for the
only three wave cohort (4th07-8th11-10th13). This
gives me the opportunity to control for unobserved
divergent or convergent trends in a single cohort
or three wave series of data. This series is also
important because it pertains to the exact moment
of high protests. Data for Occupied-S protester
is only available because Occupied-NS did not sit
for the SIMCE 8th grade test. Test subjects are
language and math because science is not available
for upper grades(10th).
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Table 2.13: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
SIMCE 8th 250.075 14.767 318
SIMCE 10th 252.68 21.949 370
repeat 0.189 0.051 159
study time 6.209 0.489 53
income 431.643 373.608 212
time to home 17.961 3.121 53
indigent 0.032 0.022 208
poor 0.103 0.053 208
unemployment 0.093 0.041 208
indigenous 0.033 0.021 208
pc at home 0.374 0.277 208
internet at home 0.063 0.067 208
President scholarship 0.002 0.003 208
indigenous scholarship 0.001 0.001 155
tuition scholarship 0.001 0.001 102
other scholarship 0.005 0.005 208
public insurance a 0.245 0.109 208
public insurance b 0.217 0.065 208
public insurance c 0.119 0.041 208
public insurance d 0.088 0.029 208
subsidy income 8.68 6.859 208
percentage public schools 0.437 0.216 213
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Table 2.14: Treated group coefficient on several methods
coefficient
on Occupied-NS
method occupied schools
na¨ıve estimator (same year scores on treated group) -20.07
plus covariates (previous scores, sex, income) -6.65
plus matching estimator (propensity score) -5.75
plus matching estimator (mahalanobis) -5.12
DiD estimator -4.89
Table 2.15: Method identification strategy
method identification strategies
na¨ıve estimator (Y1,Y0)⊥⊥ D, D→Y
(same year scores on treated group) independence,
causal effect
plus covariates [(Y1,Y0)⊥⊥ D]|X
(adjusted-regression) selection on observables,
unconfoundedness,
conditional independence
plus matching estimator [(Y1,Y0)⊥⊥ D]|Pr(D=1|X)
(propensity score) locally selection on observables
plus matching estimator [(Y1,Y0)⊥⊥ D]|MAHALANOBIS(X)
(mahalanobis) locally selection on observables,
unconfoundedness,
conditional independence
DiD estimator γs, λt, δ, occupyist
selection on unobservables
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Table 2.16: Compositional difference: Occupied group before and after treat-
ment
Before, 4 After, 10
Variable Control group Occupied Control group Occupied
books 32.83 36.33 42.85 52.15
income 362.03 325.07 500.15 607.25
mother indigenous 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07
father education 12.36 12.95 12.07 12.40
mother education 12.20 12.80 11.78 12.15
pc 0.43 0.52 0.73 0.77
internet 0.20 0.23 0.57 0.63
1 Author’s calculation from research data provided by the Chilean Ministry of Education’s Agency
for Quality in Education. The data is available only to researchers after submitting a written proposal.
2 The table shows the compositional difference of the control group and the occupied group. It lists
the control variables pre- and post-treatment.
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Table 2.17: Average attended for control group (CG) and
lost school days for treated group (Occupied, Occupied-S and
Occupied-NS for the relevant periods)
June-until ’11 SIMCE
obs level s.e t-test p-value
CG 2,589 80.83*** 0.2268 353.33 0.000
Occupied 205 -26.09*** 0.837 -31.16 0.000
Occupied-S 108 -11.58*** 1.290 -8.97 0.000
Occupied-NS 97 -40.58*** 1.161 -34.83 0.000
June-until ’12 SIMCE
obs level s.e t-test p-value
CG 2,589 263.64*** 0.648 406.64 0.000
Occupied 205 -28.80*** 2.410 -11.95 0.000
Occupied-S 108 -9.56*** 3.330 -2.87 0.004
Occupied-NS 97 -48.08*** 3.411 -14.09 0.000
1 CG=Control Group. O=Occupation (police report).
2 Occupied-S=Occ (p.r.) + SIMCE. Occupied-NS=Occ (p.r.) + No
SIMCE.
3 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.18: Missed Days
attended days Percentiles missed days
201 1% 77
242 5% 36
255 10% 23
264 25% 14
270 50% 8
275 75% 3
attend90
thpctile 278 90% 0
279 95% -1
282 99% -4
Table 2.19: Effect of # missed days on 10th grade test results
instrument: overall pupil 10th grade test results
occupied schools
missedDays(dose) -0.284*** -0.441*** -0.583*** -0.711***
tests
First stage coeff. 14.850*** 11.028*** 16.374*** 11.765***
First stage F t.(F-s r.) 219.26 59.75 181.11 50.87
controls
fatheduc, books No Yes No Yes
muni FE No No Yes Yes
1 * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
2 This table shows the results of a dose-response treatment, specifically an IV approach.
The missed school days are calculated by fixing attendance at the 90th percentile,
278, and then getting the difference between this 90th percentile and the actual value
of attended days. The first stage regress number of missed days on the instrument,
occupied schools. The second stage regress the SIMCE on the estimated number of
missed school days. I also implement sequentially controls (father education and books)
and municipality fixed effects.
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The original list released in LA TERCERA newspaper on June 28th 2011* included 231 occupied  schools 
that the Chilean police declared were under control by students  in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago.
Small inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the list reduced the number of occupied schools to 205.
It was the only "official" list released throughout the protests. 
* (http://www.latercera.com/iphone/noticia/educacion/2011/06/
657-376037-9-conoce-la-lista-de-los-231-colegios-metropolitanos-que-se-mantienen-en-toma.shtml) 
(List by municipalities)
BUIN  
COLEGIO DE MAIPO LICEO FRANCISCO JAVIER KRÜGGER ALVARADO
LICEO 131 LICEO POLIVALENTE LOS GUINDOS
LICEO ALTO JAHUEL LICEO TECNICO PROFESIONAL DE BUIN
CERRO NAVIA
LICEO POLITECNICO SAN FRANCISCO SOLANO
CONCHALÍ
COLEGIO CRISTOBAL COLON LICEO AGUSTIN EDWARDS
EL BOSQUE
CENTRO EDUCACIONAL MATIAS COUSIÑO LICEO CHRISTA MC AULIFFE
COLEGIO VILLA SANTA MARIA LICEO JUAN GOMEZ MILLAS
EL MONTE
LICEO POLIVALENTE LUIS HUMBERTO ACOSTA GAY
ESTACIÓN CENTRAL
ESCUELA PARTICULAR JOSE ANTONIO LECAROS LICEO DE ADULTOS ESTACION CENTRAL
LICEO COMERCIAL B-72 LICEO POLIVALENTE A N°71 GUILLERMO FELIU CRUZ                  
INDEPENDENCIA
LICEO GABRIELA MISTRAL LICEO ROSA ESTER ALESANDRI RODRIGUEZ
LICEO IGNACIO CARRERA PINTO LICEO SAN FRANCISCO DE QUITO
LICEO MIGUEL RAFAEL PRADO LICEO SANTA TERESITA
LICEO POLIVALENTE A80 PRESIDENTE JOSE MANUEL BALMACEDA
ISLA DE MAIPO
CENTRO DE EDUCACION GENERAL BASICA CENTRO EDUCACIONAL ISLA DE MAIPO
APPENDIX I  
THE JUNE 28TH 2011 POLICE REPORT LISTS 205 OCCUPIED SCHOOLS IN SANTIAGO
LA CISTERNA
LICEO IND DE ELECTROTECNIA RAMON B
CENTRO EDUCACIONAL LINCOLN COLLEGE LICEO POLITECNICO ABDON CIFUENTES
CENTRO POLITECNICO PARTICULAR SAN RAMON LICEO POLITEC CIENCIA Y TECNOLOGIA
CHILEAN EAGLES COLLEGE N.3 LICEO POLITECNICO GALVARINO N.2
COLEGIO JOSE LUIS LEGRANGE DE LA CISTERNA LICEO POLIVALENTE LA CISTERNA N°1
COLEGIO SANTA ISABEL DE HUNGRIA LICEO POLIVALENTE OLOF PALME
ESCUELA TECNICA SANTA ROSA LICEO PORTAL DE LA CISTERNA
LA FLORIDA
COLEGIO SANTA MARIA
CHILEAN EAGLES COLLEGE COLEGIO SHIRAYURI
COLEGIO PART. ANDARES DE LA FLORIDA COMPLEJO EDUC. MUN CARD.A.SAMORE
COLEGIO PART. FAMILIA DE NAZARETH ESCUELA LAS ARAUCARIAS
COLEGIO PART. NEW LITTLE COLLEGE ESCUELA MARCELA PAZ
COLEGIO PART. SANTA LUCIA DE LO CAÑAS ESCUELA PARTIC PHILIPPE COUSTEAU
COLEGIO PARTICULAR ANTILHUE ESCUELA RAIMAPU-TIERRA FLORIDA
COLEGIO PARTICULAR NUEVA ERA SIGLO XXI LICEO ANDRES BELLO
COLEGIO POLIVALENTE EDUCADORA ELENA ROJAS LICEO BENJAMIN VICUNA MACKENNA
COLEGIO QUINTO CENTENARIO CORDILLERA LICEO INDIRA GANDHI
COLEGIO SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS LICEO NUEVO AMANECER
COLEGIO SANTA CECILIA DE LA FLORIDA LICEO POLIVALENTE LOS ALMENDROS
LA GRANJA
LICEO LA GRANJA
COLEGIO CHRISTIAN GARDEN SCHOOL LICEO POLIVALENTE FRANCISCO FRIAS V.
COLEGIO NUESTRA SENORA DE GUADALUPE SAINT CHRISTIAN COLLEGE
LA PINTANA
CENTRO EDUCACIONAL MUN.MARIANO LATORRE COLEGIO SANTO TOMAS
COLEGIO ALTO GABRIELA ESCUELA PARTICULAR PDTE.J. J.PRIETO
LO ESPEJO
LICEO POLIVALENTE
COLEGIO PARTICULAR KENNEDY LICEO TENIENTE FCO. MERY AGUIRRE
LO PRADO
COMPLEJO EDUCACIONAL PEDRO PRADO
MACUL
ESCUELA VILLA MACUL
COMPLEJO EDUC. JOAQUIN EDWARDS BELLO. LICEO POLIVAL MERC. MARIN DEL SOLAR
MAIPÚ
LICEO INDUSTRIAL ALBERTO WIDMER
COLEGIO, LICEO COMERCIAL SAN JOSE LICEO JOSE IGNACIO ZENTENO
ESC. BASICA BOSTON COLLEGE MAIPU LICEO NACIONAL DE MAIPU
ESCUELA EL LLANO DE MAIPU LICEO SANTIAGO BUERAS Y AVARIA
ÑUÑOA
LICEO COMERCIAL GABRIEL GONZALEZ VIDELA
ESCUELA BASICA  JOSE TORIBIO MEDINA LICEO LENKA FRANULIC
ESCUELA JUAN MOYA MORALES LICEO REPUBLICA DE SIRIA
LICEO AUGUSTO D HALMAR LICEO TECNICO B N° 58 JOSE MARIA NARBONA 
PADRE HURTADO
COLEGIO LOS ROBLES DEL CURATO LICEO PAUL HARRIS
PEDRO AGUIRRE CERDA
CENTRO EDUC OCHAGAVIA COLEGIO GRACE SCHOOL ESCUELA VILLA SUR
PEÑAFLOR
COLEGIO JOSE MANUEL BALMACEDA LICEO MUNICIPALIZADO PEÑAFLOR
PIRQUE
ESCUELA AGROECOLOGICA DE PIRQUE
PROVIDENCIA
COLEG POLIV PROF GUILL GONZALEZ HEINRICH LICEO DE NIÑAS N° 7 LUISA SAAVEDRA DE GONZALEZ
LICEO B 42 TAJAMAR LICEO JOSE VICTORINO LASTARRIA
LICEO CARMELA CARVAJAL DE PRAT LICEO POLIVALENTE ARTURO ALESSANDRI P.
PUDAHUEL
LICEO DE ADU ALBERTO GALLEGUILLOS J.
COLEGIO POLIV. SAN LUIS BELTRAN LICEO MONSEÑOR ENRIQUE ALVEAR
COLEGIO SANTIAGO DE PUDAHUEL LICEO MUN. CENTRO EDUC PUDAHUEL
PUENTE ALTO
COLEG POLIV PROF ILDEFONSO CALDERON
CENTRO EDUC. PRINCIPADO DE ASTURIAS COLEGIO SANTA MARIA DE LA CORDILLERA
CENTRO EDUCACIONAL FERNANDO DE ARAGON COLEGIO SENDA DEL SABER
CENTRO EDUCACIONAL SAN CARLOS DE ARAGON ESCUELA CONSOLIDADA
COLEGIO EL SEMBRADOR ESCUELA DOMINGO FAUST SARMIENTO
COLEGIO ENSENADA ESCUELA TECNICA LAS NIEVES
COLEGIO MAIPO LICEO COMERCIAL DE PUENTE ALTO
COLEGIO NUEVA ERA SIGLO XXI SEDE PUENTE ALTO LICEO IND. MUNICIPALIZADO A N° 116
COLEGIO OBISPO ALVEAR LICEO MUN.ING.MILITAR JUAN MACKENNA O.
COLEGIO PART. ACROPOLIS LICEO MUNICIPAL CHILOE
COLEGIO PARTICULAR MIRADOR LICEO PUENTE ALTO
COLEGIO POLIV. EL ALBORADA LICEO SAN GERONIMO
QUILICURA
COMPLEJO EDUCACIONAL J. MIGUEL CARRERA LICEO ALCALDE JORGE INDO
QUINTA NORMAL
LICEO INDUSTRIAL BENJAMIN FRANKLIN
LICEO EXPERIMENTAL ARTISTICO B-65 LICEO INDUSTRIAL VICENTE PEREZ ROSALES
LICEO GUILLERMO LABARCA HUBERTSON LICEO POLIVALENTE JUAN A.RIOS
RECOLETA
LICEO INDUS Y DE MINAS IGNACIO DOMEYKO
LICEO COMERCIAL LUIS CORREA PRIETO LICEO PAULA JARAQUEMADA
LICEO COMERCIAL NORA VIVIANS MOLINA LICEO VALENTIN LETELIER
RENCA
LICEO INDUSTRIAL BENJAMIN DAVILA LARRAIN
SAN BERNARDO
CENTRO EDUC. PADRE ALBERTO HURTADO DE SAN BDO LICEO CLARA SOLOVERA
CENTRO EDUCACIONAL BALDOMERO LILLO LICEO COMERCIAL DE SAN BERNARDO
COLEGIO ADULTOS INST. BARROS ARANA LICEO COMERCIAL GABRIELA MISTRAL
COLEGIO NOBEL GABRIELA MISTRAL LICEO ELVIRA BRADY MALDONADO-SN.BDO
COLEGIO PARTICULAR SANTA LUCIA LICEO IND. MIGUEL AYLWIN GAJARDO
COLEGIO POLIV. PDTE. JOSE MANUEL BALMACEDA LICEO INDUSTRIAL HARDWARE
COLEGIO SEBASTIAN EL CANO SAN BERNARDO LICEO POLIV. LUCILA GODOY ALCAYAGA
ESCUELA DE PARV. Y ESP. EDIAL LICEO POLIV A-127 FIDEL PINOCHET LE-BRUN
SAN JOAQUÍN
LICEO INDUS DE SAN MIGUEL AGUSTIN ED
CENTRO EDUCACIONAL HORACIO ARAVENA A. LICEO MUNICIPAL SAN JOAQUIN
SAN JOSÉ DE MAIPO
COLEGIO PART. ANDINO ANTUQUELEN LICEO POLIVALENTE SAN JOSE DE MAIPO
SAN MIGUEL
CENTRO EDUC. PARTICULAR SAN LUIS LICEO BETSABE HORMAZABAL DE ALARCON
ESCUELA  E INSTITUTO DE MADRID LICEO  COMERCIAL INST. SUP. DE COM. DE CHILE (EX A99)   
ESCUELA PARTICULAR Y COLEGIO CHILE LICEO LUIS GALECIO CORVERA
LICEO ANDRES BELLO LICEO TECNICO A-100 DE SAN MIGUEL
SAN RAMÓN
CENTRO EDUCACIONAL MIRADOR LICEO MUNICIPAL PURKUYEN
ESCUELA COLEGIO ALBERTO BLEST GANA LICEO MUNICIPALIZADO ARAUCANIA
ESCUELA ESPECIAL DE ADULTOS LICEO SAN FRANCISCO
SANTIAGO
COLEGIO METODISTA DE SANTIAGO LICEO INDUSTRIAL A-22 DE SANTIAGO
COLEGIO POLIV. MANUEL BAQUEDANO LICEO INDUSTRIAL ELIODORO GARCIA ZEGERS
COLEGIO SANTA MARIA DE SANTIAGO LICEO INSTITUTO NACIONAL
ESCUELA BASICA REPUBLICA DE MEXICO LICEO ISAURA DINATOR DE GUZMAN
INST.SUP.DE COMERCIO EDUARDO FREI M. LICEO JAVIERA CARRERA
INSTITUTO FEMENINO SUPERIOR DE COMERCIO E LICEO MANUEL BARROS BORGONO
INTERNADO NACIONAL BARROS ARANA LICEO MIGUEL DE CERVANTES Y SAAVEDRA
LICEO CONFEDERACION SUIZA LICEO POLITEC. PDTE. GABRIEL GONZALEZ VIDELA
LICEO DARIO SALAS LICEO POLIV.LIB. GRAL JOSE DE SAN MARTIN
LICEO DE APLICACION RECTOR JORGE E SCHNEIDER LICEO TERESA PRAT DE SARRATEA
TALAGANTE
LICEO POLITECNICO DE TALAGANTE LICEO POLIVALENTE TALAGANTE
Appendix II
Synthetic Control R Code
library(foreign)
occupy<-read.dta("occupy13.dta")
head(occupy)
library(Synth)
dataprep.out <- dataprep(
foo = occupy,
predictors = c("SIMCE10", "repeat", "studytime", "income",
"timetohome", "indigent", "poor",
"unemployment", "indigenous", "pc", "internet",
"Presidentscholarship",
"indigenousscholarship", "tuitionscholarship",
"otherscholarship", "publicinsurancea",
"publicinsuranceb", "publicinsurancec",
"publicinsuranced", "incomewithsubsidies",
"percentagepublicschools"),
predictors.op = "mean",
time.predictors.prior = c(2000,2004,2007,2009),
dependent = "SIMCE8",
unit.variable = "regionno",
unit.names.variable = "regionname",
time.variable = "year",
treatment.identifier = 13606,
controls.identifier = c(13101:13132, 13201:13203, 13301:13303,
13401:13404, 13501:13505, 13601:13605),
time.optimize.ssr = c(2000,2004,2007,2009),
time.plot = c(2000,2004,2007,2009, 2011,2013))
synth.out <- synth(data.prep.obj = dataprep.out, method = "BFGS")
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path.plot(synth.res = synth.out, dataprep.res = dataprep.out,
Ylab = "SIMCE 8", Xlab = "year",
Ylim = c(240, 260), Legend = c("occupied schools",
"synthetic occupied schools"), Legend.position = "bottomright")
pdf("fullsyncon.pdf")
dev.off()
save.image()
savehistory(file="occupy13.txt")
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Appendix III
Robustness check for synthetic control
Table 2.21 shows the predictor mean for the treated group (205 occupied schools
in the police report), the synthetic group (the weighted average of the fifty-two con-
trol municipalities after the optimization procedure), and a rough average of the
fifty-two control municipalities.
Table 2.22 explores the weights for the twenty-one predictors. It can be seen that pc
at home and internet at home are the two predictors with the highest weights, but
an additional twelve predictors also have positive weights and only seven predictors
have weights of zero.
Finally, Table 2.23 displays the subset of the donor pool, which possesses positive
weights. In fact, only six municipalities in the entire fifty-two control municipality
donor pool do so, which roughly illustrates why they have been selected. Santiago
was the epicentre of the revolts, with twenty occupied schools, and there was also
some action in San Ramo´n, with a total of six occupied schools. Padre Hurtado rep-
resents one peripheral municipality of action, having two occupied schools. Figure
2.8a demonstrates the behaviour of the treated group and the average of the fifty-
two municipalities, as opposed to a synthetic average. Figure 2.8b offers a graphical
illustration of how the treated and synthetic controls are related. The aim of the
study is to compute the difference between the treated SIMCE and the synthetic
SIMCE. The results should show a gap close to zero up to the treatment date if the
optimization process is successful, which translates as a low mean squared prediction
error (MSPE). If the treatment affects the outcome, there should be a noticeable
bending down after the treatment.
The synthetic model is appealing because it is easily tested with placebo tests.
The three most immediate placebo tests (see Figure 2.9) are based on each of the
following falsification strategies.
• Placebo-in-outcome (see Figure 2.9a): Based on changing the outcome. In-
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stead of the outcome SIMCE 8th, the outcome is not altered by the inter-
vention, such as the poverty percentage. In the short term, families in Chile
tend to depend on parents. Thus, whether a pupil is attending school may, in
principle, be uncorrelated to poverty.
• Placebo-in-region (see Figure 2.9b): Based on changing the treated region for
any of the regions in the donor pool. For instance, instead of using the occupied
school territory, Lo Prado can be used. Lo Prado is centrally located but has
only one occupied school and, importantly, is not considered in the effective
donor pool and has zero weight in the synthetic control.
• Placebo-in-time (see Figure 2.9c): Based on changing the time component
of the intervention, such as the date. For instance, instead of having the
intervention in 2011, this value can be changed to 2009 to look for an absence
in impact for this falsified intervention.
Next the permutation test is introduced to this robust scanning of the synthetic
control method, as illustrated by Figure 2.10. This is a valid inference test which
consists of iteratively running the synthetic method to each control municipality in
the “donor pool” in order to gain possession of a distribution of placebo effects.
Then, the gap between the occupied schools and the placebo gaps are compared.
Relative to the estimated effect for a municipality chosen at random, this study
expects a large estimated impact of the synthetic control for the occupied schools
affected by the treatment. In other words, control municipalities from the “donor
pool” should have random behaviour, with less gap activity before the treatment
period and some random behaviour afterwards. The gap activity of the occupied
schools should be sufficiently divergent from the random sample. Then, the per-
mutation test graphs the school attainment gap for the occupied schools and for
fifty-two (see Figure 2.10a), thirty (see Figure 2.10b), twenty (see Figure 2.10c),
or eleven (see Figure 2.10d) municipalities depending on whether the mean square
prediction error (MSPE) is at its maximum or less or equal than twenty-five, ten, or
two times the MSPE for the occupied schools. Because the intervention is acute and
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not continuous, it is important to graphically prove that at the time of the protests
(year 2011), the gap is precisely lower for the occupied schools with a bouncing trend
afterwards.
Finally, there is an inference test which calculates the ratio between post/pre
MSPE for each of the fifty-two municipalities and the occupied schools. This test
should show that the occupied schools represent some of the highest ratios, confirm-
ing that the permutation test is robust, as confirmed by Figure 2.11.
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Figure 2.11: Post/pre MSPE
occupied schools
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Table 2.21: Treated, synthetic and average predictors
occupied schools
predictors treated synthetic average of 52
control municipalities
SIMCE 10th 245.52 251.61 250.19
repeatyear 0.17 0.17 0.19
studytime 6.33 6.60 6.21
income 332.11 357.29 433.56
timetohome 20.96 23.02 17.90
indigent 0.03 0.03 0.03
poor 0.12 0.12 0.10
unemployment 0.29 0.10 0.09
indigenous 0.05 0.04 0.03
pc at home 0.42 0.38 0.38
internet at home 0.01 0.06 0.07
President scholarship 0.01 0.00 0.00
indigenous scholarship 0.00 0.00 0.00
tuition scholarship 0.00 0.00 0.00
other scholarship 0.02 0.00 0.00
public health insurance a 0.25 0.24 0.24
public health insurance b 0.22 0.22 0.22
public health insurance c 0.17 0.12 0.12
public health insurance d 0.08 0.08 0.09
subsidy income 8.94 8.95 8.59
public voucher schools 0.56 0.36 0.43
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Table 2.22: Predictors and weights
predictors weights
SIMCE 10th 0.04
repeatyear 0.02
studytime 0.00
income 0.07
timetohome 0.00
indigent 0.01
poor 0.04
unemployment 0.01
indigenous 0.07
pc at home 0.42
internet at home 0.16
President scholarship 0.02
indigenous scholarship 0.00
tuition scholarship 0.01
other scholarship 0.00
public health insurance a 0.00
public health insurance b 0.05
public health insurance c 0.00
public health insurance d 0.05
subsidy income 0.04
public voucher schools 0.00
Table 2.23: Municipalities with positive weights in synthetic control
w.weights municipalities id
0.44 SANTIAGO 1
0.01 EL BOSQUE 5
0.22 SAN RAMO´N 31
0.03 SAN PEDRO 47
0.03 EL MONTE 49
0.26 PADRE HURTADO 51
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Appendix IV
The outburst of the Chilean Winter in the media
Table 2.24: The onset and spread of school
occupations in June 2011 at a national level
in Chile (media reports)
Date # of occupied
schools
June 6th 2011 (1),(2) 3
-”- 7th -”- (3) 5
-”- 9th -”- (4) 26
-”- 10th -”- (5) 40
-”- 13th -”- (6) ≈100
-”- 25th -”- (7) ≈600
a Source: Wikipedia from the following media reports:
1 75 pupils arrested, 2 injured and millions in losses in protesters evic-
tion from Barros Borgon˜o Lyce´e. B´ıoB´ıo Radio. June 6th 2011.
Retrieved September 3, 2014.
2 Eviction is requested for the Lyce´e Enrique Molina of Concepcio´n.
B´ıoB´ıo Radio. June 6th 2011. Retrieved September 3, 2014.
3 pupils occupy the Amunategui and Aplicacio´n Lyce´es. ADN Radio.
June 7th 2011. Retrieved September 3, 2014.
4 Occupations spread: there are already 26 occupied schools at a na-
tional level. B´ıoB´ıo Radio. June 9th 2011. Retrieved September 3,
2014.
5 Minister Lav´ın confirms that there are 40 occupied schools at a na-
tional level. La Tercera Newspaper. June 10th 2011. Retrieved
September 3, 2014.
6 Secondary pupils have occupied approximately a hundred schools
across the country. El Mercurio Newspaper. June 13th 2011. Re-
trieved September 3, 2014.
7 600 occupied schools in Chile. Argentinian Public TV. June 25th
2011. Retrieved September 3, 2014.
b The table shows the exponential growth and spread of school oc-
cupations at a national level in Chile for the month of June of 2011
when protests started. The first schools were occupied at the begin-
ning of June. Each new day dozens of new schools were occupied in
an explosive pattern. By the end of the month approximately 600
schools were already occupied at a national level.
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Appendix V
The geography of the Chilean Winter
Table 2.25: Overall occupied schools, Occupied-NS and Occupied-S by municipality
municipality occupied schools Occupied-S Occupied-NS
LA FLORIDA 23 19 4
PUENTE ALTO 23 17 6
SANTIAGO 20 3 17
SAN BERNARDO 16 8 8
LA CISTERNA 13 6 7
SAN MIGUEL 8 2 6
INDEPENDENCIA 7 6 1
MAIPU´ 7 5 2
N˜UN˜OA 7 2 5
SAN RAMO´N 6 5 1
BUIN 6 4 2
PROVIDENCIA 6 2 4
LA GRANJA 5 3 2
PUDAHUEL 5 3 2
QUINTA NORMAL 5 0 5
RECOLETA 5 0 5
LA PINTANA 4 3 1
EL BOSQUE 4 2 2
ESTACIO´N CENTRAL 4 1 3
PEDRO AGUIRRE CERDA 3 3 0
LO ESPEJO 3 3 0
SAN JOAQUI´N 3 2 1
MACUL 3 1 2
PADRE HURTADO 2 2 0
ISLA DE MAIPO 2 1 1
SAN JOSE´ DE MAIPO 2 1 1
PEN˜AFLOR 2 1 1
TALAGANTE 2 1 1
CONCHALI´ 2 1 1
QUILICURA 2 0 2
LO PRADO 1 1 0
EL MONTE 1 0 1
CERRO NAVIA 1 0 1
RENCA 1 0 1
PIRQUE 1 0 1
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Figure 2.12: Occupied schools by school type
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occupied schools
! public voucher 
E private voucher
" private
# professional technical
This figure shows 205 overall occupied schools by school type: 110 public voucher, 78 private
voucher, 16 vocational and 1 private schools. From this figure and Figure 2.1 on the main part of
the paper, one can infer that the Occupied-NS schools populate the central municipalities around
Central Santiago being in their great majority public voucher schools, while the Occupied-S schools
are located to the periphery around Puente Alto being in their great majority private voucher
schools. This is a real metaphor for the characters these pupils plays in the Chilean pupil movement.
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Chapter 3
Surrogacy in the United States:
Exploring the Effects of
Legislation and Documenting
the Consequences on Marriage,
Births, Out-of-wedlock Births
and Divorce
3.1 Introduction
Surrogacy1 is an arrangement in which a woman carries and delivers a child for
another couple. Although this practice is now medically feasible, it remains rare.
California, the most surrogacy friendly state in the US, had an average of only 211
surrogacies per year for the period of 2001-2013. At the country level and according
to available national figures, there have been 14,076 surrogacies from 1997 to 2013,
1In this chapter I use both the absolute number of surrogacies and the surrogacy rate. The
surrogacy rate is the relative number of surrogacy out of 100,000 births.
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with an average of 828 surrogacies per year and a total increase of the practice by
50% during the period. Nevertheless, this increase has not been steady. The trend
exhibits a peak (e.g. in the year 2000, 1,210 surrogacy cycles were started) and
a trough (e.g. in the year 2002—just two years later—only 548 surrogacy cycles
were started), but it has stabilized at around 900 surrogacies per year during recent
periods.
A mechanism that could explain this pattern is the introduction of either re-
strictive or permissive state legislation, or favourable or unfavourable court decisions
regarding surrogacy. Some legislation may make surrogacy contracts valid, whereas
others may forbid them entirely. To whom the birth certificate is extended is of cru-
cial importance (Figure 3.1).2 Permissive legislation or favourable court decisions
tend to guarantee that the commissioning or intended parents are listed in this cer-
tificate. Restrictive legislations or unfavourable court decisions give the surrogate
mother all parental rights over the baby.
Legislation is incipient, and the legal reforms have been slow, having peaked
immediately after the famous Baby M case in New Jersey (Markens, 2007). Baby
M was the pseudonym of the baby whose custody case in 1987 became the first
American court ruling on the validity of surrogacy. The New Jersey court ruled
that the surrogacy contract was invalid according to public policy and recognized
the surrogate mother as the child’s legal mother. Finally, the commissioning father,
who was also the biological father, was awarded custody, with the surrogate mother
having visitation rights.
To understand why legislation is incipient it is important to stress that according
to Edlund and Korn (2002), marriage is a contract that gives parental rights to an
2See section 8a indicating mother’s current legal name, section 10a, where the father’s name is
listed, and section 15, which asks whether the mother is married at birth, conception or any time
between. There is also a specification of whether paternity acknowledgement has been signed in the
hospital.
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uncertain father. The birth of a child is a public event, but the sexual intercourse in
which the cell is fertilized is a private event with a potentially uncertain outcome.
There is generally an automatic certainty associated with who a baby’s mother is,
which is never the case for the father: Mater semper certa est, pater numquam.
In most Western countries, the institution of marriage, enshrined in law, resolves
this issue by granting parental rights to the husband. Surrogacy is a mechanism
that produces the same outcome without a marriage. As a result of surrogacy, sin-
gle persons can acquire parental rights without marriage, and couples can deliver
parental rights to the father, also without marriage. Nevertheless, most favourable
state legislations demand marriage as a prerequisite to grant parental rights to the
commissioning parents.
This paper is the first to study surrogacy and has two main aims. First, it doc-
uments the effect of legislation on surrogacy, indicating that restrictive legislation
reduces surrogacy rates and that permissive legislation increases surrogacy rates. For
this purpose, categories of legislation are created based on their impact on surrogacy
contracts. This study uses pure restrictive/permissive legislation categories and ex-
tended categories with additional characteristics pertaining to surrogacy contracts,
such as whether the surrogacy contracts are compensated (commercial surrogacy) or
uncompensated (altruistic surrogacy), and whether the surrogate mother has a pe-
riod of three to five days to change her mind and decide to keep the baby. Second,
the causal effect of surrogacy on vital statistics (marriage, births, out-of-wedlock
births and divorce rate) is assessed. This study’s data are taken from the Clinic Ta-
ble Data from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for the years from
2001 to 2013. These are the most recent data available and they are the only data
available on a state level basis in the US. The study’s Surrogacy Data Set (Table
3.1 and Figure 3.2) is the first attempt to gather significant data on this issue. Data
on surrogacy are elusive, most likely because it is a controversial issue.
In order to understand the effects of surrogacy on vital statistics, this paper
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produces a theoretical model with the following assumptions: infertile couples by
definition are infertile, which means that without help they cannot have children
or, at least, their fertility is reduced; surrogacy increases fertility for these infertile
couples because another woman carries a baby engendered by the infertile couple.
Notwithstanding this fact, this may not cause an increase in overall fertility because
infertile couples seeking surrogacy have a low fertility rate, and they produce fewer
children on average than normal couples. As a result, this chapter aims to display
whether there is a crowding out of fertile couples by infertile couples. If a marriage
containing an infertile woman and a fertile man replaces a marriage containing a
fertile woman with the same fertile man, then fertility increases for this couple but
decreases for all couples. Another aim of this chapter is to identify if surrogacy
increases marriages because infertile women gain hope of fertility through surrogacy
and because of that enter the marriage market. At the same time, surrogate moth-
ers do not reduce their own number of children because it is assumed that if they
want to have their own children then they do not offer themselves in the surrogate
market. It will also be investigated whether divorce is high among commissioning
parents because marriage is usually needed for surrogacy contracts to be enforceable
under state legislation, and after reproduction, the union may be less binding and
end in more frequent divorce. The predictions of the stylized model are confronted
with the data and found to hold.
3.2 What is surrogacy?
The commissioning parent or parents, sometimes called the social parents, may
arrange a surrogate pregnancy because of female infertility or other medical issues
which make pregnancy or delivery impossible, risky or otherwise undesirable. Sur-
rogacy is the only mechanism by which a commissioning parent(s) can genetically
overcome infertility. This is the main difference between surrogacy and adoption. A
surrogacy contract implies a woman being pregnant on behalf of the commissioning
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parent(s). The surrogate mother may be the child’s genetic mother (traditional sur-
rogacy) or she may be genetically unrelated to the child (gestational surrogacy). In
traditional surrogacy, the surrogate mother’s own egg is fertilized by artificial insem-
ination or by direct sexual intercourse, and this is the most common and inexpensive
type of surrogacy. Because traditional surrogacy can be performed with little or no
medical assistance, there are no statistics available on this type of surrogacy. Alter-
natively, in gestational surrogacy, the surrogate mother receives a fertilized oocyte
through in vitro fertilization techniques. Data on this can be found because this
type of surrogacy can be estimated from the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention Success Rate National Summary and Fertility Clinic Report, which collects
data for most assisted reproductive technologies (ART). This type of surrogacy de-
pends heavily on technology and is much more expensive. Quotes for an all-included
surrogacy surge easily to $100,000, as indicated below. Many commissioning cou-
ples choose this type of surrogacy when full family heritage and continuation of the
bloodline is desired or because the existence of the legal framework that regulates
the surrogate contracts ensures their names on the birth certificate. They pay more
but receive the service of enforceable legal contracts. This suggests that, in a simi-
lar way to midwives, surrogate mothers may become popular in the following years
until an artificial uterus becomes available. Notwithstanding this, surrogacy, as is
the case with transplants, bears a force deterring its application, namely, repulsion.
Few activities have been more closely related to motherhood than pregnancy,
a strictly non-market activity or a not substitutable time-input of the household
production function. Surrogacy has started to challenge this. For a married couple
the opening of a new market, i.e. a surrogate market, can signify gains from trade.
If the couple’s wife earns more from her work or she prefers not to go through the
physiological changes associated with pregnancy, she can decide not to get pregnant
and be a genetic and social mother, i.e. not a gestational one. To buy uterine
services in a way implies that childbearing may be less of a woman’s specialization,
eroding the idea of marriage as a “long-term” contract to protect a wife specializing
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in childbearing from abandonment and other adversities (Becker, 1973).
In his seminal work on marriage Becker (1973) states that “The obvious explana-
tion for marriages between men and women lies in the desire to raise own children...”.
It is interesting that Becker adds, “Sexual gratification, cleaning, feeding, and other
services can be purchased, but not own children.” (Italics in original). In vitro
fertilization has proved that fertilization can be outsourced without sex. Surrogacy
has proved that pregnancy also can be purchased to bear one’s own children. As
divorce has permitted a covert polygamy, facilitating access to multiple partners in
stages, surrogacy is starting to permit a kind of reproductive trade and liberalization
as it uncouples the sexual and the reproductive functions.
There are many ways of conceiving of marriage. According to Family Economics
(Becker, 1973), marriage is a contract tailored for women, granting them their hus-
bands’ long-term commitment in exchange for the women’s specialization, at least
in pregnancy and childbearing. Note that in modern families, there is less special-
ization because wage rates for women have increased substantially, and the number
of children born per family has also declined. According to Evolutionary Biology
(Trivers, 1972), marriage is a contract tailored for men, granting them the presump-
tion of paternity. Note that this is being challenged by DNA testing. To reproduce,
men need only to fertilize a woman’s egg,3 while women tend to invest more heavily
in the reproduction process through a larger sex cell, pregnancy, childbearing and
child nutrition and care.
There are some important facts involved in the comparison of the benefits and
costs of marriage, surrogacy and divorce. Table 3.2 summarizes the arguments given
in the previous paragraphs and adds an estimated cost for each choice from the au-
thor’s own calculations, plus prices gathered by the author on-line from reported
3The oocyte is larger than the spermatozoon. This key regularity has been acknowledged in
Evolutionary Biology since the initial works of Trivers (1972).
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sources. Marriage costs approximately $25,000 and divorce costs $20,000 compared
to the $100,000 cost of an average all-included surrogacy. Moreover, Espenshade
and Calhoun (1986) calculates a per child expenditure of $312,000 from birth to
age 18 in 2015 for a middle-class American family with two children. The mother’s
opportunity cost averages $62,400. These per child expenses account for roughly
a quarter of the overall expenditure of the couple before the child enters college.
This compares with the cited overall cost of entering a surrogacy contract, that is
$100,000. “Adding a surrogacy” then implies an increase in the cost of a child of
32% on average, and it potentially indicates a release of part of the $62,400 of female
input resources.
3.3 A literature review
Because surrogacy is a controversial theme, it is not surprising that it has been
addressed more frequently in political, moral philosophical, sociological and an-
thropological literature than in that relating to economics. The former disciplines
include examinations of nearly every possible position on the issue, while in Family
Economics it is indeed a new topic.
The founding paper in what is called the law-and-economics of surrogacy is by
Richard A. Posner (1989), who famously argues in favour of enforcing contracts for
surrogate motherhood. “Even if there were no shortage of babies for adoption, there
would be a demand for surrogate motherhood. People (a biologist would say their
genes) desire genetic continuity, and surrogacy enables the couple to satisfy this
desire”, concludes Posner. Epstein (1995) also makes the case for full enforcement
of surrogacy contracts. Also notable is a statement by Friedlander (1995), who says
that if we take the enforcement of surrogacy contracts further, we could also begin
enforcing contracts for prostitution. She continues by saying, “Surrogacy, then, may
be a kind of “demerit good”, one we—or at least I—view instinctively as harmful
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regardless of what the individuals participating in the transaction decide. Society
need not prohibit these goods, but may merely tax or otherwise regulate them to
make them less attractive” .
These are allegations that follow the well-known Baby M case. As mentioned
above, Baby M was a child born under a surrogacy arrangement which was legally
confronted in the first American court case on the validity of surrogacy contracts.
The commissioning parents were William and Elizabeth Stern while the surrogate
mother was Mary Beth Whitehead. Mary Beth Whitehead was inseminated with
William Stern’s sperm corresponding to a traditional, not a gestational surrogacy.
After the birth, Mary Beth Whitehead did not want to relinquish her parental rights
over Baby M and decided not to give up the baby. The Sterns sued to be considered
the child’s legal parents as the surrogacy contract had established. The court’s deci-
sion was to void the surrogacy contract and recognize as legal parents both genetic
parents, William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead. Custody was given to William
Stern. During the case the news coverage of the case skyrocketed with most of the
public opinion backing the surrogate and biological mother of Baby M, but the sub-
sequent coverage of surrogacy has been modest (Markens, 2007).4
There are many books on surrogacy covering a variety of topics and positions,
from compelling stories of women who were able to have babies through surrogacy
to studies of the race and class impact of gestational surrogacy in a global mar-
ket: Markens (2007), Ragone´ (1994), Field (1988), Gostin (1990), Griswold (2006),
Twine (2011). Field (1988) and Markens (2007) review the legal issues surrounding
surrogacy. In particular, these works analyse when and to what extent the legal
statutes on surrogacy have changed in recent years.
Elizabeth Kane—the pseudonym of the first legal surrogate in the US: Justin, her
4See Figure 1, “Coverage of surrogacy in the New York Times, Los Angeles Times and Wash-
ington Post”, p. 21.
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baby, was born on November 9th 1980—rapidly converted herself into an authorized
voice on the subject. Her initial comments on surrogacy were strikingly favourable,
such as “If a woman has a legal and moral right to her own body, isn’t she free to
exercise that right in any way she deems fit? Doesn’t she have the legal right to
rent her vagina or her uterus, or to sell her one-of-a-kind and irreplaceable heart—or
unborn child?” But Elizabeth soon changed her mind and became an acid critic of
surrogacy, joining Janice Raymond, Patricia Foster, Mary Beth Whitehead, Gena
Corea and others in the National Coalition Against Surrogacy. In 1987 she released
a press statement saying that “Surrogate parenting is an emotional mine field and I
have become a statistic” and that “Today I can no longer explain to my children why
I felt justified in exchanging their brother for a $10,000 check... Today the child I’ve
sold does not know I exist”. In an autobiographic book (Kane, 1988), she confessed
her real name was coincidentally also Mary Beth—it seems that the order of the day
was that We are all Mary Beth!—saying comfortingly to Whitehead “So, you fell
in love with your baby, Mary Beth, and no one told you it would happen. Well, so
did I. So do we all!” and condemning “a contract stating the surrogate gets $10,000
for the delivery of a healthy child, nothing for a defective child, and she must pay
the father $25,000 if she decides to keep the child. Why should the life of a child
suddenly go up in value if the birth mother keeps it, as opposed to the child’s father
raising it?” (Italics in original). Gena Corea asked metaphorically “Are women
human beings or are we reproductive meat?”. In her book, Corea (1988), she em-
phasizes that as buttocks, breasts and vaginas are sold for sex, so ovaries, wombs
and eggs are sold for reproduction, and that supply and demand are pervasive in
the sex and reproduction markets: Black wombs are demanded for White eggs when
pharmacrats (the seditious patriarchal medicine) are in charge. Corea reveals that
a patriarchal society understands women as machines, breeding machines used to
reproduce the “stock of humans”, a form of eugenic capital ready to produce and re-
produce the best and to refrain from producing and reproducing the worst. Women
have historically been seen as the breeders. So women-breeders have been consis-
tently recognized as a production factory for the reproduction of humans, as just
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another form of farm animal, with mothers being conceptualized simply as machines.
Phyllis Chesler (1988) makes a thorough analysis of the Baby M case. She describes
how father and mother surrogates are different. While the first are ejaculatory, tran-
sient, painless, riskless, orgasmic, a matter of five-minute masturbation, the second
are painful, risky, permanent, nurturing, a matter of nine-month pregnancy and
childbirth. Chesler (1988) mentions the most well-known surrogacy endeavours as
SPA (Surrogate Parenting Associates in Louisville, Kentucky, run by lawyer Katie
Brophy and Dr. Richard Levin, who contracted the first legal surrogate, Elizabeth
Kane), CSP (Center for Surrogate Parenting, Inc., in Los Angeles, California, run
by lawyer Bill Handel, who claims he rejects nineteen out of twenty surrogate ap-
plicants) and ICNY (Infertility Center of New York run by the surrogacy factotum
and superstar lawyer Noel Keane, from whom she presents the full surrogacy con-
tract, signed by Whitehead and Stern, whose highlights are as follows: “1. MARY
BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, represents that she is capable of conceiving chil-
dren. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD understands and agrees that in the best interest
of the child, she will not form or attempt to form a parent-child relationship with
any child or children she may conceive, carry to term and give birth to, pursuant to
the provisions of this Agreement, and shall freely surrender custody to WILLIAM
STERN, Natural Father, immediately upon birth of the child; and terminate all
parental rights to said child pursuant to this Agreement.”; “That the consideration
for this Agreement, which is compensation for services and expenses, and in no way
is to be construed as a fee for termination of parental rights or a payment in exchange
for a consent to surrender the child for adoption”; “MARY BETH WHITEHEAD
shall be artificially inseminated with the semen of WILLIAM STERN by a physi-
cian.”; “MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD,
her husband, agree to surrender custody of the child to WILLIAM STERN, Natural
Father, immediately upon birth, acknowledging that it is the intent of this Agree-
ment in the best interests of the child to do so; as well as institute and cooperate
in proceedings to terminate their respective parental rights to said child,”; “B) The
consideration to be paid to MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, shall be de-
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posited with the Infertility Center of New York..., the representative of WILLIAM
STERN, at the time of the signing of this Agreement, and held in escrow until com-
pletion of the duties and obligations of MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate,”;
“5. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD, Surrogate, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her
husband, understand and agree to assume all risks, including the risk of death,
which are incidental to conception, pregnancy, childbirth, including but not limited
to, postpartum complications. A copy of said possible risks and/or complications is
attached hereto and made a part hereof”; and “7. MARY BETH WHITEHEAD,
Surrogate, and RICHARD WHITEHEAD, her husband, hereby agree that it is the
exclusive and sole right of WILLIAM STERN, Natural Father, to name said child”).
Janice Raymond (1994) also adopts a feminist voice, arguing that all the new
reproductive technologies violate the integrity of a woman’s body in dangerous, de-
structive, debilitating, and demeaning ways, being the result of just another form
of medical violence against women. She adds that reproductive surrogate contracts
create a traffic in women’s bodies. She underlines what she thinks to be faulty uses
of language: using the terms ‘surrogate’ or ‘substitute’ mothers, for those she ar-
gues are real mothers, and using the term ‘fathers’ for those she indicates are only
ejaculatory sperm sources. She is a strong disclaimer of procreative liberty and a
critic of the happy surrogate presented by the reproductive technology industry’s
advertising, and the functional eschatology of utopian eternal life wielded by a pa-
triarchal society that exploits women as wombs. Indeed, she insists on the striking
resemblance between men buying prostitution in brothels and reproductive services
in surrogacy arrangements. In what she calls the “spermatic economy”, men unilat-
erally decide to have children and abuse women into reproduction. She conveys the
message that for a woman there is no moral or teleological urgency to get pregnant
and deliver babies for a patriarchal society: men and doctors use the sheer pornog-
raphy of women’s bodies in the form of photos of artificial inseminations to justify
and sell the new reproductive technologies of a hegemonic male chauvinism.
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In an overwhelming book, Harvard Profesor Martha A. Field (1988) depicts a
sombre surrogacy and makes the case against enforcement of surrogate contracts.
She stands for it as a legal practice only as a strategy for curbing illegal markets.
She makes it clear that in her opinion surrogacy overall has a negative welfare im-
pact on society, then and on behalf of public policy, contracts should be deemed as
void based on babyselling prohibition. She also makes the case for always giving the
surrogate mother a window to change her mind. Some of her many arguments are as
follows: Whitehead receiving less than half the minimum wage, only $1.57 an hour;
Whitehead recognizing the time inconsistency—in choosing to deliver the baby in
advance but to keep it after the birth—of surrogacy contracts: “I signed on an egg.
I didn’t sign on a baby girl, a clone of my other little girl”; the fact that a surrogate
may seem closer to a reproductive prostitute so society should ban the use of her
body for this overly detrimental practice; that there is a Saks Fifth Avenue price
tag for an intelligent and attractive surrogate, while a K-Mart price tag exists for a
dull-looking one. Field (1988) concludes that sales and purchases should be made
illegal, but donation should be allowed when biological material is involved, as in
both organ donation and surrogacy. The book starts with two deeply moving real
life quotations: one from a surrogate that decided to change her mind and who was
brought to court by a commissioning couple just to learn that the commissioning
mother was formerly a man who had had a sex change operation. And the poignant
case of a microcephaly baby abandoned as a result of the split between the com-
missioning parents and the indolence of the natural mother: left alone in limbo at a
hospital with non-antibacterial treatment with only the public to find help for the
baby. But the story doesn’t end here. All of the involved went on the Phil Donahue
show where a paternity test was publicly released, revealing that the husband of the
surrogate was the genetic father. Accordingly to Field (1988), this is another hu-
man drama surrogacy arrangements can provoke. Another touching example comes
from the poor Frenchwomen who often sold not only their bodies, but even their
teeth to be put into wealthy mouths. Most of the persuasive arguments are care-
fully crafted for traditional surrogacy, but Professor Field reaffirms her arguments,
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extending them also to gestational surrogacies in subsequent publications as Field
(1993) when establishing that the gestational mother is still the nurturer, the birth
mother and, unlike her genetic counterpart, the only one ready to breastfeed the
baby.
Noel P. Keane, the father of US surrogacy and the most famous baby-broker
dismissed in Keane and Breo (1981) the bone of contention over him arranging for
the White and wealthy to exploit the poor and Black . The founder of many Infertil-
ity Centers around the country, Keane died prematurely at 58 of melanoma having
arranged more than six hundred surrogacies in his legal practice since 1976—by
far more surrogacy than anyone else in the US—including the controversial match
between Stern and Whitehead. An American rags to riches, self-made man story,
People magazine wrote of him: “By devising elaborate contracts and pulling together
a supply of surrogates sufficient to meet the demand, Keane has revolutionized the
production of babies just as surely as that earlier son of Dearborn, Henry Ford,
revolutionized the production of automobiles”, Kunen (1987).
A surrogate interviewed by Ragone´ (1994) said: “It’s a gift of love. I have al-
ways been a really giving person, and it’s the ultimate way to give. I’ve always had
babies so easily. It’s the ultimate gift of love”. This gift category suppresses any
consideration of money payments for surrogacy and produces a social link between
the parties. Money is no longer on the table, what it is believed to be pure and
simple love that takes its place. Another woman says: “...surrogacy sounded so in-
teresting and fun. The money wasn’t enough to be pregnant for nine months”. And
further: “I’m not doing it for the money. Take the money: That wouldn’t stop me.
It wouldn’t stop the majority”. Finally, another surrogate explained that “What’s
10,000 bucks? You can’t even buy a car...Money wasn’t important. I possibly would
have done it just for expenses especially for the people I did it for. My father would
have given me the money not to do it”.
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Capron and Radin (1990) think that commercial surrogacy should be banned and
only altruistic surrogacy should be permitted and the relationship between commis-
sioning parents and surrogates should be treated not as a contract for services, but
as an adoption arrangement similar to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling. Ban-
ning a market for children may help to protect women from exploitation or from
becoming “breeding stock” like farm animals. That is, if reproductive capabilities
were removed from a private and personal sphere and turned into blatant commerce.
Defenders of surrogacy, Capron and Radin (1990) argue that a surrogacy arrange-
ment must be understood under Family Law to suppress any comparison to “baby
selling” with a hedonic regression with personal attributes such as sex, eye color,
predicted IQ and athletic ability priced at a dollar value by the “babies market”.
Every child, whether it was sold or not, would receive this hedonic valuation. For
instance, they claim the position of the Sterns was deleterious in Baby M’s case,
where they claimed the parents had bought the ovum—as previous donor semen
sales were permitted by jurisprudence—from Mary Beth Whitehead, whose womb
was subsequently hired for the gestation of the child. But the New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled against the contract, saying that according to state laws on adoption
there cannot be a contract previous to the birth and naming of the child, i.e. there
cannot be adoptions in advance. Capron and Radin (1990) also put forward the
view that paying for babies will have the effect of introducing a“commodification”
of reproduction, treating babies as trivial objects to be disposed of or resold at will,
as a magazine, a blouse or even a puppet.
Some also argue, see Robertson (1990), that the right of procreative liberty
should be levied as a constitutional right emanating from the right of privacy ap-
plied both to coital and to non-coital reproduction, which should permit surrogacy.
So the biological parents will be entitled to make use of contracts as a way of enforc-
ing this defended constitutional right. This right can be understood as the personal
human capability of causing, but also avoiding, procreation. In fact, to avoid pro-
creation any competent woman is able to trigger an abortion up to a viable date
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and any competent person is able to use contraception. On the side of causing
procreation, Robertson (1990) advocates that surrogacy should also be permitted.
He adds that it is a negative-right, since it obligates the state not to interfere with
reproductive activities among consenting adults and physicians, but does not force
the state to finance them. In another book, Robertson (1994), builds the concept of
collaborative reproduction or when someone else other than one’s partner provides
the gametes or gestation for reproduction: sperm, egg or embryo donor, or surro-
gate motherhood. Notwithstanding this fact, this is problematic because a third
party—a donor or a surrogate—is introduced into the usual situation of two-party
parenthood, separating or deconstructing the traditional genetic, gestational and
social unity of reproduction. Banerjee and Basu (2006) explain that in India sur-
rogates are not the genetic mothers but share “blood and milk” —fluids—with the
baby. An opposite statement should be to call surrogacy a heterologous harvesting
of uterine tissue for ectopic motherhood.
In the economics literature, the issue of surrogacy is almost completely absent.
I can only cite Gershoni and Low (2015), Banerjee and Basu (2006), Banerjee and
Basu (2009), Banerjee (2013), Pelzman (2013) and Zil (2006). This last author
examines the factors that affect the market for surrogate mother contracts in the
United States, with a particular emphasis on the role of compensation. It has been
argued that compensation for altruistic gifts (such as bearing children for another
person) may decrease supply because the members of society devalue a service if it is
not freely given, or the quality of the service may decrease if donors find it more ad-
vantageous to withhold information in favour of receiving a monetary benefit. This
is an unpublished paper but represents a starting contribution to the somewhat in-
choate literature on surrogacy.
One related article is a web publication by the Council for Responsible Genetics,
authorized by Magdalena Gugucheva (2010). This publication is a review of recent
topics on surrogacy in the US, including an initial (and in a way also precarious)
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attempt to use the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Clinic Table Data.
3.4 Data set
Data on surrogacy are elusive. However, in the US, there is an invaluable source
of information: the US Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention Clinic Table Data, which has been collected since 1995
based on a 1992 law that requires each fertility clinic to report some key data of
their production function and overall performance to the Centers for Disease Control.
With such data, the Centers for Disease Control publish a well-known yearly report
and the Clinic Table Data on ART. ART includes all fertility treatments in which
both egg and sperm are handled. In general, ART procedures involve surgically re-
moving eggs from a woman’s ovaries, combining them with sperm in the laboratory,
and returning them to the woman’s body or donating them to another woman. They
do not include treatments in which only sperm are handled, such as artificial insem-
ination or intrauterine insemination, or procedures in which a woman uses drugs to
stimulate egg production without the intention of having the eggs retrieved. Some
of the main types of ART include in vitro fertilization (IVF), gamete intrafallopian
transfer (GIFT) and zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT). ART is often catego-
rized according to whether the procedure uses a woman’s own eggs (non-donor) or
eggs from another woman (donor) and according to whether the embryos used were
newly fertilized (fresh) or previously fertilized, frozen, and then thawed (frozen).
This survey includes data at the clinical level, such as the number of ART cycles
started, success rates of fertility clinics and types of ART used. In 2001, a new
question was included in this survey regarding the percentage of fresh non-donor cy-
cles that used a gestational carrier, which can be used to back calculate the number
of surrogacies and the number of ART-clinics performing gestational carrier services.
I created a variable for surrogacy using the gestational rate, which is the percent-
age of gestational carrier reported for all the fresh non-donor cycles started by each
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ART clinic by state.5 This variable shows data on surrogacy at the state level for the
very first time. Together, these variables constitute what I call the Surrogacy Data
Set. It is important to note that before this paper was initiated, nothing comparable
with this data set existed in the literature. As a matter of fact, the Surrogacy Data
Set is an important contribution of this paper and can be made available from this
author upon request.
To further clarify what is in my sample and what is not, a spermatozoon, an
ovule and a uterus are still needed for child birth. Of course surrogacy plays a rele-
vant role in homosexual couples seeking fertility counselling. But the data has been
apparently tabulated for heterosexual couples seeking infertility help in the clinics
which report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Each gestational
carrier is then related to a female patient with uterine infertility. Although my
data are most likely only from heterosexual couples and my models are built for
heterosexual couples as a result, I hope in the future surrogacy data for homosexual
couples will be also generated and assessed independently.
How do my results compare to others in the literature? First, increased access to
IVF acts as an insurance for age-related decrease in women’s fertility. Gershoni and
Low (2015) studied the case of Israel, which started a free IV programme in 1994,
positioning the country at the vanguard of fertility related treatments. Israeli women
responded to the policy intervention by marrying later, completing their university
education and pursuing postgraduate qualifications. The results are that women are
more likely to marry later by a third of a year, are 3% more likely to complete college
education, 4% more likely to finish graduate school, and that marriage is postponed
to older ages—over 30 years. Also, the first surrogacy contract model is developed
5Some clinics report “<1%”. Because the national number of surrogacies is known, I add all
integer percentages of surrogacy cycles and split the remainder evenly in the “<1%” cycles, allocat-
ing surrogacy cycles to each of these “<1%” clinics. Because I know the total national number of
surrogacies and each of the full integer surrogacy cycle percentages, it is not a problematic assump-
tion to proceed in this manner. On the contrary, confirming that assuming a figure strictly between
0%-1% permits to match the national figure with the incipient state figures represents indeed a
robustness check for the Surrogacy Data Set.
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by Banerjee and Basu (2006) and Banerjee and Basu (2009). In the model, com-
missioning parents faces heterogeneous surrogates. High type surrogates produce
better outcomes but also have higher outside options. They show that enforceable
contracts are needed to achieve better outcomes in the moral hazard problem re-
garding the surrogate actions. Since the health of the child depends strongly on the
level of care provided by the surrogate, non-contractibility leads to a worse outcome
for the child and commissioning parents. They also show that making surrogacy
contracts unenforceable may swing commissioning parents towards low types, who
need to be compensated less for inferior outside options. In a later paper and using
a moral hazard model, Banerjee (2013) shows that altruistic surrogacy is optimal
just in the case that the surrogate is increasingly altruistic and has lower outside
options. In contrast, if higher outside options are present, commercial surrogacy is
optimal. He also analyses the effects of social ignominy on the equilibrium outcome,
showing that for low outside options social ignominy causes contracts to be more al-
truistic, while for higher outside options, it causes contracts to be more commercial.
Pelzman (2013) also explores gestational surrogacy contracts as outsourcing services
and explores some contractual arrangements. He also questions whether surroga-
cies in India should be regulated by the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights.
3.5 Surrogacy legislation
3.5.1 Why legislation matters for surrogacy
Surrogacy legislation is crucial for the existence of surrogacy. Figure 3.3 presents
the consecutive geographic representation of the US surrogacy legislation by state.
Underlying surrogacy legislation is a continuous dispute among pressure groups
wanting to adopt permissive legislation and opponents wanting to completely re-
strict the practice. Before the Baby M case, just a few states had previously enacted
legislation, but many more adopted a position after the surrogacy national debate
and media exposure that followed the case. There are other states that had not
164
established a legal framework for surrogacy until recently. A significant example,
in which there was a clear choice in favour of surrogacy, is the case of the Illinois
2004 Surrogate Act. Moreover, in most cases there is no state legislation; rather,
case-by-case court judgements determine the outcomes of this conflict. Up-to-date
state legislation can be found on the Creative Family Connections LLC website
(CreFamCon, 2015) and in Darra L. Hofman (2009)’s key article, “Mama’s Baby,
Daddy’s Maybe: A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate
Gender Impact”. To create one hundred and four dummy variables spanning thirteen
years in eight categories of legislation, I have used these sources in conjunction with
the academic on-line version of LexisNexis to verify the enacting year of statutory
legislations and court decisions. I have established six categories: criminalized, un-
enforceable, probably unenforceable, uncertain, probably enforceable and enforceable.
Furthermore, I have added two more categories: uncompensated (for states in which
only uncompensated or altruistic surrogacies are allowed) and time to change mind
(for states in which there is a window of three to five days for surrogate mothers to
change their mind). The process of creating these variables is documented in detail
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Finally, I have grouped the six legislation categories into
negative laws (criminalized and unenforceable), ambiguous (uncertain and proba-
bly enforceable) and positive laws (enforceable), omitting probably unenforceable
ones. Figures 3.4a and 3.4b show surrogacy and surrogacy rate by legislation. It
is clear that more stringent legislation reduces surrogacy and surrogacy rate, while
more permissive legislation increases them. In Figure 3.5, I show the first stage
(surrogacy rate by legislation) and the reduced form (marriage rate by legislation)
of my subsequent IV strategy. This visual approach suggests that legislation is cor-
related with surrogacy rate and that legislation is also correlated with marriage rate.
Surrogacy is an alternative method of fecundation and substitute pregnancy.
The main difficulty implied by surrogacy is the cession of parental rights for the
birth mother in favour of the commissioning couple which requires contracts and le-
gal courts willing to enforce those contracts (not only is paternity at risk, maternity
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is also at risk because the surrogate mother can threaten to keep the baby). This
framework suggests that official adoption is the crucial step in making surrogacy vi-
able. Without legal binding, the practice of surrogacy is severely restricted because
the birth mother has all of the power in the negotiation, whereas the commissioning
couple has none. It is of particular interest to assess the extent to which permissive
legislation can increase the incidence of surrogacy. If a particular state passes a
law that enforces the adoption of the child by the commissioning parent(s), can one
expect to observe an increase in the practice of surrogate motherhood? Thus, one
of the economic questions of interest can be formulated as follows: Do newly passed
permissive or restrictive legislations or favourable or unfavourable court decisions
affect the rates of surrogacy for each state in the US?
I acknowledge the argument that state and time policy legislation may be en-
dogenous. It is possible that state legislation could respond to anticipated changes
in surrogacy rates. It is also the case that states that change surrogacy policies could
also be taking other actions that change the dependent variables (marriage, divorce
and fertility). Both simultaneity issues can confound the results of the chapter and
can be potentially an identification threat. Besley and Case (2000)’s critique of the
use of state spatial and temporal source of variation should be taken seriously. It
has been long recognised that this source of variation in laws afforded by a federal
system is promising in order to uncover and estimate the effect of government poli-
cies on economic outcomes. Nevertheless, if state policies are purposeful actions,
determined by economic and political conditions within the state, you may need to
control for these variables if unbiased estimates are sought. Indeed, in the chapter I
study the political process and control for the “colour” of the state legislation and
other determinants of surrogacy legislation to deal with the endogeneity of time-
varying state level policies. So using a panel data with fixed effects and controlling
for the political process I am able to estimate a 2SLS with the external variation
of the surrogacy legislation policy as an instrument to uncover the causal effect of
surrogacy on demographic variables and to address the issue of the endogeneity of
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surrogacy legislations.
Two other interesting aspects of legislation are that many legislations require
that the commissioning couple be married, that is that marriage is compulsory if
you are going to enter a surrogacy contract and you want your name to be listed
on the birth certificate; and that either court decisions or statutory laws regarding
surrogacy establish specific performance of contracts and not only damages when
breaches occur (see also discussion in the subsequent section). A surrogate mother
that does not want to relinquish all of her rights to the child she is carrying is obliged
to do so at the moment of birth, and she is not granted the right to compensate
the commissioning parents, i.e. she cannot pay for the costs of surrogacy plus
compensation. She has to deliver the child to fulfil the contract in full.
3.5.2 An example of a permissive legislation
As an example of how a legislation can abruptly transform the number of sur-
rogate pregnancies in a state, I will present the adoption of permissive legislation
by the state of Illinois. I will use this example to test extensively the hypothesis of
legislation shaping surrogacy in a synthetic control exercise. As you can see from
the following legal excerpt, surrogacy is defined, permitted and enforced with clear
rules for its procedure. First, the excerpt shows the rights of parentage with the
surrogate mother relinquishing parental rights to the commissioning parents. Then,
established established, is the eligibility which regulates the conditions that surro-
gate mothers and commissioning parents must fulfil. So, according to the Illinois
Compiled Statutes (ILCS), Chapter 750 Families, 47/ Gestational Surrogacy Act:
...
(750 ILCS 47/5)
Sec. 5. Purpose. The purpose of this Act is to establish consistent standards and
procedural safeguards for the protection of all parties involved in a gestational sur-
rogacy contract in this State and to confirm the legal status of children born as a
result of these contracts. These standards and safeguards are meant to facilitate
167
the use of this type of reproductive contract in accord with the public policy of this
State.
(Source: P.A. 93-921, eff. 1-1-05.)
...
(750 ILCS 47/15)
Sec. 15. Rights of Parentage.
(a) Except as provided in this Act, the woman who gives birth to a child is presumed
to be the mother of that child for purposes of State law.
(b) In the case of a gestational surrogacy satisfying the requirements set forth in
subsection (d) of this Section:
(1) the intended6 mother shall be the mother of the child for purposes of State law
immediately upon the birth of the child;
(2) the intended father shall be the father of the child for purposes of State law
immediately upon the birth of the child;
(3) the child shall be considered the legitimate child of the intended parent or par-
ents for purposes of State law immediately upon the birth of the child;
(4) parental rights shall vest in the intended parent or parents immediately upon
the birth of the child;
(5) sole custody of the child shall rest with the intended parent or parents immedi-
ately upon the birth of the child; and
(6) neither the gestational surrogate nor her husband, if any, shall be the parents of
the child for purposes of State law immediately upon the birth of the child.
...
(Source: P.A. 93-921, eff. 1-1-05.)
...
(750 ILCS 47/20)
Sec. 20. Eligibility.
(a) A gestational surrogate shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirements of this
6or commissioning
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Act if she has met the following requirements at the time the gestational surrogacy
contract is executed:
(1) she is at least 21 years of age;
(2) she has given birth to at least one child;
(3) she has completed a medical evaluation;
(4) she has completed a mental health evaluation;
(5) she has undergone legal consultation with independent legal counsel regarding
the terms of the gestational surrogacy contract and the potential legal consequences
of the gestational surrogacy; and
(6) she has obtained a health insurance policy that covers major medical treat-
ments and hospitalization and the health insurance policy has a term that extends
throughout the duration of the expected pregnancy and for 8 weeks after the birth
of the child; provided, however, that the policy may be procured by the intended
parents on behalf of the gestational surrogate pursuant to the gestational surrogacy
contract.
(b)The intended parent or parents shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirements
of this Act if he, she, or they have met the following requirements at the time the
gestational surrogacy contract is executed:
(1) he, she, or they contribute at least one of the gametes resulting in a pre-embryo
that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to term;
(2) he, she, or they have a medical need for the gestational surrogacy as evidenced
by a qualified physician’s affidavit attached to the gestational surrogacy contract
and as required by the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984;
(3) he, she, or they have completed a mental health evaluation; and
(4) he, she, or they have undergone legal consultation with independent legal coun-
sel regarding the terms of the gestational surrogacy contract and the potential legal
consequences of the gestational surrogacy.
(Source: P.A. 93-921, eff. 1-1-05.)
According to an article by Gitlins (2015) in the American Academy of Marriage
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Lawyers website, Illinois will become a magnet for surrogate pregnancy because of
the relatively simple procedure for obtaining a birth certificate, the fact that the
medical procedure should be performed in Illinois, and that the parent-child rela-
tionship can be legally established before birth. In her own words, “Though other
states have codified gestational or traditional surrogacy procedures, none has made
obtaining a birth certificate as easy as the Illinois statute. New Hampshire, Texas,
Virginia and Florida all have statutes regulating surrogacy. Neither Florida nor New
Hampshire have pre-birth procedures whereby the intended parents may be listed
on the original birth certificate of the child....”.
3.6 The microeconomics of the surrogacy decision
The microeconomics of the surrogacy decision builds on some stylized facts: (1)
Some infertile women will use surrogacy to have children. (2) Married couples where
the woman is infertile can use surrogacy, but this is costly and not always success-
ful, so married couples where the woman is infertile who enter a surrogacy contract
have fewer children on average than married couples where the woman is fertile.
(3) While fertile women can have out-of-wedlock children, infertile women cannot
because many states require married couples to enter a surrogacy contract. In other
words, infertile women cannot have out-of-wedlock children as a result of surrogacy
legislation requirements. (4) Because infertile women are compelled to get married
in order to access surrogacy contracts, these convenience marriages have a higher
probability of divorce. (5) Gross but anecdotal evidence suggests that the women in
the Surrogacy Data Set are already married infertile women or infertile women who
get married as a result of the legally prerequisite in place by the surrogacy legisla-
tion. (6) No homosexual couples are included in the Surrogacy Data Set, so even
if they are an important group consuming surrogacy, data have not been released
for them and the model is not designed to represent them. In fact, in the general
model marriage can be substituted out by surrogacy as a new institution to assign
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paternity rights and divorce can be lowered if newly fertile and happy marriages
take place and do not split up. Nevertheless, in my model with only heterosexual
couples marriage is likely to increase as stated and divorce may increase or decrease,
depending on which effect is larger: the newly and enduring happy marriage or
the breaking of a marriage of convenience consecrated only for surrogacy legislation
requirements. To sum up, my model is fitted for a conservative or soft surrogacy
open just to fertile couples with uterine infertility. Still it is appealing to do further
research for a liberal or hard surrogacy open to singles, fertile women, gays and
lesbian as data will become available. Results are likely to be opposed, depending
on which hard or soft type of surrogacy arrangement is or will become under study.
To support these stylized facts I present a cost-benefit analysis of marriage, sur-
rogacy and divorce (See again Table 3.2). From the Table, it is clear when the three
occur together or when they occur separately. Infertile couples mainly enter sur-
rogacy arrangements to overcome infertility conditions as stated in the table. For
these couples, it is in fact expected that marriage and surrogacy, but not divorce,
will occur. For compulsory marriages required by surrogacy laws (as underlined
previously, many state laws confer validity on surrogacy contracts signed only by
married commissioning parents) marriage, surrogacy and, this time also divorce, are
expected to occur together. For high earning females who enter surrogacy arrange-
ments to keep their salaries and not be subjected to (unpaid) maternity leave as
stated in the table, it is expected that marriage, surrogacy and divorce will occur
together. For parents motivated by continuation of the bloodline, a positive effect on
surrogacy and ambiguous effects on marriage and divorce are expected. For women
that do not want to risk the adverse effects of pregnancy (whether physical, mental
or aesthetic), marriage and surrogacy are expected to occur together and the effect
of divorce is expected to be ambiguous. Finally, for single persons who just want
to be listed on the birth certificate and give or receive child support, as stated in
the table, a negative effect on marriage and a positive effect on both surrogacy and
divorce are expected. Gross statistics suggest that infertile couples are the most
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prevalent of these categories and that single persons are the least.
A key point on surrogacy analysis is the degree of irreversibility of marriage—there
is costly reversibility through divorce—and the option value to wait for a better
match. The theory on this comes from the classic Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and an
excellent example in education is Hogan and Walker (2007). Using option theory
they study the education decisions of individuals when there is uncertainty concern-
ing the returns of education. They model an irreversible decision of leaving the
education investment, showing that high returns on education will cause individuals
to postpone exercising their option to leave the human capital accumulation. In
addition, riskier options somehow surprisingly implies more time spent investing,
independent of the risk preference of each agent. This is explained by the irre-
versibility and the option to delay the investment developed in the models of Dixit
and Pindyck (1994). Burdett and Coles (1999) use a search model that includes the
option value of waiting for better offers in what it is called the reservation value.
This implies that for every offer under the reservation value, it is worth to keep
waiting for new offers and better matches and to postpone marriage. While for an
above the reservation value offer, it is worth taking it, marrying and stop searching.
Each fertility treatment operates as an insurance promoting riskier fertility be-
haviours. As a result, the time to marriage and the time to the first child are
increased. Divorce rates should generally decrease because a fertility success is more
common and adults stop searching for new fertile partners. Surrogacy is nevertheless
a special case, where state regulations instigate marriage, but also post surrogacy
divorce.
In my model there are two kinds of contracts: a surrogacy contract between
commissioning parents and the surrogate which is permeated by moral hazard is-
sues—the surrogate has hidden actions, and the marriage contract between a man
and a low fertility woman which is characterized by adverse selection—the woman
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has hidden information, her being low fertility. Men are the principal because they
offer a take-it-or-leave it contract of marriage to their consort. The contract is
simple: divorce if not fertile, marriage forever if fertile. Following this argument
surrogacy works as an insurance, so risk behaviour increases and marriages is de-
layed and also the divorce rate is lower. Even if delayed, marriage should be at its
all-time high because low woman enter the marriage market. Divorce, nevertheless,
should also increase because many new marriages (low woman marriages) are short-
lasting because they are motivated only by the married requirement of surrogacy
laws.
A damage measure should be high enough to induce performance in a mutually
self-enforced contract. But a self-enforcement contract could also stipulate a specific
performance clause7 if it requires a party to perform a specific act: the surrogate
relinquishing her paternal rights. It is a better alternative to awarding damages.
Of course, high damages for not relinquishing paternal rights is a straightforward
means of delivering a similar outcome. But life is—especially ex-ante—priceless, so
specific performance is better. Baby M’s contract was not complete because it did
not stipulate a penalty for every contingency, such as the surrogate and biological
mother deciding not to relinquish of her rights over the baby. As I said, a sufficiently
high damages remedy for breaching the contract could suffice, but entitling specific
performance is a more reasonable provision for this contract. In a gestational surro-
gacy the actions are clear: The surrogate mother has to let herself be inseminated
and carry, gestate and bear the baby, and after birth she must relinquish her pa-
ternal rights and deliver the baby. While the intended or commissioning parents
have to deliver their fertilized sex cells to the surrogate and have to accept the baby
7Clauses that convey the parties’ intent that the court award specific performance in the event
of breaches, e.g. “Each of the parties hereto agree that irreparable damage would occur if any
provision of this Surrogate Contract were not performed in accordance with the terms hereof. The
parties hereto recognize and agree that money damages may be insufficient to compensate the
commissioning parents for breaches by the surrogate, consequently, that the equitable remedy of
specific performance of the terms hereof will be available in the event of any such breach and that
the parties shall be entitled to enforce specifically the performance of the terms and provisions
hereof in any state court”.
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after the birth, all the actions can be compensated with money, but because of their
supreme value in terms of life and paternity rights, who keeps the baby and who
is/are going to act as parents is of great importance. These last actions/goods are
not easily compensated. They are life-or-death events so whenever the possibility
to honour the contract is still possible, i.e. the child is alive for instance, the child
should be given to the one/both entitled to it. As Thomas and Worrall (1988) show,
in a self-enforcing contract neither party has an incentive to renege, i.e. these con-
tracts must offset any short-term gain from reneging with greater long-term benefits
from compliance. So at the core of these self-enforcing contacts is how the conflict
between risk-sharing and the given self-enforcement is solved. As a matter of fact,
informal contracts where the surrogacy contract are not enforceable, but if they
are criminalized then there is no self-enforcement possible . But an infertile couple
who contract to gestate a baby will never be satisfied with anything less than the
baby. Money will not suffice. In many unique goods contracts—houses, there is a
presumption of specific performance. So infertile couples will file for this remedy for
the breach of contract if the surrogate is not willing to deliver the baby. But at the
same time, babies are not real property so courts can apply Family Laws and treat
the matter as a custody case, giving custody to the surrogate mother and genetic
mother and the genetic father as in Baby M’s case. Irrational threats, such as the
purported nonsensical threat to kill the baby or the threat to kidnapp him/her are a
kind of emotional—non pecuniary—threat, difficult to evaluate for the other party
but also for the courts. So being neither possible nor easy to rule out, these threats
are non-credible ones, but modifications of contract can still resort to them, see
Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill (2003). For surrogacy contracts where emotional issues
flourish easily, validity, enforcement and renegotiation of contracts can all be ex-
tremely complex and difficult to solve and settle, and may need case by case careful
examination and judgement.
Furthermore, an interesting discussion sparks from the fact that before the fer-
tilized eggs are implanted in the uterus of the surrogate, the contract between both
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parts is similar to producing goods or services, producing the baby or providing ges-
tational services. Then the remedy of damages for breach of contract is preferred.
For instance, the surrogate will need to pay a penalty for giving up her obligations in
the contract. But after the embryo is inside the surrogate body the contract is sim-
ilar to conveying (i.e. “To transfer ownership of or title to”) existing goods or other
properties, that is the baby and the parental rights. Of course, the commissioning
parents cannot buy the baby, because how can they buy something that nobody
but him/herself owns? But the surrogate can transfer her paternal rights to the
commissioning parents. Then the remedy of specific performance is more adequate
for breach of contracts. See Shavell (2006) for an interesting and detailed analysis
of this issue.
Surrogacy as a new institution for producing children may replace the traditional
institution of marriage. Even single men can acquire parental rights without even
having a sexual partner. Same sex couples can overcome the so far impossible sex-
ual mix with a personal bloodline continuation. Again, marriage can be under fire.
But in my sample I have only heterosexual couples and heterosexual marriage rates.
Within this sample, marriage should instead be boosted because with surrogacy low
fertility women become insured and start participating in the marriage market. It
may happen that in the population, the substitution effect is stronger, but in my
sample the insurance effect is the only visible one. At the same time, divorce may
or may not increase. Even in my sample, I have two competing effects: for some
marriages the gift of reproduction acts as a love potion and divorce plunges. At the
same time, because many more marriages of convenience are needed for surrogacy to
work the first time, many more divorces have been made possible. So in my sample
it is an empirical question for which both opposite effects prevail.
Furthermore, taking the predictions of the previous discussion on the microeco-
nomics of surrogacy: option value, insurance, adverse-selection and moral hazard,
self-enforcement contracts, specific performance, irrational/emotional threats and
175
the discussion on cost and benefits at the beginning of the section, the following
hypotheses can be formulated for my restricted sample:
1. Hypothesis 1, surrogacy increases marriage;
2. Hypothesis 2, surrogacy may increase or decrease divorce.
I emphasize again that these hypotheses are for my restricted model. For in-
stance, in a general model marriages are likely to decrease as discussed earlier. Ad-
ditionally, couples entering a surrogacy contract face very high costs of procreation,
causing a substitution away from highly fertile couples, and because of an intrinsic
reduced fertility rate amongst “newly fertile” infertile women, and because of its
increase in surrogacy marriage crowding out fertile women’s marriages, there is also
an effect in births and out-of-wedlock births, and thus two more hypotheses can be
added:
3. Hypothesis 3, surrogacy causes a decrease in births;
4. Hypothesis 4, surrogacy causes a decrease in out-of-wedlock births.
Note that Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 are related. The former implies a
decrease in married and unmarried births, while the latter implies a decrease at
least in unmarried (out-of-wedlock) births. This chapter will rigorously test these
four hypotheses. Finally, for a graphic intuition of some of these results see Figures
3.6 (More marriages and fewer married births after surrogacy are introduced. When
surrogacy is introduced infertile women who were out of the marriage market are now
getting married, increasing the married population. In the Figure you can see that
now there are more marriages; in fact now there are seven marriages and before there
were just six, but there are fewer married births because new surrogacy marriages
crowd out more fertile marriages) and 3.7 (Fewer unmarried births after surrogacy
is introduced. Surrogacy increases marriages so unmarried births are replaced by
married ones. In summary, more marriages, fewer births and fewer out-of-wedlock
births). In both Figures, each pair of hollow circles is a marriage between a man
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and a fertile woman; each pair of grey filled circles is a marriage between a man
and an infertile woman who have entered a surrogacy contract. Each leg is a child,
and fertile couples have two legs so an average childbirth rate of 2, while surrogacy
marriages have only one leg, meaning so that their overall childbirth rate is lower,
at 1 child per marriage (just think of the cost of surrogacy, which makes it difficult
to have multiple children).
3.7 Identification strategy
This chapter seeks to answer two questions. The first is how surrogacy or the
surrogacy rate is influenced by surrogacy legislation. The population model or data-
generating process is as follows:
Surrogacyst = Legislation
′
stβ1 +Controls
′
stζ1 + State
′
sη1 + Y ear
′
tγ1 + ε1st
(3.7.1)
This equation relies on the assumption that legislation8 is as good as random
after controlling for fixed effects (state and year) and a set of fertility, labour mar-
ket, political process, educational attainment and demographics controls. Notice
that legislation is not solely exogenous after selecting on observables, but legislation
timing is, which makes it as good as random after selecting on observables.
This question is also the first stage of a two stage procedure to answer the sec-
ond question of interest in this chapter. The second population model studies how
vital statistics such as marriage are shaped by surrogacy using the following data-
8As six categories: criminalized, unenforceable, probably unenforceable, uncertain, probably
enforceable and enforceable, or as three grouped variables: negative laws (criminalized and unen-
forceable), ambiguous laws (uncertain and probably enforceable) and positive laws (enforceable);
probably unenforceable is omitted.
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generating process:
V ital statisticsst = β2Surrogacyst +Controls
′
stζ2 + State
′
sη2 + Y ear
′
tγ2 + ε2st
(3.7.2)
The equation requires a similar assumption, and because it is the main equation
of the chapter, I will be very specific in addressing it. V ital statisticsst are state
s and year t values for marriage rate, births, out-of-wedlock births and divorce.
State′s is an unobserved state level fixed effect that includes all time-invariant state
characteristics, such as attitudes towards values, religious feelings, unobserved state
demographics and labour market characteristics. Y ear′t is an unobserved time level
fixed effect that comprises all nation-invariant year characteristics, such as nation-
wide press reports, public awareness or discussion on surrogacy, economic shocks,
terrorist attacks, and other yearly national distressful issues. ε2st is a state-by-year
error. The main threat to identification comes from endogeneity or the fact that
surrogacy may be correlated with time and state fixed effect and with the error
term.9 To give a flavour of the presence of this identification problem, I will dis-
cuss correlation with moral values, which I argue are in the error term of the vital
statistics equation. Conservative values tend to forbid surrogacy and at the same
time increase marriage trends. They can also shape the state numbers of surrogacy
contracts. Therefore, a proxy for moral values is used as a control: party affiliation
in the political process. Of course there can be other confounders, so a reasonable
identification strategy will look for an external shock to disentangle the effect of sur-
rogacy on marriage and other vital statistics. Legislation is defensibly this needed
external shock. The legislation process is complex and unpredictable but there is
9Recall that controlling for fixed effects is needed if there is correlation between the regressors
and the unobserved effects: State′s and Y ear
′
t. An instrumental variable is needed on top of that
when the regressors are correlated with the idiosyncratic error : εst.
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sorting in surrogacy legislation: states with uncertain legislation are localized to
the centre, while states with enforceable legislation are localized to the periphery.
Nevertheless, as a balancing test shows, the timing in which legislation is introduced
in each state is arguably random after controlling for key covariates and year and
state fixed effects. This clearly indicates that legislation instruments can help to
address causality of surrogacy on vital statistics. Nudging surrogacy variation with
legislation variation permits the explanation of vital statistics variation under a full
causality interpretation. In summary, an instrumental variable procedure in which
surrogacy rate is instrumented by surrogacy legislation results in a promising and
defensible procedure to explore the causal relation between surrogacy rates and vital
statistics.
A balancing test (see Table 3.7) to test the suitability of this IV procedure shows
the unconditional regressions of the predicted endogenous variable (from a regression
of surrogacy rate on the full-set of instruments: negative, ambiguous and positive
laws) on each of the different 7 controls and 29 unobservables. The sign of the co-
efficients of these relations suggests that states with higher levels of surrogacy are
characterized by more parents who are infertile, of Black or Hispanic origin, with
higher labour market characteristics, affiliated with the Democratic party and hold-
ers of a Bachelor’s degree. This dependence vanishes when controlling for a full set
of state and year fixed effect (in only 2 controls and 5 unobservables there is still a
slight correlation). Then, after adding the 7 controls all the correlation disappears (1
control and 1 unobservable are still marginally correlated). These balancing regres-
sions suggest that legislation instruments are as good as random after controlling
for fixed effects and covariates, i.e. that are exogenous, not correlated with the er-
ror term that includes the omitted variable (moral attitudes), with other controls
(race or party affiliation) and fixed effects (unobserved demographics or religious
feelings) that explain the outcome (marriage rates); and that they are independent
of the outcomes (marriage rates), and treatments (surrogacy) and can be used as
the causal variable of this study’s population model. Multiple figures with controls
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are gathered in Figure 3.8.
3.8 Results
To answer the first question of the chapter, the first stages of the IV procedure
are appropriate. There are eight IV regressions in Tables 3.8, 3.9, 3.10. All of them
show a negative coefficient when negative laws are enforced, not significantly dif-
ferent from zero when ambiguous laws are enacted and a positive coefficient when
positive laws are upheld. Regarding only the regression with marriage rate as the
dependent variable with the controls and state and year fixed effects, the results
show the step-like coefficients going from an average of a significant value of -2.521
surrogacies in states when surrogacy is banned by negative laws, to a non-significant
value of 0.008 surrogacies in states when laws are ambiguous, and an increase with
a value of 0.876 (not significant in this regression) when surrogacy is backed by
positive laws. These coefficients show increases and decreases of surrogacy with
respect to the omitted, probably unenforceable category. In summary, restrictive
legislation reduces and permissive legislation adds surrogacies to the tally of each
state. Additionally, although not shown, having time to change mind slightly re-
duces the surrogacy rate, and being uncompensated slightly increases the surrogacy
rate. However, both variables are marginally significant.
Marriage and divorce rates express how many marriages and divorces happened
annually for every 1,000 people in the overall population. The data in this paper
shows that the overall average for marriage rates is 7.31, meaning that approximately
7 new marriages happened annually for every 1,000 people in each of the 52 states
and the overall average for divorce rates is 3.65, which means that, annually, almost
4 additional divorces are consummated each year for every 1,000 people in each state.
IV regressions of the effect of surrogacy rate on marriage rates, births, out-of-
wedlock births and divorce rates are performed. Surrogacy rates is an endogenous
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variable instrumented by legislation dummies as previously explained. Table 3.8
shows two OLS regressions of marriage rate on surrogacy rate with state and year
fixed effect with and without controls. Selected controls are: Black percentage
of female population ages 15-39, Hispanic origin percentage of female population
ages 15-39, GDP (per capita), party affiliation, Bachelor’s degree, Black percentage
and Hispanic origin percentage. For these specifications, bad controls are omitted,
such as the following outcomes: births, birth rate, fertility rate, total fertility rate,
teenage birth rate, women’s weekly earnings and the proportion of women’s weekly
earnings to men’s weekly earnings. The coefficients are negatively biased for OLS.
After switching to a full IV regression, they are significant and higher. It is inter-
esting to attempt to develop an explanation of the negative bias of columns (1)-(2).
For simplicity, suppose that the surrogacy rate (treatment) is D, a dummy variable
that indicates whether surrogacy is not practiced, D=0, or practiced, D=1, in the
state. Take Michigan as an example of the former and California as an example of
the latter. To have a negative bias, the control state, Michigan, needs to have more
marriages, outcome Y = Y0|D = 0, when not facing surrogacy than California in
the non-observed potential outcome of also not facing surrogacy, Y0|D = 1. This
can be explained by moral attitudes. California, a state open to surrogacy, is likely
to be a “liberal” state so it is also likely to have a lower marriage rate in the “what-
if” condition of not practicing surrogacy. In other words, in an omitted variable
bias setting where corr(variable of interest/surrogacy rate, omitted variable/moral
attitudes) is negative while corr(dependent variable/marriage rate, omitted vari-
able/moral attitudes) is positive, the selection bias is negative, causing downward
bias. This selection bias disappears when the IV strategy, controls and fixed effects
are used. At the same time, a LATE interpretation of the results is recommended.
The extra marriages exhibited are for the compliers, those couples that in a legal
environment of criminalized surrogacy do not enter a surrogacy contract but that,
in a legal environment of enforceable surrogacy, do enter a surrogacy contract; that
is, compliers are the ones who voluntarily enter a surrogacy contract (the observed
treatment) when nudged by the instrument (a surrogacy friendly legislation, akin
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to a voucher for entering a surrogacy contract). This variation in surrogacy pro-
voked by the instrument legislation will be the core causality input for the observed
outcome effect, namely variation in the marriage rate. The local average treatment
effect is only for the compliers who happen to be numerous in the sample, arguably
by the importance of the rule of law. Defiers (DLeg=crim = surr,DLeg=enf = surr),
always takers (DLeg=crim = surr,DLeg=enf = surr) and never takers (DLeg=crim =
surr,DLeg=enf = surr) do not matter. For the reason given previously, the preferred
regression is the IV procedure. The main specification produces a 0.007**, which
represents 6.8 marriages per surrogacy10 or a standardized effect of 5.38% over the
marriage standard deviation (see Table 3.11) assuming 41.3 additional surrogacies
for each additional point in surrogacy rate.11
Table 3.9 show births and out-of-wedlock births results. In the main specifica-
tion, births are reduced -2.1** per surrogacy. This can be explained by the direct
effect of more surrogacy-related marriages, which are less fertile than regular mar-
riages. This accounts for just 1.63% of the standardized effect on the birth standard
deviation (see Table 3.11), so the effect of surrogacy on the overall birth rate is
tenuous. An out-of-wedlock birth effect of -1.6** per surrogacy or 3.16% of the
standardized effect was also found.
Finally, Table 3.10 presents the divorce rate results. Again, the OLS regressions
are negatively biased. The main specification, i.e. IV with the selected controls and
fixed effects, reveals a significant 0.003** effect of surrogacy on divorce. Assuming
an average population of 290 million and 1,058,500 new divorces each year in the
10The results are the same if the total number of marriages regressed, with the IV setting, on
total number of surrogacies and controlling for total population. This is not surprising because
these are only transformations, or changes in variable dimensions.
11To go from 0.007*** to 281.1***, first take the US population 290 million and multiply by the
prevalence of marriages, 7.34 per 1,000 habitants, and divide the result by 53 states which produces
the number of 40,162 marriages per state. Multiplying it by 0.007** results in 281.1** marriages
per surrogacy rate. Moreover, an average of 4,137,796 births each year imply that an additional
point in surrogacy rate equals to effective 41.3 surrogacies. This permits the transformation of the
281.1 marriages per surrogacy rate into the 6.8 marriages per surrogacy as 281.1/41.3. In a few
words, the coefficient 0.007** in the marriage on surrogacy rate regression corresponds to 6.8**
additional marriages per surrogacy or 281.1** additional marriages per surrogacy rate.
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entire US territory, implies an addition of 0.97 divorces per surrogacy or a 4.21%
standardized effect over the divorce standard deviation (see Table 3.11).
In summary, the number of marriages increases because people decide to get
married even when selected infertile conditions are present. Surrogacy is a new
technology in the production function of children. Thus, the pool of marriageable
mates increases. Births are slightly reduced because newly formed surrogacy related
marriages are less fertile than regular marriages. Out-of-wedlock births are also re-
duced because there are more marriages and because couples are, on average, less
fertile. Divorces increase because some of the marriages promoted by the availability
of surrogacy are less close after marriage has been consummated and children have
been born and the legal requirement to get married in order to enter a surrogacy
contract is no longer binding. The results of this study align with the predictions
of the proposed model: with the emergence of surrogacy, men who love an infertile
woman can now marry and also secure fertility. Also, couples must marry to enter
a surrogacy contract due to legal regulations. These two mixed incentives promote
more marriages (both groups marry more), but they also promote more divorces
(couples who married just because of legal regulations are more prone to divorce
following conception). In the data, the institutional restrictions, the model and the
results, these two economic regularity are ubiquitous.
Lastly, Table 3.12 shows results for other outcomes: birthrate, fertility rate, total
fertility rate and teenage birthrate. In the IV model with fixed effects and controls
all are slightly negative. These results are also according to the predictions of the
model: lower births (birthrate) and lower fertility (fertility rate, total fertility rate,
teenage birth).
In order to test the results, six robustness checks were used with the marriage
rate IV regression with controls and fixed effects as benchmark (Table 3.13). In the
first two, results similar to the benchmark were expected because additions do not
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challenge the benchmark; they only test its integrity. However, in the last four, only
noise without any correlation was expected, because the benchmark is disrupted.
To begin with, the additional control of absolute number of organ donations (total,
live or dead) for each state and period are added. Each organ donation related
variable is a proxy to the unobserved moral values and attitudes towards body organ
promiscuity common in surrogacy and organ donation. The results show a positive,
significant and sizeable coefficient which substantially backs the effect of surrogacy
rate on marriage rate. Note that these organ donation variables are left in the
unobserved only because of missing observations (there were 82 missing observations
in total). If I had obtained access to the full set of observations, I would certainly
have used the variables as another proxy for moral values. The result is 0.009**
according to what was expected. I also attempt to use a lag variable to increase
the predetermination of the controls, and again the results are strong and according
to what was expected (0.011**). Then there are the four robustness checks where
the benchmark is severely disrupted. First, surrogacy rate is replaced by fertility
variables grouped as lowly correlated with surrogacy: surrogacy clinics (the number
of clinics that use gestational carriers) and fresh non donor (only ART fertility
treatment when gestational carriers are used, in 1% of the cycles).12 As expected,
no significance is found in the coefficient of either variable. Then fertility variables
not correlated with surrogacy are tested: non surrogacy clinics (clinics that do not
use gestational carriers in their fertility treatments), clinics (either surrogacy and
non-surrogacy clinics) and fresh donor (another ART fertility treatment in which,
at least in this sample, non-gestational carries are reported). The coefficients are
all non-significant. This is reassuring because it shows that only the surrogacy rate
has a sizeable effect on marriage rates while these placebo variables do not. Next,
the population of each state and year, which is a demographic variable, is used to
try to explain marriage. Again, no effect is found. Finally, the last robustness check
changes the dependent variable to the marriage rate by state in the years 1990, 1995,
12In fact, the vast majority of the fertility treatments do not use a gestational carrier even if
a clinic that uses them or a treatment where they are used is selected. This explains why these
apparently related variables are indeed scarcely correlated with surrogacy
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1999 and 2000 using the surrogacy rate and control variables for the years 2001 to
2004. So for surrogacy the same years were used as for the main specification, but
for married the lagged periods were used. No effect is found again, which means
that the surrogacy rate just explains the marriage rate for the same year. Using
surrogacy rates of posterior periods as a placebo treatment delivered results with no
significance at all.
3.9 Synthetic control
Regarding the initial results of the impact of the enactment of the Illinois Gesta-
tional Surrogacy Act, Table 3.14 shows that both the extensive margin (the number
of clinics) and the intensive margin (the percentage of total cycles each clinic de-
votes to gestational surrogacy) increased when the law was effectively introduced
on January 1st 2005. New clinics entered the market, some specialized exclusively
in the surrogacy business. There seems to be a permanent effect of the law in both
dimensions. Figure 3.9 also documents how the Illinois statute positively impacts
the extensive margin. Also presented are Illinois’ controls in Figure 3.10, which
shows a trough in births, birth rates, fertility rate, total fertility rate, teenage birth
rate, White births, Black births and Hispanic births, just after the onset of Illinois’
surrogate legislation, which is what the paper’s model predicts.
To test whether the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act effectively increased the
surrogacies within that state after its enactment on January 1st 2005, a synthetic
control procedure is implemented following Abadie et al. (2011).
First, Illinois is the treated state, and the donor pool consists of 28 remaining
states; 23 states were discarded due to restrictive or permissive legislation being
introduced during the window of the data (2001-2013). The excluded states are Al-
abama, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Min-
nesota, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
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Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
West Virginia and Wisconsin, and the list is consistent with the black numbers in
Table 3.3 which refer to legislations introduced during the period. Table 3.15 repro-
duces state weights in the synthetic Illinois.
Second, 15 predictors of the surrogacies (the dependent variable) are measured:
surrogacy clinics, overall fertility clinics and non-surrogacy clinics; the legislation
dummies as criminalized, unenforceable, probably unenforceable, uncertain, proba-
bly enforceable and enforceable; fertility indicators as births, birth rate and fertility
rate; and demographics of birth such as White birth percentage, Black birth per-
centage and Hispanic birth percentage. Table 3.16 shows the means of surrogacy
predictor, while Table 3.17 reproduces predictor weights in the synthetic Illinois.
Third, Figure 3.11 exhibits the result of the trends in surrogacy in Illinois versus
the synthetic Illinois. The figure shows an important increase after the beginning of
2005, with a peak of nearly 80 (a fourfold increase) surrogacies in 2010. At the end
of the sample there is a downward trend that future research should explore and that
may add a transient aspect of the effect. Similar results are shown in Figure 3.12
which is a gap graph depicting the gap between the number of surrogacies in Illinois
and the synthetic Illinois before and after the enacting of the Illinois Gestational
Surrogacy Act. Again, the results seem to favour an increase in surrogacies caused
with the introduction of permissive legislation.
Finally, Figure 3.13 shows three placebo tests: the first one, Figure 3.13a is a
placebo-in-outcome where the synthetic control code is run again but instead of us-
ing surrogacies as the dependent variables, a fake variable is used (non-surrogacy
clinics). No effect is found. Next, Figure 3.13b is a placebo-in-region which repeats
the procedure, but instead of Illinois, Alaska is the treated unit. Again, no effect is
found. Last, Figure 3.13c is a placebo-in-time where the date of the introduction of
the legislation is changed to a 2010 placebo legislation. Again, no effect is found.
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To conclude, I present a permutation test which brings statistical rigour to the
procedure by evaluating the significance of the estimates, posing the question of
whether the results could be driven entirely by chance using the mean square pre-
diction error (MSPE). What I found is a reasonable rejection of mere chance.
3.10 Conclusion
This chapter collects, for the very first time, a complete Surrogacy Data Set over
thirteen years at the state level where the US Data is from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention and reveals the incidence of surrogacy by state.
One of the goals of this chapter is, using this Surrogacy Data Set, to document
how permissive and restrictive legislation have effectively regulated the number of
surrogacies during the decade and for each US state. This shows the results of
restrictive legislation, which criminalizes surrogacy or makes surrogacy contracts
unenforceable and reduces the number of surrogacies, as well as the results of per-
missive legislation, which makes surrogacy contracts enforceable and increases the
number of surrogacies. If more data becomes available, further studies should con-
sider whether to isolate cross-border surrogacy.
Furthermore, evidence shows that surrogacy affects vital statistics (marriage,
births, out-of-wedlock births and divorce). Using an IV procedure that exploits
variation in surrogacy predicted by changes in legislation, the data shows that one
additional surrogacy increases the number of marriages by ≈7 for each state, which
means a 5.38% standardized effect, which implies that the effect of increasing mar-
riages for low fertility women and the effect of compulsory marriage in surrogacy
legislation are larger than the effect of substituting the institution of marriage with
the new social and biologic institution of surrogacy. For this to happen it is cru-
cial that my sample does not include same sex marriages or single persons wanting
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to have children without marrying. Moreover, there is evidence that an additional
surrogacy increases divorces by ≈1 for each state, or 4.21% of a standardized effect,
which implies that in my sample the effect of marriages of convenience as a con-
sequence of surrogacy legislation requirement to get married for the commissioning
parents over the insurance on low fertility marriages, and that it only marginally
reduces births and out-of-wedlock births. Thus, the most significant contribution
delivered by this paper is that the main effect of surrogacy on the vital statistics of
the country is seen through marriage.
Moreover, these results align with the predictions of a model I developed, show-
ing how the introduction of surrogacy as a new fertility technology can change the
demographics of a given US state.
I tested my results with advanced econometric techniques, including a balancing
test and six robustness check exercises, to show not only correlations but also causal
relationships from legislation to surrogacy and from surrogacy to vital statistics.
Finally, it is of interest to underline that my data—and then my study—is in-
clined to what I have called a soft or conservative surrogacy where married het-
erosexual couples and only uterine infertility are permitted. Results confirm what
the theoretical discussion predicted: more marriages, divorce and fewer births. At
the same time, if surrogacy is extended to single persons, fertile women, gays and
lesbians, the predictions of the model are at least theoretically tilted to less marriage
and probably less divorce, with births being unclear. I deeply hope this study will
trigger new data to become available to uncover the effect on surrogacy of key family
vital statistics also in the hard form of surrogacy.
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Figure 3.1: US birth certificate
U.S. STANDARD CERTIFICATE OF LIVE BIRTH 
LOCAL FILE NO. BIRTH NUMBER: 
C H  I L D  1.  CHILD’S NAME (First, Middle, Last, Suffix)  2. IME OF BIRTH (24hr) 
3. SEX  4. TE OF BIRTH (Mo/Day/Yr) 
5. FACILITY NAME (If not institution, give street and number)  6. CITY, TOWN, OR LOCATION OF BIRTH  7. Y OF BIRTH 
M O  T H E R  8a.  MOTHER’S CURRENT LEGAL NAME (First, Middle, Last, Suffix) 8b. TE OF BIRTH (Mo/Day/Yr) 
8c. OTHER’S NAME PRIOR TO FIRST MARRIAGE (First, Middle, Last, Suffix)  8d.  BIRTHPLACE (State, Territory, or Foreign Country) 
9a. RESIDENCE OF MOTHER-STATE  9b. Y  9c. Y, TOWN, OR LOCATION 
9d. TREET AND NUMBER  9e. PT. NO.  9f. IP CODE  9g. IDE CITY 
LIMITS? 
� Yes �  No 
F A  T H E R  
10a. ATHER’S CURRENT LEGAL NAME (First, Middle, Last, Suffix)  10b. ATE OF BIRTH (Mo/Day/Yr)  10c. HPLACE (State, Territory, or Foreign Country) 
CERTIFIER 
11. RTIFIER’S NAME: _________________________________________ 
TITLE: �  MD �  DO � HOSPITAL  ADMIN. �  CNM/CM �  OTHER MIDWIFE 
�  OTHER (Specify)_____________________________ 
12. TE CERTIFIED 
______/ ______ / __________
MM  DD 
13. TE FILED BY REGISTRAR 
______/ ______ / __________
MM  DD 
INFORMATION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE USE 
M O  T H E R 
14.  MOTHER’S MAILING ADDRESS: � Same as residence, or: tate: ity, Town, or Location: 
Street & Number: Apartment No.: ip Code: 
15. MOTHER MARRIED? (At birth, conception, or any time between) � Yes � No 
IF NO, HAS PATERNITY ACKNOWLEDGMENT BEEN SIGNED IN THE HOSPITAL? � Yes � No 
16.  SECURITY NUMBER REQUESTED 
FOR CHILD? � Yes �  No 
17. ACILITY ID. (NPI) 
18.  MOTHER’S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 19.  FATHER’S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 
INFORMATION FOR MEDICAL AND HEALTH PURPOSES ONLY 
M O  T H E R  
20. MOTHER’S EDUCATION (Check the 
box that best describes the highest 
degree or level of school completed at 
the time of delivery) 
�  8th grade or less 
�  9th - 12th grade, no diploma 
�  High school graduate or GED 
completed 
�  Some college credit but no degree 
�  Associate degree (e.g., AA, AS) 
�  Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, AB, BS) 
�  Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MEng, 
MEd, MSW, MBA) 
�  Doctorate (e.g., PhD, EdD) or 
Professional degree (e.g., MD, DDS, 
DVM, LLB, JD) 
21.  MOTHER OF HISPANIC ORIGIN?  (Check the box 
that best describes whether the mother is 
Spanish/Hispanic/Latina. heck the “No” box if 
mother is not Spanish/Hispanic/Latina) 
�  No, not Spanish/Hispanic/Latina 
�  Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicana 
�  Yes, Puerto Rican 
�  Yes, Cuban 
�  Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic/Latina 
(Specify)_____________________________ 
22. OTHER’S RACE (Check one or more races to indicate what the mother 
considers herself 
�  White 
�  Black or African American 
�  American Indian or Alaska Native 
(Name of the enrolled or principal tribe)____________________________ 
�  Asian Indian 
�  Chinese 
�  Filipino 
�  Japanese 
�  Korean 
�  Vietnamese 
�  Other Asian (Specify)__________________________________________ 
�  Native Hawaiian 
�  Guamanian or Chamorro 
�  Samoan 
�  Other Pacific Islander (Specify)___________________________________ 
�  Other (Specify)_________________________________________________ 
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23. FATHER’S EDUCATION (Check the 
box that best describes the highest 
degree or level of school completed at 
the time of delivery) 
�  8th grade or less 
�  9th - 12th grade, no diploma 
�  High school graduate or GED 
completed 
�  Some college credit but no degree 
�  Associate degree (e.g., AA, AS) 
�  Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BA, AB, BS) 
�  Master’s degree (e.g., MA, MS, MEng, 
MEd, MSW, MBA) 
�  Doctorate (e.g., PhD, EdD) or 
Professional degree (e.g., MD, DDS, 
DVM, LLB, JD) 
24.  FATHER OF HISPANIC ORIGIN?  (Check the box 
that best describes whether the father is 
Spanish/Hispanic/Latino. heck the “No” box if 
mother is not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino) 
�  No, not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino 
�  Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano 
�  Yes, Puerto Rican 
�  Yes, Cuban 
�  Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino 
(Specify)_____________________________ 
25. ATHER’S RACE (Check one or more races to indicate what the father 
considers himself 
�  White 
�  Black or African American 
�  American Indian or Alaska Native 
(Name of the enrolled or principal tribe)____________________________ 
�  Asian Indian 
�  Chinese 
�  Filipino 
�  Japanese 
�  Korean 
�  Vietnamese 
�  Other Asian (Specify)__________________________________________ 
�  Native Hawaiian 
�  Guamanian or Chamorro 
�  Samoan 
�  Other Pacific Islander (Specify)___________________________________ 
�  Other (Specify)_________________________________________________ 
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26.  PLACE WHERE BIRTH OCCURRED (Check one) 
� Hospital 
� Freestanding birthing center 
� Home Birth: Planned to deliver at home? � Yes � No 
� Clinic/Doctor’s office 
� Other (Specify)_______________________ 
27.  ATTENDANT’S NAME, TITLE, AND NPI 
NAME: _______________________ PI:_______ 
TITLE: � MD � DO � CNM/CM � OTHER MIDWIFE 
� OTHER (Specify)___________________ 
28. MOTHER TRANSFERRED FOR MATERNAL MEDICAL OR 
FETAL INDICATIONS FOR DELIVERY? � Yes � No 
IF YES, ENTER NAME OF FACILITY MOTHER 
TRANSFERRED FROM: 
____________________________________________ 
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Note(1): Rev. 11/2003. Note(2): Source: CDC (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US Government). For more
information see http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vital certificate revisions.htm
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Figure 3.3: Surrogacy legislation
Legislation by state: 2001, 2006 and 2013.
2001
2013
2006
Note (1): Source: Own calculation from data on US surrogacy legislation
by state for the period 2001 to 2013 in the academic on-line version of Lex-
isNexis—www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/—in conjunction with Cre-
ative Family Connections LLC website CreFamCon (2015) and Darra L. Hofman’s
key article, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe: A State-by-State Survey of Surro-
gacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact” (2009). Each register verifies
the enacting year of surrogacy statutory legislations and court decisions. I have
established six categories: criminalized, unenforceable, probably unenforceable, un-
certain, probably enforceable, and enforceable.
Note (2): These are three consecutive snapshots of geographic representations
of surrogacy legislation by states in the US. Alaska is partially shown. Puerto
Rico is shown disregarding its natural location. Hawaii is not shown. New York
is shown as criminalized because compensated surrogacy is banned: Anyone who
signs a surrogacy contract risks a fine of up to $10,000. Facilitators of these
surrogacy contracts—surrogacy agencies and barristers—risk a fine and if it is a
repeated offence, are guilty of felony. Nevertheless, in the Surrogacy Data Set
I code the state as uncertain because a prosperous uncompensated market is
permitted and in full-practice. Michigan is a similar case: While compensated
surrogacy is illegal, uncompensated one is permitted.
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Figure 3.4: Surrogacy/surrogacy rate by legislation
(a) Surrogacy by legislation
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Note (1): Source: Author’s calculations from CDC and LexisNexis source.
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Figure 3.5: First stage and reduced form
(a) First stage
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Note (1): Source: Author’s calculations from CDC and LexisNexis source. Graphs show
a visual approach to the identification strategy. Seen are the first stage—surrogacy rate on
legislation—(DC not shown) and the reduced form—marriage rate on legislation—(NV and
HI not shown) of a subsequent IV strategy.
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Footnote for Figure Controls and unobservables by state for the whole
US and the whole period 2001-2013 Note (1): Source: Author’s calculations.
Data are available on-line at www.CDC.gov. Controls—graph by state for the whole US for
the whole period—are births (number of live births, range 5,975-566,414), birth rate (number
of live births per 1,000 of a population in a particular year, range 9.4-21.8), (general) fertility
rate (number of births per 1,000 women between the ages of 15 and 44 in a particular year,
range 47.9-95), total fertility rate (TFR) (number of births that a cohort of 1,000 women
would have if they experienced throughout their childbearing years the same age-specific
birth rates observed in a given year, range 1,470-2,755.5), teenage birthrate (number of births
per 1,000 women between the ages of 15 and 19 in a particular year, range 12.1-74.9), White
births (number of White live births, range 1,175-167,025), Black births (number of Black live
births, range 29-51,799), Hispanic births (number of Hispanic live births, range 32-297,092),
percentage of female population age 15-39 and race percentage (White(range 0.023-0.959),
Black (range 0.001-0.630) and Hispanic (range 0.004-0.973)), personal income (per capita,
range $22,780-$75,950), GDP (per capita, range $28,956-$173,305), women’s (range $407-
$1,100), men’s (range $522-$1,212) and total (range $458-$1,152) weekly earnings, women’s
participation rate (range 47.7-71.2), employment ratio (range 44.8-68.9) and unemployment
rate (range 2.3-12.7), men’s participation rate (range 59.6-82), employment ratio (range 54.5-
79.7) and unemployment rate (range 2.4-15.8), total participation rate (range 53.8-76.1),
employment ratio (range 49.6-73.3) and unemployment rate (range 2.6-16), party affiliation
(Republican=1, Democrat=2), high school attendance (range 69.5-93.5), Bachelor’s degree
(range 15.1-55.1), White race (range 24.77-97.12), Black race (range 0.31-60.29), Native
American (range 0.09-15.63), Asian (range 0.25-41.78), Native Hawaiian (range 0-10.44),
two races (range 0.59-24.11), Hispanic origin (range 0.72-99.09).
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Figure 3.9: Effect of the change in surrogacy legislation in Illinois on the number of
clinics
Note (1): Source: Author’s calculation. The number of surrogacy clinics—extensive margin—is as-
sessed from the Clinic Table Data of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US Government from
2001-2013. Data are available on-line at www.CDC.gov/ART/ARTReports.htm. The legislation change
corresponds to the enactment of the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act on January 1st 2005.
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Figure 3.11: Trends in surrogacy: Illinois vs. synthetic Illinois
Note (1): Synthetic control: Illinois’ surrogacies vs. synthethic Illinois’ surrogacies. Trends in surrogacy
before and after 01/01/2005 when a new permissive legislation was introduced in the state of Illinois, a
statute called the Illinois Surrogate Act.
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Figure 3.12: Gaps in surrogacy between Illinois and synthetic Illinois
Note (1): Gaps in surrogacy between Illinois and synthetic Illinois before and after 01/01/2005 when a
new permissive legislation was introduced in the state of Illinois, a statute called the Illinois Surrogate Act.
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Figure 3.15: Surrogacy basic facts at the national level
(a) Surrogacies
(b) Fresh non-donor and total
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Note (1): Source: Author’s calculations. National level data from the official yearly reports of the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US Government from 1997-2013 (fresh non-donor and total
fertility cycles only available from 1997-2012). Data are available on-line at www.CDC.gov for recent years.
Previous years are only available through the Wayback Machine—archive.org/web/web.php—at the same
internet address. These values represent country level data. See also the Surrogacy Data Set for state level
data.
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Table 3.1: A snapshot of the Surrogacy Data Set
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Alabama 4 4 3 0 7 2 5 5 8 9 5 10 9
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Arizona 2 6 11 6 6 3 9 7 11 4 6 6 5
Arkansas 2 1 0 0 11 2 0 2 0 0 1 1 1
California 175 154 200 187 249 295 164 211 207 222 214 238 231
Colorado 16 13 15 21 22 14 15 13 9 23 13 9 6
Connecticut 6 8 26 23 33 20 17 43 28 38 30 31 37
Delaware 3 4 5 4 0 0 0 7 1 2 0 2 0
District of Columbia 0 2 0 0 0 2 3 3 3 3 6 5 4
Florida 17 21 37 54 49 60 54 54 58 47 55 48 54
Georgia 12 13 10 5 17 10 11 5 9 6 16 7 9
Hawaii 0 0 1 1 0 2 0 2 1 2 1 2 2
Idaho 0 1 2 8 6 12 4 13 11 6 16 17 3
Illinois 16 12 15 35 57 68 58 74 78 77 53 48 37
Indiana 8 16 13 14 14 19 11 13 9 7 18 5 9
Iowa 1 2 0 2 1 4 1 2 3 2 4 8 2
Kansas 8 4 12 13 7 11 10 9 5 6 3 7 12
Kentucky 2 4 1 2 1 4 6 2 3 3 0 4 2
Louisiana 6 6 4 3 2 8 4 4 8 4 12 5 10
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Maryland 36 18 5 3 37 28 38 39 38 40 26 23 47
Massachusetts 41 39 39 28 58 54 28 44 54 56 50 46 54
Michigan 15 10 11 20 21 24 17 6 16 15 18 11 15
Minnesota 17 10 11 18 14 8 12 19 11 14 17 22 14
Mississippi 0 4 1 0 0 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 1
Missouri 6 5 5 15 13 13 15 16 5 5 3 11 13
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Nebraska 2 2 1 4 3 4 3 2 1 1 2 0 4
Nevada 4 10 12 17 16 30 13 14 10 7 7 2 4
New Hampshire 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New Jersey 30 43 61 58 87 70 62 84 70 42 45 25 21
New Mexico 1 0 0 3 0 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 0
New York 12 20 37 26 33 79 29 29 46 56 53 53 55
North Carolina 5 4 1 7 5 6 2 17 15 23 31 22 19
North Dakota 0 0 0 1 3 0 4 3 1 5 1 2 1
Ohio 24 24 28 11 18 20 18 27 26 31 27 43 38
Oklahoma 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 0 1
Oregon 10 12 3 5 8 8 13 14 3 11 12 20 25
Pennsylvania 25 22 31 43 44 26 21 21 20 22 23 28 22
Puerto Rico 2 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 0
Rhode Island 0 0 4 0 4 0 2 4 3 4 0 2 4
South Carolina 3 2 2 0 4 3 5 7 6 2 9 7 3
South Dakota 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 4 5
Tennessee 4 3 6 4 2 1 4 4 5 12 8 18 6
Texas 30 31 40 34 49 90 31 42 48 64 73 65 69
Utah 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 6 7 11 9 15 6
Vermont 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 3 1 0 0 3
Virginia 14 11 11 15 13 17 22 20 15 20 19 16 22
Washington 8 3 5 8 6 7 8 16 12 10 7 9 8
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Wisconsin 4 3 1 9 4 8 7 5 7 8 7 3 3
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 571 548 671 710 929
(3)
1042 733 915 883 926 907 901 900
Notes (1): Source: Author’s calculation from the Clinic Data Table of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, US Government. Data are available on-line at www.CDC.gov/ART/ARTReports.htm.
Note (2) This snapshot of the Surrogacy Data Set documents the number of surrogacies by state. In
particular shows the surrogacies for the years 2001-2013. To calculate this variable by state I multiply the
total fresh non-donor cycles started at each clinic by the gestational rate (the percentage of fresh non-donor
cycles using a gestational carrier over the total fresh non-donor cycles started) reported by each clinic in
each of the fifty states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Before collapsing I adjust the <1%
rate to splice the number of surrogacies with the official national count from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention. This is both a calculation but also a control using all available information. I repeat the
process for each of the thirteen years of data. The complete Surrogacy Data Set is available upon
request from the author.
Note (3): A clinic in Hawaii is reported to have undertaken 83 surrogacies in 2005. It seems an outlier.
With the Hawaii surrogacies the count for 2005 will be the official 1,012 surrogacies and not the 929 shown
here.
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Table 3.2: Cost-benefit analysis.1
Marriage
Husband Wife
Benefits
Be in the birth certificate Insurance for specialization in household pro-
duction
Costs
$25,0003
Breadwinner2 for wife and children Unpaid household production
Surrogacy
Father Mother
Benefits
Be in the birth certificate. Continuation of
the bloodline. (Better) substitute for adop-
tion.
Be in the birth certificate. Overcome a fe-
male infertility. Continuation of the blood-
line. (Better) substitute for adoption. Earn
a salary and do not be subject to (unpaid)
maternity leave. Do not risk adverse effects
of pregnancy (physical, mental or esthetic).
Male breadwinner for child.
Costs
$100,0004
Breadwinner for child Lose maternal attachment
Divorce
Ex-husband Ex-wife
Benefits
Be single or build a new family Be single or build a new family. Get chil-
dren custody. Alimony and children sup-
port. Stop unpaid household production not
related to the rearing of children.
Costs
$20,0005
Alimony and children support. Lose child
custody. Children’s stress.
Raising children on her own. Children’s
stress.
1 Source: Compiled by author based on various U.S. sources including facts, customs, traditions, court rulings, statutory laws and expectations.
2 Assumption of a male breadwinner is just for simplicity. Nothing fundamental changes if a dual-earner (in fact more common, ∼60%) or a female
breadwinner is assumed instead.
3 Cost of wedding, www.costofwedding.com
4 Circle surrogacy, www.circlesurrogacy.com/costs
5 Forbes, www.forbes.com/2006/11/07/divorce-costs-legal-biz-cx lh 1107legaldivorce.html
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Table 3.3: Surrogacy legislation state-by-state
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Alabama 2008
Alaska 1989
Arizona 1989
Arkansas 1989
California 2005
Colorado 1987
Connecticut 2002
Delaware 1988 2013
District of Columbia 1992
Florida 1993
Georgia NO
Hawaii NO
Idaho 2004
Illinois 2005
Indiana 1997
Iowa 1989
Kansas 1996
Kentucky 1981
Louisiana 1987
Maine NO
Maryland 2000 2005
Massachusetts 2001
Michigan 1988
Minnesota 2007
Mississippi NO
Missouri 1997
Montana NO
Nebraska 1988
Nevada 1993
New Hampshire 1990
New Jersey 2000
New Mexico 2005
New York 2004
North Carolina 2008
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North Dakota 2005
Ohio 2007
Oklahoma 2005
Oregon 1997
Pennsylvania 2006
Puerto Rico NO
Rhode Island 2007
South Carolina 2003
South Dakota NO
Tennessee 2009
Texas 2003
Utah 1989 2005
Vermont 1999
Virginia 2000
Washington 2002
West Virginia 2001
Wisconsin 2003
Wyoming NO
Note (1): Source: I take an on-line survey of Academic Lexis-
Nexis—www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/—in conjunction with Creative Family Connections
LLC website (CreFamCon, 2015) and Darra L. Hofman (2009)’s key article, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s
Maybe: A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact” retrieving
the year when the legislation change is introduced, which is the year in this table. With this infor-
mation I create seventy-eight dummies, one for each year of data for surrogacy at the state level,
i.e., 2001-2013, and for each category of legislation. Whenever the date of legislation is before the
2001-2013 period—coded as blue dates—the dummy takes the value of one for the whole period and
for the corresponding category of legislation; similarly, the dummies uncertain have a value of one for
the whole period when no legislation has been introduced, coded as a cyan NO. When I allocate a
restrictive legislation—criminalized, unenforceable, probably unenforceable, and uncertain—I code ones
before and in the year of the change in legislation and zeros afterwards. When dealing with a permissive
category—probably enforceable and enforceable—I do the opposite: I code zeros before and in the year of
the change in legislation and ones afterwards. This so far when I deal with statutory laws. In contrast,
when dealing with common laws, I code five years around the year of the court decision using a pattern
similar to that described above. When there is no legislation and then a statute or court law is passed I
do not label the previous NO period.Note (2): Note that during the period of analysis (2001-2013) there
are only two case where the legislation changes from one rather extreme category to the contrary: In
Utah from 1989 surrogacy was criminalized but from 2005 it was enforceable. Delaware had surrogacies
probably unenforceable, but after a 2013 statute they have become enforceable. In all other cases there
was no change in the legislation category. For instance, California had an enforceable court decision in
2005: The California Supreme Court decided three companion cases that concerned lesbian couples who
had reproduced via surrogacy, Elisa B. v. Superior Court, Kristine H. v. Lisa R. and K.M. v. E.G. The
court held that under the Uniform Parentage Act, two women can be the legal parents of a child produced
through surrogacy. Before that California had had several court decisions in the same direction: Johnson
v. Calvert 1993, Myers v. Moschella 1996, and Buzzanca v. Buzzanca 1998. Besides, the 2005 court
decision, just the last court decision, in 1998, has an effect in the period of analysis because of the five
years around the year of the court decision rule, in this case of multiple and sequential same direction
court decisions—as well, in a few similar cases—I have preferred to code the court decisions as a whole
row of ones in the appropriate category of legislation. Tennessee is another case, it had court decisions
in 2009, 2003, 2002, 2001, 1998, 1997, 1996, and 1995. Six of the seven has at least some effect in our
period of analysis and has been coded according to the last criteria with a row of ones in the appropriate
legislation category. When the court decisions are in the same direction I show only the year of the
last decision for clarity and give the previous years here for completeness: Alabama 1996; California
1998, 1996, and 1993; Idaho 1986; Kansas 1982 (attorney general opinion); Massachusetts 1998; New
Mexico 2001, and 1993; New York 1999 (law banning commercial surrogacy); Ohio 2001, 1999, 1994, and
1992; Oregon 1989 (attorney general opinion); Pennsylvania 1997; Tennessee 2003, 2002, 2001. 1998,
1997, 1996 and 1995; Virginia 1991; Wisconsin 2003.Note (3): Finally, in Minnesota in the year 2008 a
Surrogacy Statute—similar to the Illinois Gestational Act—was passed by the Legislature but was then
vetoed by Republican Governor Tim Pawlenty.
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Table 3.4: Surrogacy legislation state-by-state: Uncompensated and time to change
mind
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Alabama Montana
Alaska Nebraska x
Arizona Nevada x
Arkansas New Hampshire x x
California New Jersey x
Colorado New Mexico
Connecticut New York x
Delaware North Carolina x
District of Columbia North Dakota
Florida x x Ohio
Georgia Oklahoma x
Hawaii Oregon x
Idaho Pennsylvania
Illinois Puerto Rico
Indiana Rhode Island
Iowa South Carolina
Kansas South Dakota
Kentucky x Tennessee
Louisiana x Texas
Maine Utah
Maryland x Vermont
Massachusetts x Virginia x x
Michigan x Washington x
Minnesota West Virginia
Mississippi Wisconsin x
Missouri Wyoming
Note(1): Source: Same source as the previous table.
Note (2): In the previous table, New York is shown as criminalized because compensated surrogacy
is banned: Anyone who signs a surrogacy contract risks a fine of up to $10,000. Facilitators of these
surrogacy contracts—surrogacy agencies and barristers—risk a fine and if it is a repeated offence,
are guilty of felony. Nevertheless, I code the state as uncertain because a prosperous uncompensated
market is permitted and in full-practice. Michigan is a similar case: While compensated surrogacy is
illegal, uncompensated one is permitted. This table uses the dates of the previous table and interacts
each legislation category. New York has a criminalized surrogacy legislation but at the same time
allows uncompensated surrogacies which explains the non zero surrogacies reported for this state by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The term uncompensated means that commercial
surrogacy is banned in the state and only altruistic surrogacy is allowed. The term time to change
mind indicates a clause in the legislation that allows a period of three to five days during which the
surrogate mother can change her mind and decide to keep the baby.
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Table 3.5: Variable sources and definitions
variable source definition
surrogacy CDCa the cycle has used a gestational carrier
surrogacy rate CDC how many surrogacies happened annually per
100,000 total births in area
surrogacy clinics CDC clinics which use gestational carriers in at least
one cycle
clinics CDC fertility clinics under CDC surveillance
non surrogacy clinics CDC clinics which do not use gestational carriers for
any cycle
fresh non donor CDC gestational carrier cycles (1%) g
frozen non donor CDC in my sample, non gestational carrier cycles
fresh donor CDC in my sample, non gestational carrier cycles
frozen donor CDC in my sample, non gestational carrier cycles
criminalized LexisNexisb surrogacy is forbidden under state legislation
(statutory law and cases)
unenforceable LexisNexis surrogacy contracts are not enforceable under
state legislation (statutory law and cases)
probably unenforceable LexisNexis evidence on legislation (statutory law and
cases) makes surrogacy contracts probably un-
enforceable
uncertain LexisNexis contradictory legislation (statutory law and
cases) makes unclear whether surrogacy is per-
mitted or not
probably enforceable LexisNexis evidence on legislation (statutory law and
cases) makes surrogacy contracts probably en-
forceable
enforceable LexisNexis surrogacy contracts are enforceable, i.e. sur-
rogacy is permitted under state legislation
(statutory law and cases)
negative laws LexisNexis group variable (criminalized + unenforceable):
laws—state legislation: statutory law and
cases—are negative on surrogacy contracts
Continued on next page
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variable source definition
ambiguous laws LexisNexis group variable (uncertain + probably enforce-
able): laws—state legislation: statutory law
and cases—are ambiguous on surrogacy con-
tracts. Probably unenforceable omitted
positive laws LexisNexis group variable (enforceable): laws—state leg-
islation: statutory law and cases—are positive
on surrogacy contracts
uncompensated LexisNexis commercial surrogacy is banned in the state
and only altruistic surrogacy is allowed
time to change mind LexisNexis a clause in the legislation that allows a period
of three to five days during which the surro-
gate mother can change her mind and decide
to keep the baby
marriage rate CDC how many marriages happened annually per
1,000 total population residing in area. Popu-
lation estimated as of July 1st each yearh
out-of-wedlock CDC non marital fertility, births occurred outside of
marriage
divorce rate CDC how many divorces happened annually per
1,000 total population residing in area. Popu-
lation estimated as of July 1st each yeari
births CDC number of live births
birthrate CDC number of live births per 1,000 of a population
in a particular year
(general) fertility rate CDC number of births per 1,000 women between the
ages of 15 and 44 in a particular year
total fertility rate (TFR) CDC number of births that a cohort of 1,000 women
would have if they experienced throughout
their childbearing years the same age-specific
birth rates observed in a given year
teenage birthrate CDC number of births per 1,000 women between the
ages of 15 and 19 in a particular year
White births CDC number of White live births
Black births CDC number of Black live births
Continued on next page
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variable source definition
Hispanic births CDC number of Hispanic origin live births
White female percentage CDC percentage of female population age 15-39 and
White race percentage
Black female percentage CDC percentage of female population age 15-39 and
Black race percentage
Hispanic female percentage CDC percentage of female population age 15-39 and
Hispanic origin percentage
personal income (per capita) BEAc per capita income received by persons j
GDP (per capita) BEA per capita real GDP by state
women’s weekly wage BLSd women’s median usual weekly earnings of full-
time wage and salary women workers (in dol-
lars)
men’s weekly wage BLS men’s median usual weekly earnings of full-
time wage and salary men workers (in dollars)
total weekly wage BLS both sexes median usual weekly earnings of
full-time wage and salary workers (in dollars)
women’s on men’s wage BLS women’s earnings as percent of men’s
women’s participation rate BLS percentage of women’s population in civilian
labour force
women’s employment ratio BLS percentage of women’s population employed
women’s unemployment rate BLS percentage of women’s population unemployed
men’s participation rate BLS percentage of men’s population in civilian
labour force
men’s employment ratio BLS percentage of men’s population employed
men’s unemployment rate BLS percentage of men’s population unemployed
total participation rate BLS percentage of total population in civilian
labour force
total employment ratio BLS percentage of total population employed
total unemployment rate BLS percentage of total population unemployed
party affiliation Voting Americae “colour” of most voted party in last Presiden-
tial election (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012) by state
high school attendance Censusf percentage of high school graduates or more
for persons 25 years old and over
Continued on next page
212
variable source definition
Bachelor’s degree Census percentage of Bachelor’s degrees or more for
persons 25 years old and over
White race Census percentage of White race
Black race Census percentage of Black race
Native American Census percentage of Native American
Asian Census percentage of Asian
Native Hawaiian Census percentage of Native Hawaiian
two races Census percentage of two or more races
Hispanic origin Census percentage of Hispanic origin, not a single race
Table Notes
a CDC is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, www.cdc.gov
b LexisNexis is the Academic LexisNexis, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/ in conjunction with
Creative Family Connections LLC website CreFamCon (2015) and Darra L. Hofman’s key article, “Mama’s
Baby, Daddy’s Maybe: A State-by-State Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact”
Hofman (2009).
c BEA is the Bureau of Economic Analysis, www.bea.gov
d BLS is Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov
e Voting America is a project of the University of Richmond (Digital Scholarship Lab) with politi-
cal party strength in US states maps in the Presidential elections. Retrieved October 1, 2015, from
http://dsl.richmond.edu/voting/statelevel.html For 2012 election I use Dave Leip’s Atlas of US Presiden-
tial Elections. Retrieved October 1, 2015, from http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php
f Census is the US Census Bureau, www.census.gov
g transfers can be fresh or thawed—frozen—and donor or non donor. In my data, surrogacies are related only
to fresh non donor transfers/cycles (only 1% of them uses gestational carriers). Also during the procedure
a woman’s can use her own eggs—non-donor—or eggs from another woman—donor—and the embryos used
can be newly fertilized—fresh—or previously fertilized, frozen, and then thawed—frozen.
h Puerto Rico with no data; Oklahoma with partial data; 2013 data from American Community Survey
(American FactFinder).
i California, Indiana, Puerto Rico with no data; Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma with
partial data; all the rest with no 2013 data
j from participation in production, plus transfer receipts from government and business, plus government
interest (which is treated like a transfer receipt). It is defined as the sum of per capita wages and salaries,
supplements to wages and salaries, proprietors’ income with inventory valuation and capital consumption
adjustments, rental income of persons with capital consumption adjustment, personal dividend income,
personal interest income, and personal current transfer receipts, less contributions for government social
insurance. Per capita personal income is often used as an indicator of consumers’ purchasing power and of
the economic well-being of the residents of an area.
213
Table 3.6: Overall variable summary statistics
variable obs mean std. dev. min max
surrogacy 676 15.73 32.42 0 295
surrogacy rate 676 20.04 17.72 0 146
surrogacy clinics 675 3.76 6.06 0 48
clinics 676 8.21 11.07 0 68
non surrogacy clinics 675 4.45 5.96 0 32
fresh non donor 638 1,883 2,740 8 15,391
frozen non donor 676 441 721.25 0 6,525
fresh donor 676 182 312.22 0 2,096
frozen donor 676 110 198.51 0 1,908
criminalized 676 0.02 0.16 0 1
unenforceable 676 0.03 0.19 0 1
probably unenforceable 676 0.09 0.29 0 1
uncertain 676 0.44 0.50 0 1
probably enforceable 676 0.17 0.38 0 1
enforceable 676 0.22 0.41 0 1
negative laws 676 0.07 0.25 0 1
ambiguous laws 676 0.62 0.49 0 1
positive laws 676 0.22 0.41 0 1
uncompensated 676 0.25 0.44 0 1
time to change mind 676 0.09 0.29 0 1
marriage rate 659 7.31 2.32 4 19.613
births 676 79,573 94,651 5,975 566,414
out-of-wedlock 674 30,636 36,979 1,813 221,568
divorce rate 548 3.65 0.85 1.7 7.4
birthrate 676 13.59 1.61 9.4 21.8
fertility rate 676 65.73 6.27 47.9 95
total fertility rate 676 2,002 177.76 1,470 2,755
teenage birthrate 676 38.34 12.42 12.1 74.9
White births 676 43,220 36,846 1,175 167,025
Continued on next page
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variable obs mean std. dev. min max
Black births 676 11,428 13,457 29 51,799
Hispanic births 676 19,182 45,017 32 297,092
White female percentage 676 0.55 0.18 0.02 0.96
Black female percentage 676 0.15 0.09 0.001 0.63
Hispanic female percentage 676 0.23 0.18 0.004 0.97
personal income (per capita) 666 38,291 6,781 22,780 75,950
GDP (per capita) 663 47,434 8,739 28,956 71,047
women’s weekly wage 663 622.66 89.25 407 1100
men’s weekly wage 663 772.96 100.72 522 1212
total weekly wage 667 697.77 94.04 458 1152
women’s on men’s wage 663 80.54 4.55 61.8 96.5
women’s participation rate 663 58.95 3.37 47.7 71.2
women’s employment ratio 663 55.26 3.74 44.8 68.9
women’s unemployment rate 663 6.3 1.9 2.3 12.7
men’s participation rate 663 72.41 3.36 59.6 82
men’s employment ratio 663 67.43 4.2 54.5 79.7
men’s unemployment rate 663 6.92 2.45 2.4 15.8
total participation rate 663 65.45 3.17 53.8 76.1
total employment ratio 663 61.14 3.75 49.6 73.3
total unemployment rate 672 6.68 2.21 2.6 16
party affiliation 663 1.57 0.49 1 2
high school attendance 665 84.91 3.7 69.5 93.5
Bachelor’s degree 665 27.7 4.45 15.1 55.1
White race 664 78.07 9.4 24.7 97.1
Black race 664 12.73 8.1 0.32 60.3
Native American 664 0.94 1.54 0.1 15.6
Asian 664 4.45 4.24 0.26 41.79
Native Hawaiian 664 0.17 0.63 0 10.44
two races 664 2.01 1.6 0.6 24.11
Hispanic origin 664 15.23 12.73 0.72 98.95
215
T
ab
le
3.
7:
B
al
an
ci
n
g
T
es
t
p
re
d
ic
te
d
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
u
n
c
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l
a
ft
e
r
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
a
ft
e
r
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
+
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
t
st
d
e
rr
o
r
t-
te
st
p
-v
a
lu
e
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
t
st
d
e
rr
o
r
t-
te
st
p
-v
a
lu
e
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
t
st
d
e
rr
o
r
t-
te
st
p
-v
a
lu
e
C
o
n
t
r
o
ls
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
4
.4
9
9
2
.2
9
7
1
.9
5
9
(0
.0
5
1
)*
1
0
.9
9
1
1
4
.6
8
0
0
.7
4
9
(0
.4
5
4
)
3
0
.7
7
1
3
6
.2
3
1
0
.8
4
9
(0
.3
9
6
)
H
is
p
a
n
ic
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
8
.3
7
9
1
.6
8
0
4
.9
8
8
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
2
5
.7
2
9
1
1
.7
9
0
2
.1
8
2
(0
.0
2
9
)*
*
0
.8
3
8
2
0
.8
2
5
0
.0
4
0
(0
.9
6
8
)
G
D
P
(p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
.9
2
3
(0
.0
5
5
)*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.4
8
1
(0
.6
3
1
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.5
5
3
(0
.5
8
0
)
p
a
rt
y
a
ffi
li
a
ti
o
n
2
.2
8
3
0
.5
8
0
3
.9
4
0
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
-0
.9
2
1
0
.5
6
2
-1
.6
3
9
(0
.1
0
2
)
-1
.4
2
4
0
.5
7
4
-0
.4
7
9
(0
.1
1
3
)
B
a
c
h
e
lo
r’
s
d
e
g
re
e
0
.4
0
9
0
.0
4
9
8
.2
8
6
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.1
1
7
0
.1
1
9
0
.9
8
0
(0
.3
2
7
)
0
.2
0
6
0
.1
3
6
1
.5
1
3
(0
.1
3
1
)
B
la
c
k
ra
c
e
0
.0
4
9
0
.0
2
6
1
.8
8
1
(0
.0
6
0
)*
0
.1
8
3
0
.1
7
3
1
.0
5
4
(0
.2
9
2
)
-0
.1
8
9
0
.4
2
0
-0
.4
5
0
(0
.6
5
3
)
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
0
.1
5
5
0
.0
2
5
6
.1
4
1
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.6
4
6
0
.2
1
1
3
.0
6
6
(0
.0
0
2
)*
*
*
0
.6
5
6
0
.3
4
1
1
.9
2
3
(0
.0
5
5
)*
U
n
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
b
le
s
b
ir
th
s
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
1
.7
8
8
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-1
.3
7
9
(0
.1
6
9
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-1
.1
5
0
(0
.1
8
1
)
b
ir
th
ra
te
-0
.0
9
1
0
.1
6
1
-0
.5
6
4
(0
.5
7
3
)
-1
.0
5
6
1
.2
3
8
-0
.8
5
3
(0
.3
9
4
)
-2
.6
6
7
1
.9
5
8
-1
.3
6
2
(0
.1
7
3
)
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
-0
.0
6
6
0
.0
3
7
-1
.7
7
5
(0
.0
7
6
)*
-0
.1
8
1
0
.0
4
7
-3
.8
8
2
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
0
.2
5
4
-0
.0
5
7
(0
.9
5
5
)
to
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
1
-1
.4
8
7
(0
.1
3
8
)
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
4
-1
.2
5
7
(0
.2
0
9
)
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
5
1
.1
3
3
(0
.2
5
8
)
te
e
n
a
g
e
b
ir
th
ra
te
-0
.1
0
7
0
.0
2
2
-4
.8
5
4
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
-0
.0
7
9
0
.0
3
9
-2
.0
4
1
(0
.0
4
2
)*
*
-0
.0
1
2
0
.0
6
3
-0
.1
9
2
(0
.8
4
8
)
W
h
it
e
b
ir
th
s
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
9
.0
0
1
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-1
.4
5
0
(0
.1
4
7
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
.3
6
0
(0
.1
7
4
)
B
la
c
k
b
ir
th
s
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
8
.8
4
2
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-1
.2
3
0
(0
.2
1
9
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.2
4
1
(0
.8
1
0
)
H
is
p
a
n
ic
b
ir
th
s
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
1
.9
3
6
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.1
5
7
(0
.8
7
5
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
.0
9
4
(0
.2
7
4
)
W
h
it
e
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
-6
.5
0
4
1
.4
5
2
-4
.4
8
1
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
-1
8
.7
3
3
6
.8
5
7
-2
.7
3
2
(0
.0
0
6
)*
*
*
-1
5
.7
5
9
1
0
.2
8
8
-1
.5
3
2
(0
.1
2
6
)
p
e
rs
o
n
a
l
in
c
o
m
e
(p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
7
.8
2
7
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.1
7
3
(0
.8
6
2
)
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
.0
0
7
(0
.3
1
4
)
w
o
m
e
n
’s
w
e
e
k
ly
e
a
rn
in
g
s
0
.0
2
1
0
.0
0
3
7
.5
1
5
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
9
1
(0
.9
2
7
)
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
3
0
1
.1
0
8
(0
.2
6
8
)
w
o
m
e
n
’s
o
n
m
e
n
’s
w
a
g
e
0
.2
3
1
0
.0
6
1
3
.7
6
6
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
-0
.0
3
2
0
.0
4
6
-0
.7
0
3
(0
.4
8
2
)
-0
.1
9
6
0
.2
3
1
-0
.8
5
1
(0
.3
9
5
)
m
e
n
’s
w
e
e
k
ly
e
a
rn
in
g
s
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
0
3
6
.8
3
9
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
4
0
.4
8
0
(0
.6
3
1
)
-0
.0
0
5
0
.0
2
4
-0
.2
0
7
(0
.8
3
6
)
to
ta
l
w
e
e
k
ly
e
a
rn
in
g
s
0
.0
2
0
0
.0
0
3
7
.4
3
7
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
5
-0
.3
8
9
(0
.6
9
7
)
-0
.0
3
6
0
.1
1
6
-0
.3
1
0
(0
.7
5
6
)
w
o
m
e
n
’s
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
ra
te
-0
.1
4
0
0
.0
6
7
-2
.0
9
3
(0
.0
3
7
)*
*
-0
.0
6
6
0
.1
0
1
-0
.6
5
2
(0
.5
1
5
)
-0
.1
9
0
2
.0
3
3
-0
.0
9
4
(0
.9
2
5
)
w
o
m
e
n
’s
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
ra
ti
o
-0
.1
3
5
0
.0
6
2
-2
.1
8
5
(0
.0
2
9
)*
*
-0
.0
4
5
0
.0
9
8
-0
.4
5
9
(0
.6
4
6
)
0
.5
5
5
2
.1
9
9
0
.2
5
2
(0
.8
0
1
)
w
o
m
e
n
’s
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
ra
te
0
.2
1
8
0
.1
5
7
1
.3
9
2
(0
.1
6
4
)
-0
.0
5
7
0
.1
4
7
-0
.3
8
8
(0
.6
9
8
)
-1
.2
2
5
1
.8
1
5
-0
.6
7
5
(0
.5
0
0
)
m
e
n
’s
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
ra
te
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
7
3
2
.1
4
5
(0
.0
3
2
)*
*
0
.2
0
0
0
.0
9
7
2
.0
5
0
(0
.0
4
1
)*
*
0
.8
0
6
1
.7
7
2
0
.4
5
5
(0
.6
5
0
)
m
e
n
’s
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
ra
ti
o
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
5
1
1
.9
0
2
(0
.0
5
7
)*
0
.0
6
9
0
.0
8
2
0
.8
4
4
(0
.3
9
9
)
0
.1
0
8
1
.7
8
3
0
.0
6
1
(0
.9
5
2
)
m
e
n
’s
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
ra
te
0
.0
2
2
0
.1
2
4
0
.1
8
2
(0
.8
5
6
)
0
.1
7
2
0
.1
1
9
1
.4
4
0
(0
.1
5
0
)
-0
.6
7
3
1
.7
7
7
-0
.3
7
9
(0
.7
0
5
)
to
ta
l
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
ra
te
-0
.0
5
3
0
.0
3
2
-1
.6
5
6
(0
.0
9
7
)*
0
.0
8
6
0
.1
1
3
0
.7
5
9
(0
.4
4
8
)
0
.5
9
6
2
.6
2
9
0
.2
2
7
(0
.8
2
1
)
to
ta
l
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
ra
ti
o
-0
.0
2
5
0
.0
6
4
-0
.3
8
7
(0
.6
9
9
)
0
.0
2
2
0
.1
0
0
0
.2
2
1
(0
.8
2
5
)
-1
.7
5
4
2
.5
6
2
-0
.6
8
4
(0
.4
9
4
)
to
ta
l
u
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t
ra
te
0
.0
4
0
0
.0
1
2
3
.3
3
3
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.1
0
7
0
.1
3
9
0
.7
7
2
(0
.4
4
0
)
1
.0
4
8
3
.0
1
8
0
.3
4
7
(0
.7
2
9
)
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
a
tt
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
-0
.1
5
3
0
.0
7
5
-2
.0
5
3
(0
.0
4
0
)*
*
-0
.2
7
0
0
.1
3
8
-1
.9
5
7
(0
.0
5
1
)
-0
.2
8
3
0
.1
5
6
-1
.8
1
6
(0
.0
7
0
)*
W
h
it
e
ra
c
e
-0
.0
2
7
0
.0
2
1
-1
.2
4
0
(0
.2
1
6
)
-0
.0
8
6
0
.0
6
9
-1
.2
5
3
(0
.2
1
1
)
0
.0
9
5
0
.1
1
5
0
.8
2
8
(0
.4
0
8
)
N
a
ti
v
e
A
m
e
ri
c
a
n
-0
.5
9
5
0
.0
9
8
-6
.0
9
3
(0
.0
0
0
)*
*
*
0
.7
4
6
0
.9
2
3
0
.8
0
7
(0
.4
2
0
)
1
.8
5
6
1
.2
0
4
1
.5
4
2
(0
.1
2
4
)
A
si
a
n
0
.1
2
2
0
.0
5
2
2
.3
3
4
(0
.0
2
0
)*
*
0
.6
5
6
0
.3
7
5
1
.7
4
9
(0
.0
8
1
)*
-0
.1
7
5
0
.5
2
4
-0
.3
3
5
(0
.7
3
8
)
N
a
ti
v
e
H
a
w
a
ii
a
n
-0
.4
0
5
0
.2
2
1
-1
.8
2
9
(0
.0
6
8
)*
0
.5
7
7
1
.7
4
8
0
.3
3
0
(0
.7
4
2
)
2
.9
6
0
2
.1
7
3
1
.3
6
2
(0
.1
7
4
)
tw
o
ra
c
e
s
-0
.2
2
3
0
.1
0
2
-2
.1
7
7
(0
.0
3
0
)*
*
-0
.1
5
3
0
.2
8
4
-0
.5
4
1
(0
.5
8
9
)
-0
.1
4
8
0
.4
6
0
-0
.3
2
3
(0
.7
4
7
)
N
o
t
e
(
1
)
:
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
th
o
r’
s
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
N
o
t
e
(
2
)
:
T
a
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
,
st
a
n
d
a
rd
e
rr
o
rs
,
t-
te
st
a
n
d
p
-v
a
lu
e
s
fr
o
m
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
p
re
d
ic
te
d
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
o
n
fe
rt
il
it
y
,
la
b
o
u
r
m
a
rk
e
t,
p
o
li
ti
c
a
l
p
ro
c
e
ss
a
n
d
d
e
m
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
s
c
h
a
ra
c
te
ri
st
ic
s
a
ss
o
rt
e
d
a
s
b
e
in
g
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
o
r
o
b
se
rv
e
d
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
d
ra
w
n
fr
o
m
th
e
u
n
o
b
se
rv
a
b
le
in
th
e
m
o
d
e
l.
T
h
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
a
lw
a
y
s
th
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
fr
o
m
a
re
g
re
ss
io
n
o
f
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
o
n
th
e
fu
ll
-s
e
t
o
f
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
:
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s.
T
h
e
fi
rs
t
fo
u
r
c
o
lu
m
n
s
d
o
n
o
t
in
c
lu
d
e
a
n
y
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
c
o
n
tr
o
l
o
r
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
t.
T
h
e
n
e
x
t
fo
u
r
c
o
lu
m
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
st
a
te
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
.
T
h
e
la
st
fo
u
r
c
o
lu
m
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
n
d
st
a
te
a
n
d
y
e
a
r
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
ts
.
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
re
O
L
S
.
N
o
t
e
(
3
)
:
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
216
T
ab
le
3.
8:
E
ff
ec
t
of
su
rr
og
ac
y
ra
te
s
on
m
ar
ri
a
g
e
ra
te
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
m
ar
ri
ag
e
ra
te
O
L
S
IV
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
su
rr
og
ac
y
ra
te
0.
00
5*
*
0.
00
0
0.
0
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
7
*
*
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
02
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
co
n
tr
ol
s
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
st
at
e
fe
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
ye
ar
fe
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
c
o
e
ff
n
eg
at
iv
e
la
w
s
-1
.2
8
7
-2
.5
2
1
*
*
am
b
ig
u
ou
s
la
w
s
0.
8
4
9
0
.0
0
8
p
os
it
iv
e
la
w
s
1.
22
6
*
*
0
.8
7
6
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
F
t.
(F
-s
r.
)
31
6.
4
9
*
*
*
2
1
5
.0
1
*
*
*
N
65
9
65
9
6
5
9
6
5
9
1
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
th
o
r’
s
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
th
e
C
li
n
ic
D
a
ta
T
a
b
le
o
f
th
e
C
e
n
te
rs
fo
r
D
is
e
a
se
C
o
n
tr
o
l
a
n
d
P
re
v
e
n
ti
o
n
,
U
S
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t.
D
a
ta
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
o
n
-l
in
e
a
t
w
w
w
.C
D
C
.g
o
v
/
A
R
T
/
A
R
T
R
e
p
o
rt
s.
h
tm
.
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fr
o
m
U
S
C
e
n
su
s
B
u
re
a
u
,
U
S
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
L
a
b
o
r
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
n
d
U
S
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
A
n
a
ly
si
s.
2
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(1
-2
)
a
re
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
n
d
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(3
-4
)
a
re
IV
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
a
s
th
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
a
n
d
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
a
s
th
e
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
I
u
se
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
st
a
te
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
t
th
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t
th
e
m
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
a
d
d
it
e
ra
ti
v
e
ly
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
.
S
e
le
c
te
d
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
e
1
5
-3
9
,
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
e
1
5
-3
9
p
e
rs
o
n
a
l,
G
D
P
(p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
),
p
a
rt
y
a
ffi
li
a
ti
o
n
,
B
a
c
h
e
lo
r’
s
d
e
g
re
e
,
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
a
n
d
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
.
In
th
e
IV
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
is
in
st
ru
m
e
n
te
d
b
y
th
e
le
g
is
la
ti
o
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s:
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s.
I
im
p
le
m
e
n
t
in
S
ta
ta
a
2
S
L
S
.
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
a
n
d
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
te
st
s
a
re
sh
o
w
n
.
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
la
w
s
=
c
ri
m
in
a
li
z
e
d
+
u
n
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
la
w
s
=
u
n
c
e
rt
a
in
+
p
ro
b
a
b
ly
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s
=
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
.
O
m
it
te
d
p
ro
b
a
b
ly
u
n
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
.
3
F
t.
=
F
te
st
,
F
-s
r.
=
F
ir
st
-s
ta
g
e
re
le
v
a
n
c
e
.
217
T
ab
le
3.
9:
E
ff
ec
t
of
su
rr
og
ac
y
ra
te
s
on
b
ir
th
s
an
d
ou
t-
o
f-
w
ed
lo
ck
b
ir
th
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
b
ir
th
s
O
L
S
IV
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
su
rr
og
ac
y
ra
te
-3
.9
1
-2
2.
39
-2
0.
66
-8
7.
05
**
(1
8.
36
)
(1
8.
35
)
(3
0.
48
)
(3
3.
53
)
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
ou
t-
of
-w
ed
lo
ck
b
ir
th
s
O
L
S
IV
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
su
rr
og
ac
y
ra
te
-3
.1
9
-8
.3
9
-3
9.
59
-6
6.
44
**
(1
4.
84
)
(1
4.
40
)
(2
4.
92
)
(2
6.
39
)
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
co
n
tr
o
ls
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
st
at
e
fe
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
ye
ar
fe
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
c
o
e
ff
n
eg
at
iv
e
la
w
s
-1
.2
84
/-
1.
78
8*
*
-1
.4
47
*/
-1
.9
54
**
am
b
ig
u
o
u
s
la
w
s
0.
85
3/
1.
07
5
0.
00
6/
0.
22
3
p
o
si
ti
ve
la
w
s
1.
22
9*
*/
1.
78
9*
*
0.
54
6/
0.
91
1
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
F
t.
(F
-s
r.
)
31
8.
65
**
*/
35
5.
10
**
*
24
8.
13
**
*/
24
6.
47
**
*
N
67
6/
67
6
67
6/
67
6
67
6/
67
6
67
6/
67
6
1
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
th
o
r’
s
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
th
e
C
li
n
ic
D
a
ta
T
a
b
le
o
f
th
e
C
e
n
te
rs
fo
r
D
is
e
a
se
C
o
n
tr
o
l
a
n
d
P
re
v
e
n
ti
o
n
,
U
S
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t.
D
a
ta
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
o
n
-l
in
e
a
t
w
w
w
.C
D
C
.g
o
v
/
A
R
T
/
A
R
T
R
e
p
o
rt
s.
h
tm
.
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fr
o
m
U
S
C
e
n
su
s
B
u
re
a
u
,
U
S
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
L
a
b
o
r
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
n
d
U
S
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
A
n
a
ly
si
s.
2
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(1
-2
)
a
re
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
n
d
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(3
-4
)
a
re
IV
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
b
ir
th
s/
o
u
t-
o
f-
w
e
d
lo
c
k
b
ir
th
s
a
s
th
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
a
n
d
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
a
s
th
e
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
I
u
se
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
st
a
te
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
t
th
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t
th
e
m
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
a
d
d
it
e
ra
ti
v
e
ly
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
.
S
e
le
c
te
d
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
e
1
5
-3
9
,
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
e
1
5
-3
9
p
e
rs
o
n
a
l,
G
D
P
(p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
),
p
a
rt
y
a
ffi
li
a
ti
o
n
,
B
a
c
h
e
lo
r’
s
d
e
g
re
e
,
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
a
n
d
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
.
In
th
e
IV
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
is
in
st
ru
m
e
n
te
d
b
y
th
e
le
g
is
la
ti
o
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s:
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s.
I
im
p
le
m
e
n
t
in
S
ta
ta
a
2
S
L
S
.
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
a
n
d
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
te
st
s
a
re
sh
o
w
n
.
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
la
w
s
=
c
ri
m
in
a
li
z
e
d
+
u
n
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
la
w
s
=
u
n
c
e
rt
a
in
+
p
ro
b
a
b
ly
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s
=
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
.
O
m
it
te
d
p
ro
b
a
b
ly
u
n
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
.
3
F
t.
=
F
te
st
,
F
-s
r.
=
F
ir
st
-s
ta
g
e
re
le
v
a
n
c
e
.
218
T
ab
le
3.
10
:
E
ff
ec
t
of
su
rr
og
ac
y
ra
te
s
on
d
iv
o
rc
e
ra
te
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
d
iv
or
ce
ra
te
O
L
S
IV
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
su
rr
og
ac
y
ra
te
0.
00
1
-0
.0
00
0.
00
5
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
*
*
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
c
lu
d
e
co
n
tr
ol
s
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
st
at
e
fe
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
ye
ar
fe
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
in
st
ru
m
e
n
ts
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
c
o
e
ff
n
eg
at
iv
e
la
w
s
-0
.2
5
1
-1
.3
2
4
*
am
b
ig
u
ou
s
la
w
s
1.
62
8
*
*
*
0
.8
7
9
p
os
it
iv
e
la
w
s
2.
30
4
*
*
*
1
.2
7
9
*
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
F
t.
(F
s
r.
)
22
6.
0
5
*
*
*
1
4
0
.2
1
*
*
*
N
54
8
54
8
5
4
8
5
4
8
1
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
th
o
r’
s
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
th
e
C
li
n
ic
D
a
ta
T
a
b
le
o
f
th
e
C
e
n
te
rs
fo
r
D
is
e
a
se
C
o
n
tr
o
l
a
n
d
P
re
v
e
n
ti
o
n
,
U
S
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t.
D
a
ta
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
o
n
-l
in
e
a
t
w
w
w
.C
D
C
.g
o
v
/
A
R
T
/
A
R
T
R
e
p
o
rt
s.
h
tm
.
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fr
o
m
U
S
C
e
n
su
s
B
u
re
a
u
,
U
S
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
L
a
b
o
r
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
n
d
U
S
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
A
n
a
ly
si
s.
2
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(1
-2
)
a
re
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
n
d
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(3
-4
)
a
re
IV
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
d
iv
o
rc
e
a
s
th
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
a
n
d
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
a
s
th
e
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
I
u
se
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
st
a
te
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
t
th
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t
th
e
m
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
a
d
d
it
e
ra
ti
v
e
ly
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
.
S
e
le
c
te
d
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
e
1
5
-3
9
,
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
e
1
5
-3
9
p
e
rs
o
n
a
l,
G
D
P
(p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
),
p
a
rt
y
a
ffi
li
a
ti
o
n
,
B
a
c
h
e
lo
r’
s
d
e
g
re
e
,
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
a
n
d
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
.
In
th
e
IV
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
is
in
st
ru
m
e
n
te
d
b
y
th
e
le
g
is
la
ti
o
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s:
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s.
I
im
p
le
m
e
n
t
in
S
ta
ta
a
2
S
L
S
.
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
a
n
d
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
te
st
s
a
re
sh
o
w
n
.
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
la
w
s
=
c
ri
m
in
a
li
z
e
d
+
u
n
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
la
w
s
=
u
n
c
e
rt
a
in
+
p
ro
b
a
b
ly
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s
=
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
.
O
m
it
te
d
p
ro
b
a
b
ly
u
n
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
.
3
F
t.
=
F
te
st
,
F
-s
r.
=
F
ir
st
-s
ta
g
e
re
le
v
a
n
c
e
.
219
Table 3.11: Summary effects of surrogacy on selected vital statis-
tics
per surr. rate per surrogacy standardized effect
∆ marriage +281.1** 6.8** 5.38%**
∆ divorce +39.9** 0.97** 4.21%**
∆ births -87.06** -2.1** -1.63%**
∆ out-of-wedlock -66.44** -1.6** -3.16%**
1 Source: Author’s calculation from the Clinic Data Table of the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, US Government. Data are available on-line at
www.CDC.gov/ART/ARTReports.htm.Controls are available from US Census
Bureau, US Bureau of Labor Statistics and US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
2 Magnitudes implied by the coefficients of the IV preferred regressions
(Columns (4) of the previous tables) elucidating the causal relationship be-
tween surrogacy on selected vital statistics. I calculate how many more or less
marriages, divorces, births and out-of-wedlock births imply an additional unit
in surrogacy rate (1 additional surrogacy per 100,000 births) and per surro-
gacy (in my sample there are an average of 4,137,796 births each year: Then
an increase in 1 additional point in surrogacy rate adds up to approximately
41.3 surrogacies). I report per 100,000 birth and per surrogacy changes. Addi-
tionally, I show the standardized effects as
s.d.surrogacy rate∗coefficientsurrogacy rate
s.d.vital statistics
(e.g. s.d.surrogacy rate = 17.72; coefficientsurrogacy rate = 0.007; s.d.marriage rate =
2.32), so that it gives the percentage of the variation of the vital statistics
(marriage rate, divorce rate, births, out-of-wedlock) explained by the variation
on the causal variable (surrogacy rate).
220
T
ab
le
3
.1
2:
E
ff
ec
t
of
su
rr
og
ac
y
ra
te
s
on
ot
h
er
o
u
tc
o
m
es
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
ia
b
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
to
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
fe
rt
il
it
y
te
en
a
g
e
b
ir
th
ra
te
ra
te
ra
te
b
ir
th
ra
te
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
r
ia
b
le
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
ra
te
O
L
S
+
y
ea
r
+
st
a
te
fe
0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
1
6
*
-0
.2
0
5
-0
.0
1
9
*
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.2
5
0
)
(0
.0
1
2
)
O
L
S
+
y
ea
r
+
st
a
te
fe
+
ct
ls
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
*
*
*
-0
.4
6
4
*
*
-0
.0
1
6
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
7
)
(0
.1
9
8
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
ra
te
IV
+
y
ea
r
+
st
a
te
fe
0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
4
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
7
6
-0
.0
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
1
5
)
(0
.4
1
3
)
(0
.0
1
9
)
IV
+
y
ea
r
+
st
a
te
fe
+
ct
ls
-0
.0
1
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
1
*
*
*
-1
.4
6
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
4
*
*
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
1
3
)
(0
.3
6
5
)
(0
.0
1
8
)
N
6
5
0
6
5
0
6
5
0
6
5
0
1
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
th
o
r’
s
c
a
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
fr
o
m
th
e
C
li
n
ic
D
a
ta
T
a
b
le
o
f
th
e
C
e
n
te
rs
fo
r
D
is
e
a
se
C
o
n
tr
o
l
a
n
d
P
re
v
e
n
ti
o
n
,
U
S
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t.
D
a
ta
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
o
n
-l
in
e
a
t
w
w
w
.C
D
C
.g
o
v
/
A
R
T
/
A
R
T
R
e
p
o
rt
s.
h
tm
.
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
a
v
a
il
a
b
le
fr
o
m
U
S
C
e
n
su
s
B
u
re
a
u
,
U
S
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
L
a
b
o
r
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
n
d
U
S
B
u
re
a
u
o
f
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
A
n
a
ly
si
s.
2
R
o
w
s
(1
-2
)
a
re
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
a
n
d
R
o
w
s
(3
-4
)
a
re
IV
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
o
f
o
th
e
r
o
u
tc
o
m
e
s—
b
ir
th
ra
te
,
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
,
to
ta
l
fe
rt
il
it
y
ra
te
,
te
e
n
a
g
e
b
ir
th
ra
te
—
a
s
th
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
a
n
d
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
a
s
th
e
c
a
u
sa
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
I
u
se
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
st
a
te
fi
x
e
d
e
ff
e
c
t
th
ro
u
g
h
o
u
t
th
e
m
o
d
e
l
a
n
d
a
d
d
it
e
ra
ti
v
e
ly
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
.
S
e
le
c
te
d
c
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
e
1
5
-3
9
,
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
o
f
fe
m
a
le
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
a
g
e
1
5
-3
9
p
e
rs
o
n
a
l,
G
D
P
(p
e
r
c
a
p
it
a
),
p
a
rt
y
a
ffi
li
a
ti
o
n
,
B
a
c
h
e
lo
r’
s
d
e
g
re
e
,
B
la
c
k
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
a
n
d
H
is
p
a
n
ic
o
ri
g
in
p
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
.
In
th
e
IV
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
su
rr
o
g
a
c
y
ra
te
is
in
st
ru
m
e
n
te
d
b
y
th
e
le
g
is
la
ti
o
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s:
n
e
g
a
ti
v
e
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s.
I
im
p
le
m
e
n
t
in
S
ta
ta
a
2
S
L
S
.
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
c
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
ts
a
n
d
F
ir
st
st
a
g
e
te
st
s
a
re
sh
o
w
n
.
N
e
g
a
ti
v
e
la
w
s
=
c
ri
m
in
a
li
z
e
d
+
u
n
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
,
a
m
b
ig
u
o
u
s
la
w
s
=
u
n
c
e
rt
a
in
+
p
ro
b
a
b
ly
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
a
n
d
p
o
si
ti
v
e
la
w
s
=
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
.
O
m
it
te
d
p
ro
b
a
b
ly
u
n
e
n
fo
rc
e
a
b
le
.
221
T
ab
le
3.
13
:
R
ob
u
st
n
es
s
ch
ec
k
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
o
rg
a
n
la
g
fe
rt
il
it
y
fe
rt
il
it
y
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
la
g
g
ed
d
o
n
a
ti
o
n
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
s
(o
u
tc
o
m
es
)
lo
w
ly
-c
o
rr
el
a
te
d
u
n
co
rr
el
a
te
d
’9
0
-’
9
5
-’
9
9
-’
0
0
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
v
a
r
ia
b
le
e
n
d
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
v
a
r
ia
b
le
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
la
g
g
ed
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
ra
te
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
ra
te
0
.0
0
9
*
*
0
.0
1
1
*
-0
.1
0
9
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
cl
in
ic
s
0
.0
1
1
(0
.0
8
8
)
fr
es
h
n
o
n
d
o
n
o
r
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
0
)
n
o
n
su
rr
.
cl
in
ic
s
0
.0
5
5
(0
.1
1
4
)
cl
in
ic
s
0
.0
7
8
(0
.1
1
7
)
fr
es
h
d
o
n
o
r
0
.0
0
2
(0
.0
0
2
)
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
-0
.0
1
2
(0
.0
0
9
)
N
5
9
4
6
2
4
6
5
9
6
5
9
6
5
9
2
0
1
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
N
o
te
(1
):
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
A
u
th
o
r’
s
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
N
o
te
(2
):
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
I
a
d
d
o
rg
a
n
d
o
n
a
ti
o
n
to
th
e
re
g
re
ss
o
rs
.
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(2
)
I
u
se
la
g
s
a
s
co
n
tr
o
ls
.
In
th
e
n
ex
t
tw
o
co
lu
m
n
s
I
re
p
la
ce
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
b
y
lo
w
ly
-s
u
rr
o
g
a
cy
-c
o
rr
el
a
te
d
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(s
u
rr
o
g
a
cy
cl
in
ic
s
a
n
d
fr
es
h
n
o
n
d
o
n
o
r,
C
o
lu
m
n
(3
))
a
n
d
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
-n
o
n
-c
o
rr
el
a
te
d
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
(n
o
n
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
cl
in
ic
s,
cl
in
ic
s
a
n
d
fr
es
h
d
o
n
o
r,
C
o
lu
m
n
(4
))
.
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(5
)
in
st
ea
d
o
f
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
I
tr
y
to
ex
p
la
in
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
b
y
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
.
In
C
o
lu
m
n
(6
)
I
re
p
la
ce
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
fo
r
m
a
rr
ia
g
e
in
1
9
9
0
,
1
9
9
5
,
1
9
9
9
a
n
d
2
0
0
0
u
si
n
g
a
s
R
H
V
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
a
n
d
th
e
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
y
ea
rs
2
0
0
1
to
2
0
0
4
.
In
th
e
fi
rs
t
tw
o
re
g
re
ss
io
n
I
ex
p
ec
t
a
p
o
si
ti
v
e
a
n
d
se
iz
a
b
le
a
ss
o
ci
a
ti
o
n
b
et
w
ee
n
su
rr
o
g
a
cy
a
n
d
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s.
In
th
e
o
th
er
fi
v
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
I
d
o
n
o
t
ex
p
ec
t
a
n
y
a
ss
o
ci
a
ti
o
n
n
o
r
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
.
222
Table 3.14: Clinics gestational rate (percentage). Illinois 2001-2013
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Surrogacy
Act
clinic 1 < 1 < 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2
clinic 2 0 0 1 94 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 < 1
clinic 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 < 1 0 1 < 1 0
clinic 4 1 < 1 < 1 0 0 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1
clinic 5 0 < 1 0 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 1 2 1 1 < 1 < 1
clinic 6 0 < 1 0 0 < 1 < 1 0 < 1 < 1 2 < 1 0 0
clinic 7 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 < 1 0 3 < 1
clinic 8 0 0 0 0 < 1 < 1 0 < 1 0 0 2 0 < 1
clinic 9 0 0 1 < 1 0 0 < 1 < 1 0 < 1 0 0 0
clinic 10 0 0 0 2 0 < 1 0 0 0 0 < 1 0 0
clinic 11 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 < 1 0 < 1 0 < 1
clinic 12 < 1 0 < 1 0 < 1 < 1 0 0 2 < 1 0 2 < 1
clinic 13 0 < 1 < 1 < 1 0 < 1 < 1 0 < 1 2 2 0 0
clinic 14 0 0 1 0 < 1 0 0 0 0 < 1 0 0 0
clinic 15 0 0 0 < 1 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0
clinic 16 0 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 3 0 2 4
clinic 17 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 < 1 0
clinic 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 < 1 < 1 0
clinic 19 0 0 < 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 < 1 < 1
clinic 20 0 3 0 1 0 0 0 < 1 < 1 0 0 0 0
clinic 21 0 0 0 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 < 1 2 < 1 0 0 < 1
clinic 22 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1
clinic 23 0 0 0 0 < 1 < 1 0 0 1 0 0 < 1 0
0 0 1 < 1 2 < 1 < 1 0 0 < 1
< 1 1 0 0 0 0 < 1 0 0 0
0 2 < 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 < 1 0 0 0 0 3
0 0 0 0
2
Number
of clinics 23 23 23 28 29 28 27 27 27 28 26 25 25
Note(1): Source: Author’s calculations. Clinic Table Data 2001-2013 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
US Government. Data are available on-line from www.CDC.gov/ART/ARTReports.htm.
Note(2): The twenty three clinics operating in Illinois in 2001 were Rush-Copley, center For Reproductive Health, Life-
Women’s Health center, IVF Lincoln Park, Northwestern University, Rush center for Advanced Reproductive Care, University
of Chicago Hospitals, University of Illinois at Chicago IVF Program, Watertower Women’s center, Midwest Fertility center,
The Hoxsey-Rinehart center, The Hoxsey-Rinehart center for Reproductive Medicine, Advanced Fertility center of Chicago,
Highland Park IVF center of Chicago, Hinsdale center for Reproduction, center for Human Reproduction—Illinois, Reproduc-
tive Health Specialists, IVF1, Reena Jabamoni M.D., Oak Brook Fertility center, Lutheran General Hospital IVF Program,
Advanced Reproductive center, Reproductive Health and Fertility center, Reproductive Endocrinology Associates, Seth Lev-
rant.
Note (3): There is attrition therefore some clinics drop from the sample and after the introduction of new permissive
legislation new clinics enter the market. For these reasons the initial twenty three clinics are not necessarily the final ones.
After a while of initial competition some of the new entrants exit the market.
some clinics report “< 1”. Because the national number of surrogacies is known, I add all integer percentage of surrogacy
cycles and then split evenly the reminder in the “< 1” cycles.
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Table 3.15: State weights in the synthetic Illinois
state weight state weight
Alabama - Montana 0
Alaska 0 Nebraska 0
Arizona 0 Nevada 0
Arkansas 0 New Hampshire 0
California - New Jersey 0
Colorado 0 New Mexico -
Connecticut - New York -
Delaware - North Carolina -
District of Columbia 0 North Dakota -
Florida 0.326 Ohio -
Georgia 0 Oklahoma -
Hawaii 0 Oregon 0
Idaho - Pennsylvania -
Illinois 0 Puerto Rico 0
Indiana 0 Rhode Island -
Iowa 0 South Carolina -
Kansas 0 South Dakota 0
Kentucky 0 Tennessee -
Louisiana 0 Texas -
Maine 0 Utah -
Maryland - Vermont 0
Massachusetts - Virginia 0
Michigan 0.674 Washington -
Minnesota - West Virginia -
Mississippi 0 Wisconsin -
Missouri 0 Wyoming 0
1 State weights in the synthetic Illinois. Weigth symbol (-) is
for 23 states discarded because they change legislation status
during the period 2001-2013 so that they are better excluded
from the donor pool.
224
Table 3.16: Surrogacy predictor means
Illinois Average of
Variables Real Synthetic 28 control states
surrogacy clinics 6.75 6.771 2.107
overall fertility clinics 24.25 17.553 5.402
non surrogacy clinics 17.5 10.782 3.295
criminalized 0 0 0.036
unenforceable 0 0 0.036
probably unenforceable 0 0 0.143
uncertain 1 0.674 0.5
probably enforceable 0 0 0.107
enforceable 0 0.326 0.179
births 181,989.75 156,935.328 55,260.643
birth rate 14.475 12.895 13.764
fertility rate 67.325 62.194 64.977
White birth percentage 0.547 0.643 0.638
Black birth percentage 0.174 0.187 0.126
Hispanic birth percentage 0.23 0.122 0.149
1 Surrogacy predictor means: Illinois real and synthetic; average of 28 control
states. Legislation dummies: criminalized, unenforceable, probably unenforce-
able, uncertain, probably enforceable, enforceable.
Table 3.17: Predictor weights in the synthetic Illinois
predictor weight predictor weight
surrogacy clinics 0.078 enforceable 0.253
overall fertility clinics 0.108 births 0
non surrogacy clinics 0.168 birth rate 0.015
criminalized 0.071 fertility rate 0.019
unenforceable 0.072 White birth percentage 0.011
probably unenforceable 0.008 Black birth percercentage 0.076
uncertain 0.037 Hispanic birth percentage 0.014
probably enforceable 0.071
1 Predictor weights in the synthetic Illinois. Note that all but births have
positive weights. Legislation dummies: criminalized, unenforceable, proba-
bly unenforceable, uncertain, probably enforceable, enforceable.
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Table 3.18: Surrogacy basic facts at the national level
year surrogacies fresh non-donor cycles % total fertility cycles
1997 600 55,002 1.09 70,147
1998 809 61,650 1.31 80,634
1999 821 65,751 1.25 86,822
2000 1210 74,957 1.61 99,629
2001 571 80,864 0.71 107,587
2002 548 85,826 0.64 115,392
2003 671 91,032 0.74 122,872
2004 710 94,242 0.75 127,977
2005 929(*) 97,442 1.04 134,260
2006 1042 99,199 1.05 138,198
2007 733 101,897 0.72 142,435
2008 915 104,673 0.87 148,055
2009 883 102,478 0.86 146,244
2010 926 100,824 0.92 147,260
2011 907 101,213 0.90 151,923
2012 901 99,665 0.90 157,662
2013 900(**) t.b.r. t.b.r. t.b.r.
Note(1): Source: Author’s calculations. Assisted Reproductive Technology
Reports (yearly) 1997-2012 (ART reports). Available on-line from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention’s website. See note (1) in the previous table.
Note(2): A clinic in Hawaii is reported to have undertaken 83 surrogacies in
2005. It seems an outlier. With the Hawaii surrogacies the count for 2005 will
be the official 1,012 surrogacies, not the amended 929(*).
Note (3): Notice that data for surrogacy are aggregated at the national level
for the years 1997-2012. In contrast, I have made available the data for surrogacy
at the state level for 2001-2012. Using these data I extrapolate the country total
for 2013 (**) while the other figures are yet to be released (t.b.r.).
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Appendix
The big picture
As I have stated in the main part of the chapter before its Surrogacy Data Set there were
data on surrogacy only at the national level. I will go over them now. I built a reasonably
long set of data on surrogacies from fresh non-donor cycles. Table 3.18 and Figure 3.15
summarize the basic facts in the industry. First, I present an exhaustive series of officially
released data on surrogacies (note that national data are available from 1997 to 2013).
There has been an increase of 50% in surrogacies but this increase has not been steady; it
has peaks (i.e. 2000 with 1,210 cycles) and troughs (i.e. 2002 with 548 cycles, the latter
roughly half of the former and less than the first point in the series). Thus for this last
period, there is negative growth. Then there are the fresh non-donor cycles (only available
from 1997 to 2012). Note that the increase in fresh non-donor cycles is a steady trend with
a smooth change year by year, 81% increase in the whole period with an annual increase of
6.2%. Next its the turn to the overall fertility cycles (also only available from 1997 to 2012),
with a steady increase of 125% in the sixteen years of the sample and an average annual
increase of 9.6%. Finally, I present the percentage of surrogacies over fresh non-donor cycles
(this figure has appreciable change during the period, with a peak in 2000 and a trough
in 2002), but then the rate of these two variables seem to stabilize at approximately 0.9%,
meaning that the increase in surrogacies after 2001 in the numerator is matched by an also
ascending trend of the increasing fresh non-donor cycles in the denominator. As shown the
increase in surrogacies is well behind the rate of increase in fresh non-donor and overall
fertility cycles, representing a less steady technology adoption compared with overall ART
technology adoption.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, I have investigated the spatial aspects of education and family economics.
Firstly, I measured the effect of spatially determined competition in the Chilean school
voucher system. Recently, the effect of voucher schools has been under great scrutiny, and
Chile is perhaps the ideal causal quasi-experiment because it is home to the longest lasting
national voucher system in operation in the world. Using a similar approach to Gibbons et
al. (2006), I created two spatial indices in order to measure spatially determined competition:
a choice index which counts the number of schools accessible from a given municipality, and
a competition index which summarizes the choice index for a given community of students.
The chapter tests the hypothesis that schools which spatially compete more are also more
efficient. Testing whether performance is responsive to market forces is of crucial interest.
I use sophisticated econometrics techniques, including two geographical instruments (slope
and ruggedness). The results show no effect of spatially determined competition on value-
added. Disaggregating the results reveals that private schools do respond to market-oriented
incentives, but the voucher system does not. I investigated next the potential reasons behind
the underperformance of the voucher system. Schumpeterian (Schumpeter, 1934) competi-
tion for and in the market is related to these outcomes. In addition, non or slow response of
parents to “poorly performing” schools and a “too low” voucher are claimed as the proposed
causes of this poor functioning of the voucher system. Nonetheless, this effect is the spatial
economics equivalent of the literature finding that controlling for peer effects, socio-economic
background and non-spatial selection bias results in the difference between private voucher
and public voucher schools either disappearing or persisting only for selected groups; see for
instance Howell et al. (2001) and, for Chile, Hsieh and Urquiola (2002). I find two groups
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that are better off with the spatially determined competition: the first group is pupils with
families that have more income, more family education, a pc and internet at home. The
second group is pupils in smaller schools with higher achievements in standardized testing
and with median dispersion. This last result could be of policy interest, because a system
that increases or reduces the dispersion in the composition of schools could imply large im-
provements or detriments in school educational productivity. According to my results, the
best system does not select too much, but also does not include too much.
In the student riot chapter I exploited a police report on occupied schools in the so-called
Chilean Winter to test the hypothesis that a decrease in attendance has a causal effect in
reducing students’ performance in standardized tests. The Chilean Winter was a social
outburst of indignation in which the protagonists were pupils who decided to occupy their
schools, stage repeated walkouts or simply protest on the streets. When occupying their
schools, the pupils forced cancelled days of schools. Thanks to a published police report, I
can identify 205 schools that were occupied during the revolts. My evidence indicates that
the performance of pupils affected by missed days of school dropped nearly 5%, which is a
huge number in terms of its cost in human capital.
Finally, in the chapter on maternal surrogacy, I addressed the implications of the new
fertility technique in which another woman carries and gives birth to a baby for a couple
who want—but usually physically cannot have—a child. Surrogacy remains relatively rare
but has provoked heated and passionate public debates. This is the first quantitative spatial
policy evaluation of surrogacy. Using, until now, elusive data from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, I back calculate for the first time the incidence of surrogacy for
each US state and for the period 2001-2013. Fertility clinics must report to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, and in 2001 a new question on the percentage of use of
gestational carriers made the survey the first detailed register of surrogacy. I then studied
surrogacy legislation and classified it as criminalized, unenforceable, probably unenforce-
able, uncertain, probably enforceable and enforceable according to the degree that the state
legislation enforces the listing of the commissioning parents in the birth certificate; a key
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step for surrogacy to be viable (because otherwise the surrogate mother has all the nego-
tiation power). I explored surrogacy as a causal variable and used changes in legislation
as an instrument for surrogacy whose exogeneity I defended both theoretically and with a
smooth balancing test. Then I calculated the Local Average Treatment Effect of surrogacy
running an IV procedure. I found that one additional standard deviation in surrogacy rate
causes an increase of 5.38% standard deviation in marriage and 4.21% standard deviation in
divorce and a decrease of -1.63% standard deviation in births and -3.16% standard deviation
in out-of-wedlock births. I tested the results with at least 6 robustness checks, including lag
outcomes and alternative “hoax” causal variables. I also analysed the case of Illinois where
a surrogacy friendly statute was introduced in 2005. I scrutinized the legislation adopted to
facilitate surrogacy, and I implemented a synthetic control approach to test the causal link
of this legislative innovation and the number of surrogacies. The results are reassuring, and
I performed a series of placebo tests to contrast the results, including placebo-in-outcome,
-in-region, and -in-time. In conclusion, my results show that surrogacy has real, meaningful
and measurable effects in vital statistics which must be carefully considered by policy makers.
To sum up, in this thesis I hope to have exhibited a distinct contribution to the knowledge
of education and Family Economics from an Economic Geography perspective. I also hope to
have produced original evidence with the discovery of new facts and relations via my exercise
of independent critical power, which is the most valuable asset of a researcher in Academia.
These results encompass the unresponsiveness of the voucher system to spatially determined
competition, the downward effect in performance of students who participated in student
riots and the implications of maternal surrogacy on vital statistics. In doing so, I have
presented a critical assessment of the relevant literature. This assessment encompassed even
the literature on surrogacy, which still holds significant unexplored territory. I have carefully
overviewed the methods of research as well, with strong emphasis on causal inference and
with an introduction and critical discussion on the stylized facts of my chapters. I have
presented my findings and an open discussion of them for each paper. In each case, the
main results have been followed by an additional critical discussion of their implications,
including external and internal validity and profuse robustness checks. I have also confirmed
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the results with new and independent identification strategies to reassess the data from as
many view points as possible to corroborate each defensible result.
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